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Anacrusis	
 
Not unlike any other dissertation ever written, this one was supposed to be about 
something else. My Ph.D. position was made available by the LARM project, a 
research project spanning 10 research and cultural institutions, the goal of which 
was to develop a digital research infrastructure for Danish radio. The topic called for 
was user contribution to digital cultural heritage archives and the candidate was 
asked to deliver an evaluation of “best practice” accompanied by an analysis from 
the perspective of philosophy of technology. As will no doubt become clear, user 
contribution plays an exceedingly small part in what follows. And as will also become 
apparent, any recommendation for best practice has been reduced to a critical 
stance with regard to the object at hand. 
 These changes of scope and path are, of course, common and necessary 
parts of the process of concocting a dissertation. As someone kindly remarked at the 
beginning of my employ: Now you have written the project proposal you needed to 
get funding, next you need to describe the dissertation that you are actually going to 
write. But one thing is the difference in tastes and desires between the candidate and 
the funding organs, another is the legitimate academic reason for diverging from the 
given path. In the present case, it soon became apparent that the question of user 
contribution to digital cultural heritage archives took far too much for granted. What is 
a user? Such an entity could possibly be defined from a technological perspective as 
the actual person referenced by a digital profile within a computational environment, 
which could then be defined as specific interface behaviour adapted to a dataset, 
defining characteristics of an ID in a user database. Even within this narrow 
technological perspective, however, questions regarding interface behaviours and 
database operations abound. Just the relation between profile and “actual person” 
should give us pause. What is an actual person? What is the relation between the 
traces left by such a person and the aggregation of a profile? Foucault once wrote: 
“Plus d’un, comme moi sans doute, écrivent pour n’avoir plus de visage. Ne me 
demandez pas qui je suis et ne me dites pas de rester le même : c’est une morale 
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d’état civil; elle régit nos papiers. Qu’elle nous laisse libres quand il s’agit d’écrire.”1 
Is the profile the computational establishment of an inescapable identity of the user 
as writing author? 
 It was once famously claimed that “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a 
dog.”2 The profile was presumed to be radically severed from any necessary 
inferences of actual identity; it was the supposed freedom from the obligation to 
prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet. Or at least it was the supposed 
contingent relation between face and subject. This assumption collapsed 
spectacularly like an all too rapidly cooled soufflé, however, when, in 2006, New York 
Times reporters, Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller Jr. identified AOL subscriber no. 
4417749 as 62 year old widow Thelma Arnold simply by examining search 
keywords.3  
 Instead of continuing in this vain in a no doubt vain attempt to deconstruct the 
original question, a deconstruction that would leave the question unanswered, the 
present dissertation limits itself to questioning certain imaginaries regarding the 
digital cultural heritage archive and the related questions of heritage, the subject and 
community. What is, then, a digital cultural heritage archive? This is the deceptively 
simple question taken as the point of departure for the present dissertation. The 
question, of course, contains numerous other questions: What is an archive? What is 
cultural heritage? How does one inherit culture? And what difference does it make if 
the archive is digital or not? The dissertation aims to explore the above questions, 
not to answer them individually, but to ask concerning the digital cultural heritage 
archive over five chapters, each considering the digital cultural heritage archive in 
specific instantiations and in a specific mode. 
 The first chapter describes the archive as a kingdom of relations, i.e. it 
proposes an analysis of the distributions inherent to archives in general and the 
cultural heritage archive – whether digital and analogue – in particular. “Distributions” 
is not meant to indicate relations between actors or entities endowed with various 
                                                            
1 Foucault, L’Archéologie Du Savoir, 28. 
2 This famous statement was the caption of a cartoon by Peter Steiner published by The New Yorker 
on July 5, 1993. The joke has been repeated more recently with regard to the tracking of objects on 
the Internet of things: “On the Internet of Things, nobody knows you’re a fridge.” 
http://www.secmeme.com/2014/02/on-internet-of-things-nobody-knows.html 
3 Nicholas Carr tells the story better than I do; see Carr, The Big Switch, Rewiring the World, from 
Edison to Google, 185–186. 
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characteristics or attributes of power but, rather, the operations through which 
objects, actors and the rules governing their interactions constitute and are 
constituted by the archive. The chapter thus provides an initial cartography or 
diagram of the relations between the archival object, the archival order, the subject 
and the other. Although the chapter engages in a discussion with numerous 
theoretical positions, it takes Derrida as its main protagonist by examining the 
archive as a topo-nomology, a specific topos both governing and constituted by an 
archival law determining the different modes of inclusion of objects and access of 
subjects permitted by the archive.  
 The second chapter performs an archaeological analysis of the digital cultural 
heritage archive as an object of formations, i.e. as a structure created and sustained 
by a convergence of two separate formations: 1. Technological development as the 
material condition of possibility of the digital cultural heritage archive; 2. The 
discourse of cultural politics that provides the funding and the legitimising vocabulary 
of digital cultural heritage archives. As indicated by the archaeological mode, the 
chapter takes Foucault as its guide in examining the archive of the archive, i.e. the 
historical conditions of possibility for such a term as the digital cultural heritage 
archive to arise.  
 The third chapter attempts an analysis of the digital cultural heritage archive 
as three-fold Thing. Taking Heidegger’s notion of the four-fold of the thing as its 
inspiration, the purpose of the chapter is to go beyond the archaeological description 
of historical formations as conditions of possibility and consider the current strategic 
investments, interventions and interruptions in the space opened by the digital. 
These new imaginaries are analysed as systems of Access, Evidence and Control – 
access as the newfound availability and emancipation of the digital object, evidence 
as the cognitive approach marshalled in response to the surge of data and control as 
the new ruling practice, whether academic, ethical or critical.  
 The fourth chapter takes Alexander Galloway’s presentation of two different 
readings of the word techne as a point of departure for an exploration of larm.fm, the 
research infrastructure developed by the LARM project. Larm.fm is presented in 
accordance with the two readings of techne as, respectively, a medium with specific 
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formal characteristics and a dispositif, i.e. the bringing together of heterogeneous 
elements in an operation determining the character of each element. 
 The fifth chapter engages in a political analysis of the community of memory 
established by the cultural heritage functions of the archive. Cultural heritage, of 
course, has to do with both culture as artefacts and culture as the community 
congregating around such artefacts. The purpose of this final chapter is to 
investigate the ways in which the DCHA can be said to go beyond mere preservation 
and participate in the constitution of a community in the specific temporal conjunction 
of the past as a resource to drive the present into the future. This temporal 
conjunction is problematized with regard to the notion of the contemporary and ways 
in which such a time may become emancipatory. 
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1.	A	kingdom	of	relations	
 
“The rulers are the mediators. They 
arbitrate and exercise dominion in 
the middle of a kingdom of relations. 
The mediator is the one who takes 
care, who directs or leads with 
attention to the entities at play.” 
 
Galloway: "Love of the middle" p. 65 
 
 
1.1	Opening	the	archive	
1.1.1	The	notion	of	the	archive	
 
In order to finally begin, neither at the beginning nor with the archive itself, but with 
the word “archive,” we could follow Derrida (why not?) in beginning with the ἀρχή of 
the word “archive” as commencement and commandment: the sequential and 
juridical orders of place.4 The archive is the putting in its place of an object, its 
introduction in a system of identification and classification: “Une science de l’archive 
doit inclure la théorie de cette institutionnalisation, c’est-à-dire à la fois de la loi qui 
commence par s’y inscrire et du droit qui l’autorise.”5  
 If we follow Derrida’s lead we must consider the founding law, the law 
governing the selection of what to include and the very establishment of the place of 
inclusion but also the law of access: who has access to the included objects and how 
is this access performed: “Nul pouvoir politique sans contrôle de l’archive, sinon de 
la mémoire. La démocratisation effective se mesure toujours à ce critère essentiel : 
la participation et l’accès à l’archive, à sa constitution et à son interprétation.”6  
                                                            
4 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 11. 
5 Ibid. 15. 
6 Ibid. 15 n.1. 
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 This political aspect of archival control does not mean, however, as Ariella 
Azoulay would wrongly have it, that the walls of Derrida’s archive are necessarily 
guarded by sentries (άρχοντες) “distancing those wishing to enter […].”7 The 
sentries are most certainly there in Derrida, and they do prohibit uninhibited access, 
but they are as much an opening for engagement as they are a closure. Azoulay’s 
concept of the well-guarded archive is closer to that of Wolfgang Ernst’s bureaucratic 
archive meant for legal systemic feedback and not cultural reactivation: “Exactly as 
long as its records cannot be accessed by the general public for the use of cultural 
knowledge, a memory agency can be called archive.”8 For Ernst, the distributed 
accessibility of the Internet is radically at odds with the nature of the archive and “[the 
computer] effaces the resistance to access characteristic of the traditional archive 
thus far […]”9  
 Azoulay’s view of Derrida’s archive as fundamentally closed is based on the 
claim that he overlooks the new archival state of affairs brought about by digital 
media:  
 
““Archive fever” is not simply a problematic translation of a book title, 
Derrida’s Mal d’archive. It is a real phenomenon that Derrida ignores. It is 
the result of numerous individual initiatives of creating new archives and 
depositories, and of claiming the right to re-arrange and use existing 
ones. Radical changes brought about by the new social (civil) media 
have turned these initiatives into a contagious and irreversible trend, 
whereby archival procedures, such as collecting, extracting and 
cataloguing, can be practiced through these new media in a way that 
contests the monopoly, let alone the authority or prerogatives, of official 
archival agents and institutions.”10 
  
 Contrary to Azoulay’s claim, Derrida’s questioning of the archive is, in fact, 
directly and explicitly engendered by the challenge to archival order and power 
                                                            
7 Azoulay, “Archive.” 
8 Ernst, “Cultural Archive versus Technomathematical Storage,” 64. 
9 Ernst, “Dis/continuities: Does the Archive Become Metaphorical in Multi-Media Space?” 108. 
10 Azoulay, “Archive.” 
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posed by new media and the consequent opening of not only the archive but also of 
new political futures. With his death in 2004, Derrida just missed the advent of the 
“social (civil) media” mentioned by Azoulay, but he nonetheless performs a relevant 
analysis with regard to the political and juridical consequences of the dominant new 
media of his time:11 “[...] à un rythme inédit, de façon quasi instantanée, cette 
possibilité instrumentale de production, d’impression, de conservation et de 
destruction de l’archive ne peut pas ne pas s’accompagner de transformations 
juridiques et donc politiques.”12  
 Derrida, Azoulay and Ernst all agree, however, that something new is afoot: 
The archive is challenged by its new media foundation. Azoulay and Ernst both 
consider the new as a result of an epochal shift. For Azoulay, “radical changes [are] 
brought about by the new social (civil) media.” For Ernst, the era of archives has past 
and been replaced by media of transmission, ultimately characterised by the rise of 
the Internet.13 Derrida, finally, acknowledges the importance of the new media but 
insists on analysing their impact within the same horizon as traditional archives. 
Freud’s circumcision and E-mail are both traces made by specific technologies of 
impression within the same overarching archival framework and not insignia of two 
radically separate eras or spheres.  
 We shall return to the possibility of Azoulay’s notion of civil media in chapter 5, 
but for now, a fundamental difference between Derrida and Ernst can be established 
by their respective perceptions of the word “archive”. Leaning on Derrida once more, 
we could claim that Ernst operates with a concept of the archive, whereas Derrida 
operates with a notion of the archive.14 The concept is assured in its consistent 
relation to the object. It knows what an archive is and can measure any empirical 
                                                            
11 In Mal d’archive, E-mail is the privileged example (pp. 34-35, but he also mentions numerous 
others: e.g. “des multimédia et du CDrom” (Prière d’insérer), “micro-informatisation, éléctronisation, 
computerisation, etc.” (p. 32), “de cartes de crédit téléphonique MCI ou ATT, de magnétophones 
portables, d’ordinateurs, d’imprimantes, de Fax, de télévision, de téléconférences […]” (p. 33) and 
even the “répondeur automatique” (p. 100). 
12 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 35. 
13 “[…] aus der Ahnung heraus, daß die Epoche der Archive gerade zuende [sic!] geht […] [A]m Ende 
wird die Einsicht stehen, daß wir uns von einer alteuropäischen Kultur, die das Speichern privilegiert, 
hin zu einer Medienkultur der permanenten Übertragung fortbewegen.” Ernst, Das Rumoren der 
Archive, 13–14. “[…] an die Stelle von Bibliothek und Archiv tritt ein Begriff der generalisierten Post 
namens Internet.” Ibid. 15. 
14 “J’oppose ici la rigueur du concept au vague ou à l’imprécision ouverte, à la relative indétermination 
d’une telle notion.” Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 51. 
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object by this standard. The concept is thus itself an archival law governing the in- or 
exclusion of archival objects with regard to an archive of archives. This clear 
measure is also what allows the establishment of an epochal shift: What the archive 
was, is no longer.  
 Although Ernst works with an epochal shift, the archive still operates as the 
steady horizon allowing such periodization. The archive may be no longer but it 
nonetheless remains the measure for its successor. The archive now mainly persists 
in the form of metaphor: “Der Begriff des Archivs ist dabei zu einer kulturtechnischen 
Universalmetapher avanciert, zu einer Begriffsmünze, die durch lauter Gebrauch bis 
zur Unkenntlichkeit abgegriffen ist.”15 “The media-archaeological task, then, is to re-
think archival terminology in order to embrace a multi-media concept of the 
archive.”16 The archive only persists metaphorically and thus wrongfully and it is the 
task of media archaeology to develop a vocabulary adequate to the new situation at 
hand. So, although the archive is no longer, it remains the horizon that allows for the 
description of its historical conceptual obsolescence as well as the remedy for this 
obsolescence.17  
 The notion of the archive, on the other hand, is a vague impression that 
changes along with the technologies of impression. The notion of the archive is an 
impression of certain techniques and practices of impression. From the point of view 
of the notion, the concept remains inadequate18 and ignorant of its own inadequacy 
and there would, indeed, be no archivable concept of the archive.19 The concept 
remains inadequate because, according to the notion, the archive is not a particular 
mode of inclusion and a strictly legal mode of access. The concept will remain 
forever separated from its ideal referent. Ernst claims to know what the archive is 
and yet the archive haunts a time where it is no longer. According to the notion, the 
                                                            
15 Ernst, Das Rumoren der Archive, 7. 
16 Ernst, “Dis/continuities: Does the Archive Become Metaphorical in Multi-Media Space?” 110. 
17 Any presentation of multiple positions will risk simplification of the respective protagonists. Ernst 
does himself tend to mention the archive in contemporary contexts. At the Rewriting social memory-
conference in Oslo (December 2014), e.g., he objected to David Berry’s notion of the post-archival on 
the grounds that archival functions within our digital media persist and remain poorly understood since 
we tend to focus our attention on interaction and thus the non-archival. So the archive is no longer 
what it was, but an aspect of it keeps haunting us, even within digital media. Media-archaeology is the 
attempt to lay that spectre in earth. 
18 “[…] le concept d’archive ne peut pas ne pas garder en lui, comme tout concept, un poids 
d’impensé.” Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 52. 
19 Ibid. 60. 
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archive is not a specific order but the very fact that orders of inclusion and access 
exist.  
 Ernst’s texts are riddled with categorical proclamations that this and that is not 
an archive and that the word “archive” mainly persists as inflation of the archival 
metaphor. Against the metaphor of the archive, he presents the memorial 
cybernetics of objectivised archives.20 The Derridean notion would be hard pressed 
to make similar claims and distinctions. Instead it would ask: How is this an archive? 
How does the archival fever operate in this instance? The problem with using Ernst 
as the guide for examining our initial question – “What is a digital cultural heritage 
archive?” – is that the Ernstian answer par excellence would be: It isn’t! For Ernst, 
the “digital cultural heritage archive” is a contradiction in terms. 
 For Derrida, on the other hand, if there is trace there is archive and he spent his 
career demonstrating that traces and archives abide by certain (grammato-)logics. In 
order to avoid beginning with a specific concept of the archive as a pre-established 
answer to the present questioning of what a digital cultural heritage archive might be, 
we shall begin, then, with this vague Derridean notion, not as a vague answer but as 
a means of questioning the operational logics of the archive. 
 
1.1.2	Archive,	library,	canon	
 
Out of this vague beginning we can distil three distinct aspects inherent to the word 
“archive”: 1. Inclusion of the object, 2. The possibility of access to the object and 3. 
The quality of that access, e.g. whether or not access can be used for Ernst’s 
“cultural knowledge” or Azoulay’s “civil” engagement. We shall name these three 
aspects consignation, interpretation and heritage: Consignation as not just inclusion 
but a gathering together in a specific whole; Interpretation as the both legal and 
technical accessibility entailed in any hermeneutic engagement with the archive and, 
finally, Heritage as the ways in which the traces of the past play an active role in the 
cultural, scholarly, “civil” or we could even say political present.  
                                                            
20 This is an explicit part of Ernst’s media archaeological perspective “der die memoriale Kybernetik 
realer, institutionell und medial verdinglichter Archive (aller Virtualisierung zum Trotz) in den Blick 
gerät.”  Ernst, Das Rumoren der Archive, 8–9. 
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 In Ernst’s traditional bureaucratic archive of Prussian origin, consignation is 
based solely on provenance.21 Well-defined rules of belonging include objects into 
the archival whole in the correct chronological succession. Ernst’s traditional archive 
is restricted to consignation of the trace or document and denies public interpretation 
and thus heritage. The archive is the “nicht-diskursiven Gedächtnis zum Feedback 
einer Verwaltung.”22 Any divergence from the strict rules of provenance and any 
opening of the archive toward interpretation would transform the archive into a 
library, “Bibliothek,” as a “diskursiv gefaßten Gedächtnis eines Kollektivs.”23 Ernst’s 
archive is thus a matter of cybernetics and not of hermeneutics.24 
  Aleida Assmann’s distinction between canon and archive aligns nicely with this. 
Canon consists of the active acts and efforts of memory to keep a given past present 
in mind, and archive is the passive preservation of the past as past.25 For Assmann 
as for Ernst, the archive is inert knowledge: “It is stored and potentially available, but 
it is not interpreted.”26 Contrary to the canon, which attributes a certain aura to its 
“cultural working memory,” the archive destroys the aura of its “cultural reference 
memory.” Assmann’s canon is here equivalent to Ernst’s discourse. Canonical aura 
is a matter of discursive valuation whereas the archive is an auraless matter of non-
discursive reference.  
 Ernst and Assmann seem to agree that archival consignation is both the 
establishment of a concrete spatial entity and a principle of practice, both organised 
space and organising strategy. More than just the virtual backdrop for an actualised 
canon, Assmann’s archive is also a very concrete “unhallowed bureaucratic space of 
a clean and neatly organized repository.”27 For Assmann, the difference between 
canon and archive is the one between activity and passivity, circulation and 
preservation, memory and storage. For Ernst, the closed and open spaces of the 
                                                            
21 “When closed data blocks migrate according to well-defined rules from production site to storage 
site and are stored in their original context, the archival principle of provenance (the Prussian archive 
tradition) prevails.” Ernst, Digital Memory and the Archive, 85–86. The alternative to this Prussian 
archive is the French archive organised according to pertinence (“Pertinenz”), see Ernst, Im Namen 
von Geschichte : Sammeln, Speichern, Er/Zählen : Infrastrukturelle Konfigurationen Des Deutschen 
Gedächtnisses, 45. 
22 Ernst, Das Rumoren der Archive, 18. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Ibid. 29. 
25 Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” 98. 
26 Ibid. 193. 
27 Ibid. 102. 
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archive and the library, respectively, are equally practical modes: “Das 
Mißverständnis liegt darin, daß Foucault Archiv schreibt und Bibliothek praktiziert.”28 
Foucault’s archive, i.e. the conditions of possibility for the epochal meaningfulness of 
a given statement29 is, for Ernst, on the side of cultural knowledge and hence, on the 
side of library, not as space or institution but as practice.  
 For the present purpose, the fundamental difference between Assmann and 
Ernst is one of focus. Where Assmann focuses on the conditions of possibility for the 
establishment of canon and its role as support for a cultural identity, Ernst examines 
the materiality and technologies of culture as distinct from cultural or historical 
knowledge – cultural memory vs. technologies of inscription.30 For Ernst, narrating 
the archive, transforming it from its non-discursive origins to the discursivity of the 
library, is already a betrayal of the cold media archaeological gaze which, like 
Friedrich Kittler, is more interested in how the real ceases not to inscribe itself in the 
substrate or is transcribed in the symbolic and the imaginary than in what these real 
inscriptions or symbolic or imaginary transcriptions may mean.31  
 So while for Ernst, the operation of the archive is distinct form the inclusion in 
the canon of cultural knowledge and can only serve such knowledge at the expense 
of its status as archive, Assmann’s archive keeps the archival object in a state of 
latency, it “stores materials in the intermediary state of “no longer” and “not yet.””32 
This latency then has a dual function: It can serve as future reference for historical 
scholarship and it can serve as “an important tool for power.”33 These functions are 
handled by the political and the historical archive, respectively, and are entirely 
compatible with Ernst’s framework. But “Elements of the canon can also recede into 
                                                            
28 Ernst, Das Rumoren der Archive, 18–19. 
29 “L’archive, ce n’est pas ce qui sauvegarde, malgré sa fuite immédiate, l’événement de l’énoncé et 
conserve, pour les mémoires futures, son état civil d’évadé; c’est ce qui, à la racine même de 
l’énoncé-événement, et dans le corps où il se donne, définit d’entrée de jeu le système de son 
énonçabilité.” Foucault, L’Archéologie Du Savoir, 170. 
30 “An die Stelle historischen Verstehens tritt die Analyse von Materialitäten der Kultur und ihrer 
Techniken.” Ernst, Das Rumoren der Archive, 48. 
31 Cf. e.g. Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 7–33. This cold anti-hermeneutic gaze has been 
criticised for taking a profoundly anti-political stance, e.g.: “The problem is that such a focus on 
machines, despite making a very refined point about the technical conditions of perception, does not 
effectively connect this to themes of political economy, or for instance subjectivity and subjectification. 
These are technologies that contribute to the archaeology of cognitive capitalism, but such links have 
not really been elaborated yet.” Parikka, What Is Media Archaeology? 133. 
32 Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” 103. 
33 Ibid. 
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the archive, while elements of the archive may be recovered and reclaimed for the 
canon.”34 Assmann embraces this dynamics between canon and archive, while Ernst 
seems hell-bent on resisting it.    
 
1.1.3	Archival	interpretation,	spectrality	and	heritage	
 
For Derrida, consignation is the archival gathering in a single ideal configuration.35 
The archive is not just a container of heterogeneous objects. Via the including 
procedures of identification and classification, the heterogeneous traces are bound 
together by their inscription in a system of differences, which bestows upon them a 
certain belonging36 and a certain genealogical relation.37 We could say that archival 
consignation establishes, “en rassemblant les signes,”38 a certain domestic relation 
of kin and kind. And as assemblage of signs, archival configuration is, according to 
Derrida, inseparable from its hermeneutic aspect. 
 The act of consignation gathers heterogeneous elements in a whole and, in 
addition to the distribution of elements within such a whole or home, archival law – 
the nomos of the archival topo-nomology, its oiko-nomia – decides the permitted 
level of access. Derrida is aware of the difference between the traditional closed 
archive and public access, between Ernst’s concepts of archive and library, but 
considers them two different institutionalisations of the archive. 
 Access is, for Derrida as for Ernst and Assmann, a matter of interpretation. As 
already mentioned: “La démocratisation effective se mesure toujours à ce critère 
essentiel : la participation et l’accès à l’archive, à sa constitution et à son 
                                                            
34 Ibid. 104. 
35 “La consignation tend à coordonner un seul corpus, en un système ou une synchronie dans 
laquelle tous les éléments articulent l’unité d’une configuration idéale.” Derrida, Mal d’archive, une 
impression freudienne, 14. Of course, this configuration is only seemingly ideal as already noted by 
the younger Derrida: “[L’écriture] crée le sens en le consignant, en le confiant à une gravure, à un 
sillon, à un relief, à une surface que l’on veut transmissible à l’infini.” Derrida, “Force et Signification,” 
24. The inscription is supposed to be the eternally transmissible carrier of an ideal meaning, which is 
only produced by this inscription although never as entirely present. Cf. also the use of the verb 
“consigner” in Derrida, Jacques. La Voix et Le Phénomène, 26 and 90-91. 
36 See Derrida, De la grammatologie, 164. 
37 See Ibid. 182. 
38 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 14. 
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interprétation.”39 Constitution and interpretation are aspects that are irreducible to 
one another but are nonetheless profoundly linked. No constitution, for Derrida, 
without the interpretations of kin and kind. “Le premier archiviste institue l’archive 
comme elle doit l’être, c’est-â-dire non seulement en exhibant le document, mais en 
l’établissant. Il le lit, l’interprète, le classe.”40 Classification and interpretation 
establish the archival object as part in a whole. The particular object and that same 
object as part of an archive are not identical. 
 The effect of this difference is an aspect of archival interpretation, which Derrida 
examines via the Freudian notion of “deferred obedience” ("nachträglichen 
Gehorsams"). In his reading of Yosef Yerushalmi’s Freud’s Moses, Judaism 
terminable and interminable, he quotes at length:  
 
“In writing Moses and Monotheism [Freud] belatedly obeys the father and 
fulfills his mandate by returning to the intensive study of the Bible, but at 
the same time he maintains his independence from his father through his 
interpretation. He rejects the “material truth” of the biblical narrative but 
rejoices in his discovery of its “historical truth.””41  
 
Freud’s distinction between material and historical truth is crucial. We can say that 
“material truth” is the notion that the particular object in itself holds a specific 
authentic meaning, the intended meaning of origin. “Historical truth,” on the other 
hand, is linked to “un nouveau concept de la vérité”42 and thus also a new scholar as 
interpreter of that truth. The traditional scholar, the scholar of “material truth,” 
pretends to a constative and theoretical neutrality43, an interpretation of an object 
unaffected by its new archival consignation. In this regard, we could say that Ernst is 
a traditional scholar of new “material truth”. He aspires to bringing the constative 
neutrality of the old archive to the actual archival operations behind the merely 
                                                            
39 Ibid. 15 n.1. 
40 Ibid. 89. 
41 Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses, Judaism Terminable and Interminable, 78, quoted in French in Derrida, 
Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 96. 
42 Ibid. 67. 
43 Ibid. 88. 
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metaphorical archival aspects of media’s technological establishment of material 
truth and then leaves the haunting hermeneutics of historical truth to others. 
 For such are the effects of the archival consignation that requires new 
interpretation, a new concept of truth and a new scholar: “[L]a structure de l’archive 
est spectrale.”44 Like the ghost of Hamlet’s father, the archive is a paradoxical 
incorporation. It is both present and absent, visible and invisible. Just as the concept 
of the archive is burdened by the weight of the unthought-of, the archive and all that 
it contains is haunted by an inadequacy: “l’inadéquation à soi”: “The body is with the 
King, but the King is not with the body. The King, is a thing.”45 
  This inadequation is the difference between that which leaves the impression 
and the trace of that impression – between the event and its effects, between the 
eidos of expression and its impression in writing. This material impression, this 
hypomnema, is the externalisation of memory, which is haunted by the absence of 
its origin. And this haunted externalisation is then internalised in the archival 
consignation. Like writing, the archive produces and incorporates its own lack; it is 
the presence of an absence, which results in the paradoxical spectral incorporation. 
 A patient reading would bring to light in Derrida’s early work the germinal 
structure of all of his later notions of the archive and spectrality. Such an 
engagement would, however, test the patience of the reader of the present argument 
and I will thus limit myself to referencing this earlier work to the extent that it furthers 
the argument at hand and then leave the genealogical demonstration to others. But 
for the present purpose, it is practical to consider consignation, the inclusion in the 
archive, in the light of De la grammatologie: “Penser l’unique dans le système, l’y 
inscrire, tel est le geste de l’archi-écriture, l’archi-violence […]”46.  
 The act of consignation, as described in Mal d’archive, is haunted by the exact 
same violence as in De la grammatologie. It is the inscription into the system of 
differences, of classification, “le système des appellations,”47 where the ideal 
configuration is both created and dislocated by this classifying inclusion: “[...] la 
                                                            
44 Ibid. 132. 
45 Hamlet as quoted in Derrida, Spectres de Marx, l’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle 
Internationale, 29. 
46 Derrida, De la grammatologie, 164. 
47 Ibid. 162. 
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relation généalogique et la classification sociale sont le point de suture de l’archi-
écriture, condition de la langue (dite orale), et de l’écriture au sens commun.”48  
 This paradoxical incorporation of the hypomnemata, this structural spectrality of 
the archive is what renders both possible and necessary the aspect of heritage: “Un 
héritage ne se rassemble jamais, il n’est jamais un avec lui-même. Son unité 
présumée, s’il en est, ne peut consister qu’en l’injonction de réaffirmer en 
choisissant.”49 Only by rejecting any claim to material truth of the archive and 
engaging in a never-ending and ever-rejoicing (re-)affirmation of historical truth, can 
Derrida’s new scholar inherit a future which necessarily takes the form of a differed 
obedience of the past.  
 We have already noted that Derrida and Ernst differ fundamentally in their 
notions of interpretation and thus inheritance with regard to the archive. This 
difference can be further pinpointed with regard to spectrality: “The media-
archaeological exercise is to be aware of the fact that at each technologically given 
moment we are dealing with media not humans, that we are not speaking with the 
dead but dealing with dead media that operate.”50 They both focus on inscriptions but 
where Ernst investigates technological inscriptions and transcriptions of the real, 
Derrida analyses persistent re-inscriptions of the real as a consequence of the 
dynamics between consignation, interpretation and heritage, i.e. the non-coincidence 
of the trace as the opening up of a spectral past from the future (à-venir). Ernst 
examines the operations of the tracing of the trace, Derrida how the trace operates 
as a consequence of being traced. 
 
1.1.4	The	ghosts	of	their	lusts	and	lives	
 
The archived object speaks of a time that is no longer. Or, rather, the archive holds a 
multiplicity of voices speaking of a multiplicity of times that never existed in the form 
of a single consistent origin of the object. As a brief example we could take the first 
folio edition of Shakespeare’s works kept at Oxford’s Bodleian Library. This edition is 
                                                            
48 Ibid. 182. 
49 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, l’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale, 40. 
50 Ernst, Digital Memory and the Archive, 183. 
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responsible for conveying much of that Shakespeherian Rag — it’s so elegant, so 
intelligent – to the present day canon.  
 In 2012, in spite of its being a less than rare edition, this particular copy was the 
object of a crowdfunding campaign called “Sprint for Shakespeare” seeking the 
volume’s digitisation. The reason for this effort was not to preserve a rare and early 
source of Shakespeare’s works but to preserve the traces impressed upon it: “Its 
unique marks of wear connect us with the tastes of early readers, and we can see 
how their hands have worn the pages of Romeo and Juliet almost to shreds, while 
leaving King John virtually pristine.”51  
 Because of the paradoxical incorporation, “l’inadéquation à soi,” the archive 
does not speak with a clear voice, it speaks with several. In addition to the multiple 
voices of Shakespeare – a collection otherwise published in four folio and several 
quarto editions, the spectral multiplicity of which is easily visible in the footnotes of 
the Arden Shakespeare editions – this particular instantiation of an oeuvre in multiple 
incorporations seems to whisper the desires that let Romeo and Juliet win the hearts 
of Oxford undergraduates by virtue of a certain amount of naughty bits. 
 Shakespeare himself as well as his oeuvre are spectral archives with multiple 
murmuring voices. Any engagement with the historical person or its written traces 
requires affirmations and choices of inheritance: “On n’hérite jamais sans s’expliquer 
avec du spectre et, dès lors, avec plus d’un spectre.”52 And such an inheritance 
again influences the archive: “[…] l’interprétation de l’archive […] ne peut éclairer, 
lire, interpréter, établir son objet, à savoir un héritage donné, qu’en s’y inscrivant, 
c’est-à-dire en l’ouvrant et en l’enrichissant assez pour y prendre place de plein droit. 
Il n’y a pas de méta-archive.”53  
 We shall return to the question of the meta-archive. For now, let it suffice to see 
the Derridean notion of heritage as an equivalent, although far from identical, to the 
concept of canon. They are both results of an engagement with the archival object 
but where Assmann’s canon could be described as what we shall soon call doxa, i.e. 
what is generally accepted but without individual affirmation and choice, Derridean 
inheritance is the continued individual engagement with the hypomnemata in the 
                                                            
51 Bodleian Libraries, “The Bodleian’s First Folio | Sprint for Shakespeare”. 
52 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, l’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale, 46. 
53 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 108. 
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form of an ever-necessary reaffirmation and choice. What better example of the re-
inscription into the archive of archival interpretation, choice and affirmation than the 
worn pages of the Bodleian first folio copy of Romeo and Juliet? The interpretation 
and heritage of the readers enrich the archive and, in this case, the archive 
transcends the cover of the particular book on the Bodleian shelves. The inscriptions 
of desire leave a trace in the entire Shakespearian archive, if the entirety of such a 
thing may be imagined. They speak of a literary taste and of university life. The 
ghosts of the readers join the multiple ghosts of author and work in establishing and 
opening of the archival object and the archive itself. 
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1.2	Depicting	the	archive	
 
“Ich glaube, daß dieser von mir nur 
ein einziges Mal gesehene, in 
meiner Vorstellung aber immer 
phantastischer und ungeheuerlicher 
gewordene Film den Titel Toute la 
mémoire du monde trug und daß er 
gemacht war von Alain Resnais. 
Nicht selten beschäftigte mich 
damals die Frage, ob ich mich in 
dem von einem leisen Summen, 
Rascheln und Räuspern erfüllten 
Bibliothekssaal auf der Insel der 
Seligen oder, im Gegenteil, in einer 
Strafkolonie befand […]” 
 
Sebald: Austerlitz pp. 371-372. 
 
 
1.2.1	Depiction	as	object	of	analysis	
 
Now that we are getting to the beginning of a notion of the archive as 
commencement and law, as spectre and heritage, let us take the less abstract 
approach and look at a concrete entity which could, if we stick to the notion and 
abandon the concept, be called an archive. In his short film essay from 1956, Toute 
la mémoire du monde, commissioned by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
depicting the old Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) in rue de Richelieu in 
Paris, Alain Resnais engaged in a both humorous and somewhat disturbing depiction 
of the archives of human memory.  
 Before we begin, however, we should take pause and consider such a film as 
Toute la mémoire du monde as object of analysis or, rather, as source material for 
an analysis of the BNF as archive. What weight does this particular filmic statement 
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have with regard to the present context? We cannot, of course, consider it an 
objective documentation of the BNF. The film is a trace or an impression of the BNF, 
but not of the BNF as such. Although it contains facts in the form of department 
names, content lists and descriptions of procedure, it cannot in and of itself be 
considered such a fact. The film is a statement with specific conditions of possibility, 
a historical context, individual and institutional intentions and aesthetic preferences 
and such diverse material conditions as funding, light and the imperative not to 
interrupt the daily workings of the depicted library operations. The film is in itself an 
archive in which its object is present but spectrally as a paradoxical incorporation. 
 The film was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and distributed 
by Pleiade Films, but was originally intended as a collaboration with RTF 
(Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française). The director of the department of periodicals, 
Jean Prinet, described the original RTF project proposal in ambiguous tones:  
 
“Nos impressions sont les suivantes : l’ensemble est intéressant, 
ingénieux, vivant.  
 Il y a des erreurs, des maladresses. Le ton est plutôt celui de la 
propagande, voire même à certains moments de la publicité, que celui 
qui conviendrait à un grand organisme français. […] Un tel film aurait un 
intérêt touristique, mais il passerait sous silence ou laisserait à l’arrière-
plan un aspect essentiel […] Si l’on veut que ce film corresponde plus 
exactement à la réalité, il faut insister davantage sur certaines activités 
typiques.”54 
 
Even before filming, the film was thus caught in a strategic tangle between the 
national promotional concerns of the foreign ministry, the media concerns of the RTF 
and the BNF’s concerns regarding public perception and recognition of their work. As 
stated by initially presumed producer Pierre Neurisse: “Il est donc indispensable de 
mettre en œuvre le maximum de moyens pour obtenir le film de prestige 
international qu’un tel sujet mérite.”55 And this was all before the intentions of Alain 
                                                            
54 Carou, “Toute la mémoire du monde, entre la commande et l’utopie,” 120. 
55 Quoted in Ibid. 122. 
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Resnais came into play, since the director at this point was supposed to be Jacques 
Baratier. 
 Analysing the BNF through the eyes of Resnais and all that influenced them, 
thus falls in line with our general method: analysing the possible conceptualisations 
of archives, their related imaginaries. It will, for the time being, contribute to the 
opening of the field of discussion. Hopefully, this particular conceptualising statement 
will prove its worth as a first introduction to some very concrete library or archival 
techniques as well as to the political implications of such techniques.  
 
1.2.2	From	plethora	to	pleroma	
 
In the final film, Resnais depicts the BNF in Paris as a fortress and a prison of words, 
allowing man the freedom to consult only selected treasures via an intricate archival 
system of storage and retrieval. But the initial image of the BNF is not one of ordered 
storage and hence facilitated retrieval. The point of departure is indiscernible form 
and prevalent darkness upon the face of the deep. The opening credits have as their 
background a focus shot of a camera in the midst of this subterranean chaos. Once 
the credits are over, the shot pans down and the camera turns to a microphone, thus 
initiating the voice over: “Parce que leur mémoire est courte, les hommes 
accumulent d’innombrables pense-bêtes.”56   
 The camera then tracks and pans over piles and jumbles of books, other print 
material, paintings and a turned-over wheel-less bicycle. The microphone reappears 
and the voice-over continues: “Devant ces soutes pleines à craquer, les hommes 
prennent peur, peur d’être submergé par cette multitude d’écrits, par cet amas de 
mots. Alors pour garantir leur liberté, ils construisent des forteresses.”57 
 
                                                            
56 “Toute la Mémoire du Monde (scénario),” 65. 
57 Ibid. 
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 The film thus begins by clearly stating its own technically constructed nature. 
The camera is presented quite ostensibly, it almost literally hangs on the words of 
the microphone – words without an embodied speaker that then seem to come from 
the recording device itself. Two spotlights connect different shots – the first by 
conspicuously blinding the camera, the second by taking over the light of the first 
spot in the first shot and letting it fade out in the second. This initial technical 
emphasis seems intent on presenting the film as a very particular view of the BNF, 
and not just as a normal walk through the straightforward yet interesting goings on at 
a national library. The focus is the technical relation between consignation, 
interpretation and heritage and the film acknowledges as much emphatically. 
 Immediately after the mention of fortresses, the film cuts to an external shot of 
the towered roof of the BNF. Several external shots follow, ending in a handheld 
walk around one of the domes.   
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The walking camera then enters the building, walking along pathways, following a 
library employee walking on a pathway above and below.  
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 This beginning establishes both a vertical and a horizontal axis. The vertical 
axis traces the tension between the formless deep and the organised summits of 
institutional power. And the horizontal axis traces the internal distributions between 
input, storage and output: ingest, index and interested inquiry. 
 The identity of the chaotic storage of the initial sequence is never made 
explicit, although the stone walls and the disorderly assemblage of goods indicate a 
cellar of some sort. In lack of identification, the viewer mainly gets an impression of 
abundance and neglect. The idea for this initial chaos followed a visit by Resnais and 
the script writer, Remo Forlani,58 to the cellars of the BNF and was expressed in the 
second version of the film’s synopsis, sent to the BNF officials for comments and 
approval:  
                                                            
58 Forlani himself claims that he had very little to do with the writing of Toute la mémoire du monde. 
“[…] je ne suis pour rien dans ce film. Pour rien. […] le commentaire signé Forlani sera largement 
réécrit par un autre chic type. Chris Marker.” Forlani, Toujours vif et joyeux !, 289–290. Other versions 
of the story only ascribe the film’s final paragraph to Marker (with Jean Cayrol) Liandrat-Guigues and 
Leutrat, Alain Resnais, liaisons secrètes, accords vagabonds, 67, but Resnais himself claimed that 
only the last phrase was written by Marker and that it was Marker alone: “Alles war von Forlani, bis 
auf den lezten Satz, der ist von Chris Marker. Deshalb wohl steht er auch im Abspann als »Magic 
Marker«.” Kämper & Tode, Chris Marker : Filmessayist, 212. Marker is only credited under “Avec la 
collaboration de” as “Chris and Magic Marker.” 
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“Cette réserve fantastique, cette cave où sont accumulés des objets qui 
semblent oubliés pour toujours, c’est le dernier sous-sol de la 
Bibliothèque Nationale : nous sommes donc ici en présence de trésors et 
ces trésors nous appartiennent. Ces papiers jaunis, ces trésors abîmés 
ne sont pas perdus. Ils sont là en attente. Le moment va venir où ils 
seront remis en circulation, où ils seront de nouveau utiles. Mais à quoi 
pourront-ils bien servir, quel sens y aura-t-il à les restaurer, à les tirer de 
l’oubli ? […] Ces objets, ces signes, notre mémoire ne les avait pas 
catalogués, répertoriés – c’est pourquoi « ils ne nous disent rien ».”59    
 
It is difficult to distinguish, here, between genuine excitement on behalf of Resnais 
and Forlani and strategic flattery of the institution. The claim that in the cellars of the 
BNF one is necessarily in the presence of treasures seems hyperbolic. But on the 
other hand, it is easy to imagine the excited encounter with this plethora of 
miscellanea and the hopes for what the circulation of such treasures may bring. But 
we should also notice that the silence of the objects, the fact that “ils ne nous disent 
rien,” springs from the lack of consignation. That which is not yet in the archive is 
unable to express anything but a spectral murmur.    
 There is thus a clear sense of both latent potential and need in this 
description. Even these tattered old books and stacks can once again become 
useful, but only if the mnemonic failures caused by incomplete indexing and 
cataloguing are vanquished. And the need for vanquishing this incompletion is total: 
“Pour progresser, l’humanité a pourtant besoin de tout connaître. L’humanité a donc 
besoin d’une mémoire totale et tenue à jour.”60 The BNF is clearly haunted by the 
Derridean archive fever. It desires totality but the less than total index causes the 
haunting of the cellars. These objects have no voice because they have no archival 
place, but their very proximity, the very fact that they constitute an accumulation calls 
for proper consignation. There is an injunction but still no voice. Only when properly 
                                                            
59 Carou, “Toute la mémoire du monde, entre la commande et l’utopie,” 127–128. 
60 Ibid. 128. 
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catalogued will the spectres of the vaults give the injunction voice in a proper 
imperative of deferred obedience or heritage.  
 The total memory needed for the progress of humanity is termed an 
“exemplary memory” in the final film:  
 
“Mémoire exemplaire, la Nationale emmagasine tout ce qui s’imprime en 
France. […] Dépareillée, une collection perd sa valeur. C’est pourquoi on 
s’interdit ici la moindre faute d’inattention. Si un numéro manque il sera 
réclamé… Même si certains de ces imprimés ne devraient être consulté 
qu’une seule fois, il faut les conserver. C’est la règle du jeu.”61  
 
The BNF is ruled by the demand for fullness. It requires “tout ce qui s’imprime en 
France” and “[t]ous les signes que la main de l’homme a tracés […].”62 We could say 
that the library as an incomplete collection requesting completion, the filling of every 
and any lack, constitutes a state of plethora aspiring to a state of pleroma. The 
overabundance of material held at the library is nothing if it is not everything. We 
shall return to the notion of pleroma, but for now we should simply define pleroma as 
the fullness of the archive, the point where the spectral incorporation ceases to be 
paradoxical and the archive fever rages no more. Or to stay with the theological 
aspects of the term: Pleroma is the moment where the oikonomia of the archive is 
fulfilled and ceases to operate.  
 The aspiration of pleroma is the foundation of what has elsewhere been called 
the archival promise63, which Resnais formulates as follows:  
 
“Ici se préfigure un temps où toutes les énigmes seront résolues, un 
temps où ces univers et quelques autres nous livreront leur clé. Et cela 
simplement parce que ces lecteurs assis devant leur morceau de 
                                                            
61 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 69. 
62 Ibid. 66. 
63 “Also key to the newness of the digital is a conflation of memory and storage that both underlies 
and undermines digital media’s archival promise.” Chun, “The Enduring Ephemeral, or the Future Is a 
Memory,” 148. “Memory allegedly makes digital media an ever-increasing archive in which no piece of 
data is lost. This always-thereness of new media is also what links it to the future as future simple, as 
what will be, as predictable progress. By saving the past, it was supposed to make knowing the future 
easier.” Ibid. 154. 
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mémoire universelle auront mis bout à bout les fragments d’un même 
secret qui a peut-être un très beau nom, qui s’appelle le bonheur.”64  
 
The archive promises a future state of full knowledge where the accumulated 
consultations of universality finally constitute a reign of happiness on earth.  
 The shift from the destabilising effect of the “désordre initial”65 to the domes of 
the institution and then through the labyrinthine pathways of the BNF takes us, in 
effect, from the murmurs of unstructured plethora through the process of 
consignation (indexing and cataloguing) towards the ideal configuration of the 
archival whole as pleroma under the name of “mémoire totale”, “mémoire 
exemplaire” or “mémoire universelle.” The totality of interpretation and heritage of 
this complete memory is called happiness. And in both the first and the second 
synopses, the aspirations of the archival promise seem to go beyond the one library, 
the BNF, and hold the potential for an inclusion of all cultural institutions in the ideal 
pleroma: “On peut penser qu’un jour – tous les hauts lieux de la Culture seront reliés 
les uns aux autres.”66 
 
1.2.3	A	plethora	of	ambiguities	
 
The archival promise is supposedly kept or fulfilled by a certain number of technical 
procedures, by the technical operations of archival oikonomia. The main part of the 
film depicts the library’s techniques of consignation. Of the library’s four sources – 
donations, purchases, exchanges and legal deposit – the last one is of primary 
importance.67 In the first synopsis for the film, legal deposit is presented as a solution 
                                                            
64 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 72. 
65 Longtime BNF administrator (1930-1940 and 1945-1964) Julien Cain responded to the first second 
synopsis by asking that the location of the “désordre initial” not be identified, see Carou, “Toute la 
mémoire du monde, entre la commande et l’utopie,” 129. 
66 Ibid. 125. In the margins of this statement, Julien Cain had the good sense and humor to scribble: 
“obscur - ou banal ?” Ibid. 129. 
67 It should be noted here, that according to Ernst, legal deposit libraries constitute a sort of middle 
ground between the library and the archive, in that many depository libraries receive two copies of 
each item: “one copy for strict conservation (not to be used for current reading, the archival task); the 
other for functional use in the reading room (the library task). The institution of the dépõt légal (once 
introduced by a French king as an instrument of censorship) in fact smuggles an element of the 
archive into the library.” Ernst, “Cultural Archive versus Technomathematical Storage,” 65. It should 
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to the problem of choosing what deserves preservation: “dans l’impossibilité de 
définir ce qui est le bon grain et ce qui est l’ivraie, il leur fallait tout accumuler.”68 
 The legal aspect of this source, its legal authority, is expressed in the film by 
references to law and the prison: Conservation is “la règle du jeu”69, and the 
disciplines devoted to establishing the great catalogue “se sont muées en lois”70. As 
already mentioned, the library is constructed as a fortress, certain preserved items 
are kept separate by “un rempart”71 and the library is explicitly referred to as a 
prison: “[C]’est à la Bibliothèque Nationale que les mots sont emprisonnés.”72  
 This imprisonment within the fortress of the library is performed via indexing 
and cataloguing: “Puis il est inscrit sur le registre des entrées. Sa fiche signalétique 
est établie sommairement. Après quoi, prisonnier, il attend que vienne le jour du 
classement.”73 Once indexed and catalogued, the book is stamped with a unique 
identifier forever connecting it to a specific place within the library walls: “Pour 
indiquer qu’un volume est entré à la Bibliothèque Nationale, que plus jamais il n’en 
pourra sortir, on l’estampille.”74 
 Imprisonment by catalogue is necessarily accompanied by observing the laws 
of preservation. Keeping the book in its place is more than a question of not losing it. 
It is also the matter of not allowing the book to fade away in material degradation: 
“Ces richesses, il nous faut les préserver […] Des machineries pareilles à celles du 
capitaine Nemo maintiennent une température favorable au papier, au cuir, au 
parchemin. […] De jour et de nuit, les contrôles se succèdent. Coûte que coûte, il 
faut faire échec à la destruction.”75 This somewhat ironic tone, struck by the 
reference to Jules Verne, culminates when an ornamented leather binding receives a 
shot from a syringe with the dry voice-over comment: “On vaccine les livres.”76 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
also be noted that legal deposit is considered an early adoption of a conscious cultural politics which 
anticipates a political recognition of cultural heritage: “Une autre initiative s’inscrit davanatage dans la 
préfiguration d’un patrimoine collectif, c’est la création du dépôt des imprimés, le « dépôt légal ».” 
Chastel and Babelon, La notion de patrimoine, 35. 
68 Carou, “Toute la mémoire du monde, entre la commande et l’utopie,” 126. 
69 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 69 
70 Ibid. 66. 
71 Ibid. 72. 
72 Ibid. 66. 
73 Ibid. 69. 
74 Ibid. 69. 
75 Ibid. 71. 
76 Ibid. 71. 
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film doesn’t quite believe in this procedural production of the book as patient, but the 
institution does, this specific archive installs and requires such a belief, such an 
imaginary of internment.  
 The reference to Captain Nemo is yet another aspect of the film’s strategies of 
alienation, of making the BNF other – prison, fortress, hospital, the Nautilus. 
Similarly, noting that everything must be collected because we never know “ce qui 
demain témoignera le plus sûrement de notre civilisation,”77 the camera rests 
demonstratively on an edition of Mandrake le roi de la magie: Guerre dans le monde 
à X dimensions published in France in 1949 as the 112th issue of Aventures et 
Mystères. Surrounded by other French translations of American comics, such a 
focus shot establishes a contrast with the immediately preceding comments about 
the rediscovered first published piece by Rimbaud. This contrast only contributes to 
the film’s efforts to “convey the uncanny atmosphere within a public institution.”78 
 This contrast invites the question whether the comics were part of the library 
or merely added to the film by Resnais in order to achieve this uncanny mood, and 
Liandrat-Guigues and Leutrat confirm that they were, indeed, from Resnais’s own 
collection.79 The viewer, of course, does not know this, but the presentation of the 
comics in piles seems quite incongruous with the otherwise neatly ordered shelves of 
the catalogued stores. The piled comics seem to recall the unordered plethora in the 
cellars calling for consignation. The comics enable the personal addition of “X” 
dimensions to universal memory, the inclusion of absence into the presence of the 
archive. The irony and alienation established by the Mandrake and its semblables, is 
thus not a pejorative depiction of comic books but, rather, the private comic books as 
a criticism of the high cultural penchants of the archival universality as well as the 
exclusion of personal inclusion from institutional consignation. 
 Everything must be collected, imprisoned and preserved. But the ever-
growing collection breaks down the walls of the prison and keeps the catalogue in an 
                                                            
77 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 69. 
78 Ungar, “Scenes in a Library,” 68. A further aspect of the shot is that comics were not recognised as 
a specific material subcategory. They were thus stored in either the “Département des Estampes et 
de la photographie”, the “Département Littérature et art”, the “Département des périodiques” or simply 
under historical documents in the print section. The question of what will be the most important 
witness of our time is posed with regard to something which tended to be quite literally lost in 
indexation. (https://phylacterium.wordpress.com/2010/09/29/la-bibliotheque-nationale-de-france-et-la-
bande-dessinee/#f1). 
79 Liandrat-Guigues & Leutrat, Alain Resnais, liaisons secrètes, accords vagabonds, 259 n. 84. 
 33 
eternal state of construction: “Bientôt, cet antique grenier disparaîtra. En effet, depuis 
vingt ans, les métamorphoses successives tendent à faire de la Nationale la 
bibliothèque la plus moderne du monde.80” And “Avec le temps est né le grand 
catalogue des imprimés dont le propre est d’être toujours en chantier.”81  
 While the walls of the fortress or prison are bursting in the voice-over, the 
closed and well-guarded structures of the prison remain a clear aesthetic reference 
in the internal shots of the metallic architecture, the narrow metallic pathways and 
the slow, measured movement of the library personnel. The first synopsis clearly 
notes the reference to the Sing Sing Correctional Facility in Ossining, New York: 
“Nous voici maintenant dans ces couloirs, dans ces réserves dont l’architecture 
métallique fait penser aux « Sing Sing» des films de hors-la-loi.”82 The book, Mars, 
which is the main character in the film’s illustration of the consignation of input via 
legal deposit to the final placement in the designated spot on the shelf, literally 
awaits this final journey behind bars.83 
                                                            
80 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 71. 
81 Ibid. 66. 
82 Carou, “Toute la mémoire du monde, entre la commande et l’utopie,” 126. 
83 The idea of following a book through the library process was described already in Prinet’s 
comments to the first RTF project proposal: “Si l’on veut que ce film corresponde plus exactement à la 
réalité, il faut insister davantage sur certaines activités typiques. Par exemple : suivre un livre, une 
estampe, une médaille, un manuscrit depuis son entrée (Dépôt légal, don, acquisition en vente 
publique ou autrement, etc…), jusqu’au moment où il est entre les mains d’un lecteur ou présenté 
dans une exposition en France ou à l’étranger.” Ibid. 120. Resnais chose to adopt the idea but to use 
a fake book in its execution. 
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 Incidentally, the specific book behind bars is yet another part of the self-
proclaimed technical construction of the film as well as the personalised intervention 
in institutional consignation by the fact that it is not an actually published book. Like 
Mandrake, it is a highly personal addition to the institutional collection. The cover 
claims it to be part of the very real series of travel guides, Petite Planète, founded 
and edited by Chris Marker and published at Editions du Seuil (1954-1958). The 
actual titles of this series include Autriche (1954), Suède (1954), Italie (1954) etc., 
whereas the fictional edition in Toute la mémoire du monde is entitled Mars.  
 Although many of the books in the Petite Planète series were written by 
acquaintances of Marker – e.g. Allemagne (1955) was written by Joseph Rovan who 
is also visible in the reading room at the end of the film84 – this fictional book was 
supposedly written by Jeannine Garane, who assisted Marker on Olympia 52 (1952). 
Even the book’s table of contents is a story of its own when it comes to inside 
                                                            
84 His name appears on the list of extras as presented in Liandrat-Guigues and Leutrat, Alain 
Resnais, liaisons secrètes, accords vagabonds, 284. 
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jokes.85 The main example of a book entering the eternal and universal memory of 
the nation is, thus, a tangle of pranks indicating another world, a planet beyond the 
“small planet” on which we live, and, again, a stark contrast to the sombre 
seriousness of the library and much of the music.86 
 By hand or by trolley, the guards bring books between input, storage and 
output. And not only do they patrol the library stores; they also survey the visitors in 
the reading room. There are two guards surveying or patrolling the reading room. 
One is visible and walking the aisles looking left and right, the other is hidden behind 
two bookcases. 
 
 
 
                                                            
85 See Ungar, “Scenes in a Library,” 67. Apart from a number of references to Agnès Varda, we see a 
chapter called “De Wells à Domenach.” We shall return to H.G. Wells in chapter 2, but we should note 
that Resnais had him in mind when he made the film. Domenach is presumably a reference to French 
writer Jean-Marie Domenach who in addition to being part of the intellectual milieu of Paris at the time 
would, incidentally, go on write the 25th volume of the Petite Planète series: Yugoslavie (1960). 
86 The most notable and noted change in the musical mood of the film is constituted by the two bar 
reference to “Singin’ in the rain” when the legal deposit deliveries are carried into the library from the 
street. See Ibid. 66. 
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 This prison theme in both text and image thus contrasts with the archival 
promise expressed in the final word “bonheur” and this contrast nourishes the 
ambiguous and at times ironic undertones of Resnais’s film.87 This fundamental 
ambiguity is succinctly expressed in W.G. Sebald’s novel Austerlitz where the 
eponymous main character questions his own experiences at the BNF after having 
seen Toute la mémoire du monde: “Nicht selten beschäftigte mich damals die Frage, 
ob ich mich in dem von einem leisen Summen, Rascheln und Räuspern erfüllten 
Bibliothekssaal auf der Insel der Seligen oder, im Gegenteil, in einer Strafkolonie 
befand […]”88 
 In Derridean parlance, this tension between the penal colony and the Islands 
of the Blest, between haunting plethora and fulfilled pleroma, the impossible archival 
promise which nonetheless remains operative in our interactions with it, is called 
archive fever (Mal d’archive). The rule of the BNF archive, the law of the house, the 
archival oikonomia, demands completeness of both past and future via preservation 
                                                            
87 An irony which Resnais apparently denied, see Carou, “Toute la mémoire du monde, entre la 
commande et l’utopie,” 138. 
88 Sebald, Austerlitz, 372. 
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and accumulation. Preservation via environment control and inoculation and the 
accumulation via legal deposit promise fullness of the archive, even though these 
exact operations assure that the archive remains open. “On ne pourra jamais 
l’objectiver sans reste. L’archiviste produit de l’archive, et c’est pourquoi l’archive ne 
se ferme jamais. Elle s’ouvre depuis l’avenir.”89 The past is never fully present, the 
present is always already fading into the past, and the future is always yet to come. 
The fever burns because the very efforts to fulfil the desire for fullness undermine 
pleroma: “[Mal d’archive] [c]’est bruler d’une passion. C’est n’avoir de cesse, 
interminablement, de chercher l’archive là où elle se dérobe.”90 
 Derrida engaged with what I have here called the archival promise of an end 
to haunting plethora in fulfilled pleroma via the problem of infinity: “Une mémoire 
sans limite ne serait d’ailleurs pas une mémoire mais l’infinité d’une présence à 
soi.”91 And “Seul l’infini positif peut lever la trace, la « sublimer » […]”92 Such self-
presence of infinite memory would be anamnesis without hypomnesis,93 matter’s 
immediate rendering of the ideal, direct access to the meaning of the archive. The 
problem inherent to the archival promise of what Resnais’s film calls “bonheur” is 
that pleroma fulfilled would mean the end of heritage: “L’infini n’hérite pas, il ne 
s’hérite pas. L’injonction elle-même (choisis et décide dans ce dont tu hérites, dit-elle 
toujours) ne peut être une qu’en se divisant, déchirant, différant elle-même en 
parlant à la fois plusieurs fois – et de plusieurs voix.”94 This is the archival paradox, 
the mal d’archive: It installs the desire for pleroma, Resnais’s happiness of universal 
memory, but archival pleroma means the end of the archive, inheriting everything 
means inheriting nothing.  
 
1.2.4	The	barrier	
 
                                                            
89 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 109. 
90 Ibid. 142. 
91 Derrida, “La pharmacie de Platon,” 124. 
92 Derrida, De la grammatologie, 104. 
93 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 144. 
94 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, l’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale, 40. 
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Toute la mémoire du monde proposes a vertical axis from formless abyss to well-
structured “grenier”. The horizontal axis holds the practical operations of 
consignation as well as the possibility of interpretation: the operations of archival 
oikonomia should produce the ideal unity as pleromatic opus, but the horizontal 
wanderings of the structure operated by the library employees, the prison guards, 
take in so much material that the “grenier” explodes. The vertical axis between 
plethora and pleroma in the ideal unity of consignation requires expansion to cope 
with the level of horizontal ingest: “Pour éviter l’éclatement, perpétuellement elle 
s’enferme plus avant dans le sol, elle s’élève plus haut dans le ciel.”95  
 But in addition to the work, opera, of consignation in service of the ideal opus 
of pleroma, the horizontal axis also articulates the encounter between consignation 
and heritage. The final shot of the film clearly demonstrates this barrier within the 
horizontal axis, separating the operations of consignation and those of heritage.  
 
 
 
                                                            
95 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 66. 
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One side of the barrier holds the supposedly complete storage of the written trace of 
human existence, leaving human memory free to engage in productive or creative 
manipulations of the stored content. The other side opens onto a completely different 
existence:  
 
“Et voici le livre en marche vers une ligne idéale,96 un équateur plus 
décisif pour son existence que la traversée du miroir. Ce n’est plus le 
même livre. À l’instant il faisait partie d’une mémoire universelle, 
abstraite, indifférente, où tous les livres étaient égaux entre eux, où ils 
bénéficiaient ensemble d’une attention aussi tendrement glacée que 
celle de Dieu pour les hommes. Et le voici choisi, préféré, indispensable 
à son lecteur, arraché à sa galaxie97 pour nourrir ses faux insectes 
croqueur de papier irrémédiablement différents des insectes en ceci 
qu’ils sont attelé chacun à une besogne distincte.”98 
 
Within the realm of consignation, the book on the shelf is but a dormant part of 
universality. It is abstract potentiality, or, according to the concept, it is the archive 
that may become canon, the archival aspect of the library. The primary signifying 
elements of content have been abstracted in the index and the catalogue and 
replaced by ID and location. From the viewpoint of this abstraction, one element is 
exactly equal to the next and the God-like view of the catalogue cares equally little 
about them all because all that matters is the administration of creation, the nomos of 
its distribution within the archival oikos. The actualisation of the book in the reading 
room, on the other hand, establishes a completely new and singular existence within 
the realms of interpretation and heritage.  
 The book leaves its designated place in storage only when replaced by a 
spectral supplement, “une fiche prend sa place. C’est son fantôme.”99 Maybe this 
                                                            
96 This ideal line separates the Labrouste reading room and “Le magasin central” which will become 
accessible to the public for the first time in 2016: “Inaccessible au public jusqu’ici, le magasin central 
accueillera, à partir de 2016, dans la nouvelle configuration de la bibliothèque, les collections en libre 
accès de l’INHA.” (http://blog.bibliotheque.inha.fr/fr/posts/un-ecrin-pour-les-livres-la-salle-
labrouste.html) 
97 The published script reads “arraché à sa galerie” but the actual voice-over says “galaxie”. 
98 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 72. 
99 Ibid. 
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supplement constitutes the truth of the library book as archival object, since the small 
piece of paper reduces the book to its abstract coordinates in the catalogue. The 
difference between the book in its ideal, consigned place, and the book in its singular 
relation to interpretation constitutes the book as paradoxical incorporation: “Ce n’est 
plus le même livre.” Just as the archivist produces the archive, thus forever keeping 
it open, the interpreter constitutes the historical truth of the book by belatedly 
inscribing it, as nourishment or heritage, in the body of the page-eating reader-insect.  
 This brings us back to the aforementioned last words of the film: “Et cela 
simplement parce que ces lecteurs assis devant leur morceau de mémoire 
universelle auront mis bout à bout les fragments d’un même secret qui a peut-être un 
très beau nom, qui s’appelle le bonheur.” What does this happiness mean within the 
ambiguous technical construction of not only the film but also the archive? Sebald’s 
Austerlitz was not the only one to notice the ambiguities of the film. According to 
Jacques Doniol-Valcroze, these ambiguities are the reason the film was booed by 
the Paris audience as it was shown before the premiere of Pot-Bouille (1957). In an 
interview, Resnais mentioned his desire to express the feeling of liberty installed by 
the library as uncensored communication of thought, but Doniol-Valcroze had the 
exact opposite impression:  
 
“Ici l’on s’interroge. Resnais cache-t-il son jeu ou a-t-il involontairement 
réalisé un film qui exprime à peu près le contraire de cette dernière 
citation? En effet, le suivant dans les couloirs de la Nationale, ce n’est 
pas une impression de grisante liberté qu’on éprouve mais 
d’emprisonnement étouffant.”100 
 
 Even the happy actualisation of the book in the reading room seems 
ambiguous. Finally arrived, the ideal galaxy is broken and the book is consumed by 
insects bound by desire and surveyed by guards. The utopia expressed in the title, 
Toute la mémoire du monde, is impossible and quite possibly dangerous. Perhaps 
the ambiguities should be conceived according to a different reading, presented by 
Youssef Ishaghpour: “Toute la mémoire du monde n’est pas un documentaire sur la 
                                                            
100 Doniol-Valcroze, “La Prisonnière Lucia,” 59. 
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Bibliothèque nationale, mais l’autoportrait d’Alain Resnais […]”101 According to such 
a reading, the film – with the many inside jokes, the presence of his own comic 
collection and so many friends – becomes a personal act of consignation, Resnais’s 
own archive, based on an interpretation and affirmative heritage of the included 
elements. In that case, the mentioned happiness of putting fragments together 
becomes the only happiness possible within the library as a hospital for the 
treatment of archive fever. 
                                                            
101 Ishaghpour, D’une Image à L’autre. La Représentation Dans Le Cinéma D’aujourd’hui, 187. 
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1.3	Automating	the	archive	
 
1.3.1	Digitalised	libraries	
 
According to the concept of the archive, Resnais’s barrier between library stores and 
reading room would delineate the difference between archive and library, archive 
and canon. As mentioned, Ernst is willing to consider the library’s legal deposit an 
archive, provided the public had no way of gaining access to interpret its content and 
transform that interpretation into cultural knowledge. Similarly, for Assmann the 
archive is but reference memory, whereas canon is a matter of working memory. For 
her, presumably, the reading room would be but one of the many ways in which 
reference memory could be brought into the circulation of the canon, although the 
book or its content would need to be consumed by more than one desiring insect for 
canon to arise. 
 In the reading room of Toute la mémoire du monde, the hypomnemata 
traverse the ideal line between storage techniques and human memory. One is 
reminded of Friedrich Kittler who chose the RAM/ROM distinction over Mnemosyne 
as a conceptual instrument for describing the “historischen Stadien der 
Gedächtnisorganisation.”102 He would no doubt have seen in the related but strictly 
separate topoi of the library stores and the reading room a manifestation of the 
computer’s distinction between storage spaces as “mechanisch betriebene elektro-
magnetische Gedächtnisse” and working memory as the topos of “Adreßarithmetik,” 
where data computation is done.103 Interestingly, the parallel of the computer has 
become anything but metaphoric in the on-going digitalisation of the library which 
began in the early 1990’s.104  
                                                            
102 Kittler, “Memories Are Made of You,” 187. 
103 Ibid.190. 
104 Here and in the following, I will distinguish between “digitalisation” and “digitisation” according to 
the OED: Digitalisation: “2. The adoption or increase in use of digital or computer technology by an 
organization, industry, country, etc.” Digitisation: “1. To convert (analogue data, esp. in later use 
images, video, and text) to digital form, typically for storage or processing by a computer; to represent 
in digital form.” 
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 Although its electric circuitry had yet to become digital, Resnais’s BNF was 
already to a wide extent a matter of an arithmetic of addresses. The book entered 
storage via identification, indexation and inclusion in the catalogue without which 
“cette forteresse ne serait qu’un pays sans route.”105 The catalogue was “le cerveau 
de la Bibliothèque Nationale”106 remembering the storage location of each item, “le 
point précis qui lui est imparti […]”107 Calls for retrieval from storage to memory 
resounded throughout the labyrinthine pathways, “des appels sont lancés. Sans 
cesse des messages fusent à travers le labyrinthe de ces magasins.”108 Each item 
passed by the ideal barrier and arrived at its precise destination to be consumed by 
number or information-crunching insects: “Un dernier contrôle, une dernière 
vérification de l’identité du livre et de son bulletin. […] Et le voici choisi, préféré, 
indispensable à son lecteur, arraché à sa galaxie […]”109 The distributions between 
storage location, catalogue, transmission and target address are clear.  
 Resnais didn’t hesitate to prophesy a different future, however: “Bientôt cet 
antique grenier disparaîtra. En effet, depuis vingt ans, des métamorphoses 
successives tendent à faire de la Nationale la Bibliothèque la plus moderne du 
monde.’’110 But he was hardly able to grasp the extent of the future metamorphoses, 
neither of the BNF nor of libraries in general. In the case of the BNF, the antique attic 
has been replaced by the modern stores of the new main site at Quai François 
Mauriac, and as for the technical operations of this current BNF, the glum march of 
Resnais’s library officials has been digitalised and automatized.   
 The new François Mitterrand library site consists of four 20 story towers and 6 
underground levels, comprising a grand total of 365.178m2 of floor space. At the 
tempo depicted by Resnais, book transmission by hand-pushed carriage from 
storage to memory in the form of the ten available reading rooms could take quite a 
while. In order to bring the transmission latency from storage to barrier down to an 
average of 20 minutes, the library installed a so-called TAD-system (Transport 
Automatique de Documents). The TAD basically consists of 7800 meters of rails 
                                                            
105 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 66. 
106 Ibid. 71. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 72. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 71. 
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carrying 330 baskets, various readers and writers of electronic labels and 1 
centralised information system keeping track of the identity and itinerary of the 
specific tome in the basket.  
 The metamorphosis of the BNF has been a question of digitalised catalogue 
and robotised transportation, but any interaction with the books at their shelved 
location and their crossing of the barrier to the reading room has remained manual. 
Many libraries have gone further, however. In 1991, The Oviatt Library at the 
California State University, Northridge (CSUN) inaugurated the first library 
Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS). Just as the stores of Resnais’s 
BNF were fit to burst, the Oviatt library was experiencing insufficient room for the 
average acquisition rate of 30,000 volumes per year, and the costs of constructing 
new library stores in the traditional form proved financially untenable.  
 A more efficient storage facility was constructed by DEMATIC, an American 
provider of “material handling systems.”111 In this case, the ASRS initially had a 
capacity of 950.000 volumes within an area of 8.000 square feet (ca. 743m2), all 
retrievable from the circulation desk “less than ten minutes upon request by users of 
the online computer catalog.”112 This automated facility stored only less frequently 
used volumes. “Books with no circulation in the past three years, periodicals over 
fifteen years old and no reference materials that are no longer current […]”113 The 
facility now holds 1.7 million volumes in 13.260 steel bins.114 The automatic stores 
are a matter of Assmann’s reference archive rather than of canon.  
 The facility is a rack structure along six aisles, served by “mini-load cranes.” 
Resnais’s BNF adorned its book covers with a round label inscribed with an obscure 
combination of letters and numbers – “Rondé, ce livre n’échappera à aucune 
recherche”115 – in order to always identify the relation between the book as object, its 
location in the catalogue and its placement on the shelves. The Oviatt’s ASRS 
operates via the relation between bar codes on each individual book, the digitalised 
                                                            
111 http://www.dematic.com/en. 
112 DEMATIC, “Case Study - California State University - Oviatt Library. Northridge, California”. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Oviatt Library, “Oviatt Library - Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS)”. 
115 This particular phrase is absent from the published “scénario” but should appear after “Une lettre, 
des chiffres désignent la tablette qu’il occupera dans l’un des magasins” “Toute la mémoire du monde 
(Scénario),” 71. 
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library catalogue which handles search and request and, finally, the ASRS database 
which keeps track of book ID and metal bin.116  
 There are two types of relation between book and bin. One is equivalent to the 
old BNF method of keeping the book in a “point précis qui lui est imparti dans le 
dédale d’un rayonnage long de cent kilomètres.”117 This permanent storage 
arrangement is used for multiple volume periodicals, Special Collections and 
Archives, the last two containing “different kinds of materials, including 
correspondence, diaries, maps, university records, organizational records, 
photographs, and audio or video recordings.”118 Regular book volumes, however, are 
kept in random storage. This means that a book is returned to the first available bin 
and that there is no intended relation of kin and kind within the bin or between bins. 
Consignation via the hermeneutic establishment of kin and kind has been abstracted 
from the storage layer and is now strictly confined to the retrieval function of the 
catalogue. We might say that, from the point of the view of the concept, the library 
has taken a step towards the archive by relying on a certain aspect of provenance, 
i.e. the first available bin location at the time of return, and not on its hermeneutic 
signification and pertinence. 
 Oxford’s Bodleian – “Before Google, before Amazon, before Wikipedia, and 
before the British Library, there was the Bodleian Library,”119 the keeper of that 
naughty rag of Shakespeare’s – has also felt the recurring need to expand their 
storage space as well as their storage and retrieval technology. After having opened 
new stores in 1912 and in 1940, respectively, the Bodleian Libraries opened the 
Book Storage Facility (BSF) in Swindon in 2010. As indicated by the relatively 
remote location, the BSF mainly holds books that are less frequently in use and thus 
mainly holds a reference function.  
 The Bodleian opted against an ASRS and chose a Library Archival System 
(LAS) developed by Generation Fifth Applications, Inc., also in use at Harvard.120 But 
not unlike the ASRS at the Oviatt, the Bodleian’s LAS enables the relation between a 
unique barcode ID for each item, a unique barcode ID for a tray holding one or more 
                                                            
116 Heinrich and Willis, “Automated Storage and Retrieval System: A Time-Tested Innovation,” 7. 
117 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 71. 
118 Oviatt Library, “Oviatt Library - Special Collections and Archives”. 
119 Heaney and Cannon, Transforming the Bodleian, 1. 
120 Ibid. 137. 
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items and, finally, a unique barcode for a shelf address. Similar to the round labels 
depicted by Resnais, the Bodleian chose to place its item barcodes on the front, top 
left corner to facilitate scanning121, and akin to the BNF this corner label also 
includes a reference to the shelf position.122  
 The LAS is a piece of software handling these data correlations, whereas the 
overall system including hardware and the content of the database is termed the 
Book Storage Facility Information System (BSFIS), which should then again not be 
confused with the library catalogue. The catalogue keeps records of the library items 
and their barcodes, whereas the BSFIS keeps records of the barcode relations 
enabled by the LAS. Where the library catalogue holds information of kin and kind, 
the BSFIS thus “contains no bibliographical information, but provides the sole source 
of information about where individual items are located.”123  
 Yet another element is needed, however: The resource discovery platform or 
Online Public Access Catalogue (OPAC), in this case called SOLO (‘Search Oxford 
Libraries Online’), is, as the name aptly expresses, the public access point to the 
library catalogue. When a book is requested, SOLO “generates a file of barcodes 
and associated request information (including requester name, reading room 
destination etc.).”124 This file is then sent to the BSFIS and the retrieval work can 
begin the transmission from “mechanisch betriebene Gedächtnisse” to the 
“Adreßarithmetik” of the reading room. Unlike Resnais’s BNF, the BSF has no need 
for the spectral placeholder of a book gone to the other side. The BSF did practice 
this spectral supplementation but since the BSFIS keeps track of the intended 
location of the “point précis qui lui est imparti” in storage, no such supplement is 
required.125 The slip of paper does, however, persist as a companion on the other 
side of the barrier, indicating the target address, i.e. the reader.  
 Although the item ID is strictly correlated to a shelf ID, items “stored at the 
BSF would no longer be sorted in shelfmark sequence; therefore neighbouring items 
                                                            
121 Ibid. 142. 
122 It was a point of debate at the Bodleian whether to adopt the American model of having each shelf 
address in a human readable form with a related random barcode or to translate the human readable 
address into barcode form. The latter option was chosen, see Ibid. 141. 
123 Ibid. 146. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 143. 
 47 
were less likely to have any logical relationship to any misplaced item.”126 This 
underlines the Library Archival System (LAS) as a contradiction in terms from the 
point of view of the Ernstian concept of the archive as strictly opposed to the library 
(except, of course, in the mitigating case of legal deposit libraries). The BSF is at a 
remote location in Swindon, inaccessible from the reading rooms of Oxford, and its 
stores operate in a manner completely distinct from any hermeneutic classification or 
consultation. The BSFIS is pure archive. Even the library catalogue is, as such, 
separate from the reader. Only the SOLO OPAC as a specific mediation of the 
catalogue and the reading rooms retain a library function.  
 We now have somewhat of a spectrum between the manual proceedings of 
Resnais’s BNF and the different metamorphoses induced by the digitalisation of its 
operations: The BNF at the François Mitterrand site has a digital catalogue and the 
robotised transmission from stores to barrier. The BSF uses manual transmission in 
the form of manual shelf retrieval and manual transport from Swindon to Oxford twice 
a day, but it uses a digital archiving system, automating storage control and reader 
request. The Oviatt introduced a completely automatized retrieval system as well as 
automated storage for at least a part of its collection, i.e. for the reference part, or 
what Assmann would call the archive. We can say that the Bodleian has an 
automated catalogue, the Mitterrand BNF has added automated transmission, and 
that, in addition to automated transmission and catalogue, the Oviatt has automated 
storage. 
 We neither can nor shall go through every significant library automation since 
the Oviatt in 1991. Suffice it to conclude that automation via digitalisation of 
Resnais’s horizontal axis has turned the library towards the concept of the archive in 
two ways: 1. Storage has to a wide extent abandoned physical consignation 
according to a hermeneutic establishment of kin and kind in favour of random item 
distribution. 2. Automated storage has to a wide extent been reserved for the 
reference libraries; meaning that, according to the concept of the archive, what has 
been digitalised is the archive and not the library/canon, which tends to remain in the 
open stacks.  
 
                                                            
126 Ibid. 138. 
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1.3.2	Digitised	libraries	
 
So far, we have considered automation via digitalisation of the library operations on 
primarily the storage side of Resnais’s ideal barrier, which to this day remains the 
physical point of transition between library consignation and heritage. The only 
aspect of these automations reaching the address arithmetic of the reading room is 
the OPAC allowing for a virtual gaze into the archival stores. Further efforts have, 
however, been made in recent years. 
 A somewhat exuberant rendition of possible strategies behind the full 
digitisation of library content is given by Robert Darnton who, apart from being the 
director of the Harvard University Library and thus the library which inspired the LAS 
choice of the Bodleian, is also a driving force behind the Digital Public Library of 
America (DPLA), which launched on April 18, 2013. Not unlike the pan-institutional 
archival promise expressed by Resnais, the DPLA “aims to make available all the 
intellectual riches accumulated in American libraries, archives, and museums.”127 
During its first year, the DPLA managed to triple its collections to “include seven 
million books and other objects” not under copyright, accessible from anywhere in 
the world.128  
 Darnton sees in the technical execution of this project a certain emancipation 
from the yoke of centralised corporative initiatives such as Google Book Search:  
 
“[…] it is not a vertical organization erected on a database of its own. It is 
a distributed, horizontal system, which links collections already in the 
possession of the participating institutions, and it does so by means of a 
technological infrastructure that makes them instantly available to the 
user with one click on an electronic device. It is fundamentally horizontal, 
both in organization and in spirit.”129 
 
                                                            
127 Darnton, “A World Digital Library Is Coming True!” Notice the reference to “libraries, archives, and 
museums”, an entity often referred to as LAM or, if galleries are invited to the mix, GLAM. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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We see here an attempted abolishment of the vertical axis present in Resnais’s BNF. 
In Toute la mémoire du monde, as we have seen, the vertical axis was a matter of 
transforming the formless deep to the summits of institutionally organised universal 
memory hinging on the catalogue as the brain of the library. The vertical axis 
culminated in the final shot from above of the barrier between storage and reading 
room. Darnton’s library is explicitly not “a great edifice topped with a dome and 
standing on a gigantic database.”130 Without the dome, Darnton hopes for the 
fulfilment of the promise of cross-institutional pleroma, mentioned in the initial 
synopses for Toute la mémoire du monde: “On peut penser qu’un jour – tous les 
hauts lieux de la Culture seront reliés les uns aux autres.” This horizontal 
organisational distribution across numerous institutions is presented as a non-profit 
attack on Google’s explorations of various business models.131  
 This technical horizontality is achieved by establishing “service hubs” for 
collection administration, promotion and aggregation at the state level and “content 
hubs” “located in institutions with collections of at least 250.000 items […]. Such 
horizontality reinforces the “democratising” impulse behind the DPLA.”132 The 
technical distribution and the fact that it is non-profit and even operated and 
developed by volunteers, i.e. unpaid labour,133 are all seen as manifestations of an 
inherently democratic impulse.  
 This distribution does, however, operate with a certain degree of 
centralisation, albeit somewhat more abstract. The developed infrastructure 
“aggregates metadata (catalog-type descriptions of documents) in a way that allows 
easy searching.”134 So the cultural institutions have been linked “les uns aux autres,” 
but the aggregations of metadata, without which this distributed fortress would 
remain but “un pays sans route” still create a centralised catalogue.  
                                                            
130 Darnton, “The National Digital Public Library Is Launched!” 
131 Google originally intended to provide a search service making only book excerpts accessible. 
Google was, however, sued for infringement by copyright holders, and therefore proposed Google 
books as a subscription service. This proposed settlement was dismissed by the Southern Federal 
District Court of New York on March 22, 2011 because “it would have given Google a de facto 
monopoly over the digital versions of so-called “orphan” books […]” Singer, “Whither the Dream of the 
Universal Library?” 
132 Darnton, “A World Digital Library Is Coming True!” 
133 “More than a thousand computer scientists collaborated free of charge in the design of its 
infrastructure […]” Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
 50 
  
“The metadata will be aggregated in a repository located in what the 
designers call the “back end” of the platform, while an application 
programming interface (API) in the “front end” will make it possible for all 
kinds of software to transmit content in diverse ways to individual users. 
 The user-friendly interface will therefore enable any reader […] to 
consult works that used to be stored on inaccessible shelves or locked 
up in treasure rooms […]. Readers will simply consult the DPLA though 
its URL, http://dp.la.135” 
 
 This is, of course, dashed practical, and allows a reading room of one’s own 
to access numerous library stores without waiting at the barrier depicted from above. 
The focal point of the barrier between storage and reading room has been replaced 
by the API between “back end” and “front end.” The OPAC system has gone mobile 
and the reader’s reading screen of choice allows search, retrieval and interpretation 
in one fell swoop. Interaction with the library stores is open to reinvention as long as 
it respects the API. But does this, indeed, entail that the dome’s vertical view of the 
horizontal barrier is gone? As Alexander Galloway has noted, we should be wary of 
considering any distributed network as the inherent emancipation from hierarchical 
control: “It is common for contemporary critics to describe the Internet as an 
unpredictable mass of data — rhizomatic and lacking central organization. […] 
protocol is how technological control exists after decentralization.”136 The API is as 
powerful a guardian of the barrier and the reading rooms as any uniformed library 
official.  
 A different barrier along a different axis, controlling what can enter 
consignation, is created by the limits of copyright, keeping “virtually everything 
published after 1923 out of the public domain.”137 But such are obstacles to be 
overcome, or at least a balance to be struck between public and commercial interest, 
                                                            
135 Darnton, “The National Digital Public Library Is Launched!” 
136 Galloway, Protocol, How Control Exists after Decentralization, 8. Galloway’s example of the 
persistence of hierarchy even in the distributed network of the Internet as based on TCP/IP is this 
system’s reliance on DNS (Domain Name System) guarding the relations between URLs and IP 
adresses. 
137 Darnton, “A World Digital Library Is Coming True!” 
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between democratisation and commercialisation. Darnton proposes a convergence 
of utopianism and pragmatism.138 On the one hand, “The Digital Public Library of 
America (DPLA) will make the cultural and scientific heritage of humanity available, 
free of charge, to all.”139 And not satisfied with making it available for interpretation, 
the DPLA wants to enable heritage, i.e. the individual appropriation of hypomnemata: 
“[Students] will sharpen their sensitivity to language in general, and the lessons they 
learn will help them gain possession of their cultural heritage.”140 But on the other 
hand, this free access of everyone to everything “must be sustainable,” i.e. it must 
develop according to “the right balance between commercialization and 
democratization.”141 
 Interestingly, the promise of pleroma is within reach, “[w]e have the 
technological and economic resources to make all the collections of all our libraries 
accessible to all our fellow citizens […]”142 The only hindrance is copyright: “The 
main impediment to the DPLA’s growth is legal, not financial.”143 A similar statement 
was made regarding the Norwegian National Digital Library: “The greatest obstacle 
to making works available to the public in digital form is not related to technology, but 
rather to copyright issues.”144  
 
Norwegian Repository Library in Mori Rana, source: http://www.statsbygg.no/Prosjekter-og-
eiendommer/Byggeprosjekter/Nasjonalbiblioteket-Automatlager-2-Mo/ 
                                                            
138 Darnton, “The National Digital Public Library Is Launched!” 
139 http://dp.la/wiki/Concept_Note 
140 Ibid. 
141 Darnton, “A World Digital Library Is Coming True!” 
142 Darnton, “The National Digital Public Library Is Launched!” 
143 Ibid. 
144 Takle, “The Norwegian National Digital Library.” 
 52 
 
 The National Library of Norway, the Repository Library of which has, 
incidentally, operated via ASRS and random or “chaos storage”145 since 2003, has 
launched an effort of not only digitalising their storage operations but also digitising 
the library content. Here as well, we see the difference between front end and back 
end, and its relation to the difference between technology and copyright: “As part of 
its digitisation strategy, the National Library has developed an archive for digital 
storage called the Digital Security Repository […]”146  
 This Security Repository is a technical back end, it is an archive serving a 
library function via an API and certain front ends. Technologically it can handle a 
wide variety of digital material from any number of institutions. As Darnton noted, the 
technology is not the problem. The impediment for this archive to serve as a library is 
copyright. Two specific projects were made possible via “agreements with rights 
holders regarding distribution over the Internet.”147 The first one, signed on March 14, 
2007, made various literature from and about the High North and northern available. 
Based on a 2008 evaluation of the High North project, another project, Bokhylla.no 
struck a deal with Kopinor, a representative of multiple right holder organisations.  
 On April 23, 2009 a contract was signed relating to “printed books published 
in Norway during the years 1790-1799, 1890-1899 and 1990-1999, including 
translated literature. This contract regulated that part of the copyright-protected 
material covered by the project, up to 50 000 books with an estimated average of 
185 pages.”148  On September 30, 2012, a new contract took effect, relating to “the 
digital dissemination of printed books published in Norway until and including the 
year 2000, including translated literature.”149 
 Bokhylla.no (The Bookshelf) came online in 2009 with 14.000 books from the 
1990s and “some 3.500 published much earlier.”150 In 2006 the Norwegian National 
Library started digitising its whole collection in order to achieve its vision of being “a 
living memory bank, […] a “Multimedia Centre of Knowledge” with a focus not only 
                                                            
145 See. Sakrihei, “Automatic Storage and Retrieval System for Interlibrary Lending,” 2. 
146 Takle, “The Norwegian National Digital Library.” 
147 Ibid. 
148 National Library of Norway and Kopinor, Contract Regarding the Digital Dissemination of Books 
(Bokhylla / The Bookshelf). 
149 Ibid. 
150 Skarstein, “The Bookshelf,” 48. 
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on preservation, but also on mediation.”151 The imaginaries of the exemplary, total 
and universal memory depicted by Resnais are obviously still operational in its 
digitised manifestations.  
 But this total memory is both centralised and distributed. The back end may 
be distributed as described by Darnton, or it may be centralised as in the Norwegian 
Digital Security Repository. The front end may be centralised as in the case of DPLA 
or distributed as in the case of the High North project and the Bookshelf, separated 
by the ramparts of copyright agreements. But contrary to Darnton’s high hopes, we 
cannot simply ascribe democratic horizontality to digitised content platforms. The 
axes and parameters remain the same as those depicted by Resnais, but their 
instantiations, their metamorphoses are most definitely new. 
 
1.3.3	Amazon		
 
According to Darnton, the state of archival pleroma is now technically attainable. Via 
the processes of digitalisation and digitisation, we have reached a stage of 
technological development, where institutional and corporate verticality can be 
replaced by democratic horizontality. The vertical view of the barrier between storage 
and memory has supposedly been replaced by the distribution of “service hubs” and 
“content hubs” in the “back end” that are linked to multiple possible “front ends” via 
the API.  
 Digitalisation automated the manual back end procedures depicted by 
Resnais and it enabled the search and request functions of the OPAC front ends, but 
the barrier remained as firm as ever. Are we really to believe that the technical 
characteristics of content digitisation would finally fulfil the potential of pleroma were 
it not for the legal limitations of copyright? Distributed storage and memory, 
distributed back end and front end, distributed index and catalogue and the 
possibility of multiple APIs, render the distinctions, so clearly drawn by Resnais, 
abstract and diffuse. But just as the archive, according to the notion, remains open 
                                                            
151 Ibid. 52. The quotation marks are a reference to the official strategy of the library, expressed on the 
website as follows: “It is the ambition of the National Library of Norway to be the nation’s memory and 
a multimedia centre for knowledge and culture.” http://www.nb.no/English/About-us/Strategy 
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because any attempt of fullness and closure depend on the inclusion of a certain 
lack, the technical structures enabling the utopian democratising side of Darnton’s 
argument depend on the inclusion of operations from, or at least shared with, the 
commercial sphere.  
 The digitalisation of libraries quite openly embraced commercial technologies. 
The ASRS is a standard technology within Warehouse Management Systems 
(WMS). In addition to the above-mentioned libraries, such technology has been 
embraced by another prominent book repository: Amazon. On March 19, 2012, 
Amazon.com, Inc. announced its acquisition of Kiva Systems, Inc., a provider of 
material handling technology.152 This acquisition has enabled a certain transition of 
warehouse processes within Amazon’s “fulfilment centres.” In late 2013, Bloomberg 
Business could still report on “A Day in the Life of an Amazon Package”153, and show 
random storage made possible by digitalised indexing along with automated 
transmission from packaging to deployment. “A team of workers called “storers” 
stash the items, well, anywhere, no rhyme or reason. Products are stowed in the first 
empty space. It makes for unusual bedfellows: Hello Kitty next to Vans sneakers and 
Alpine speakers.” “Storers” are matched by “pickers” retrieving ordered products that 
are then sent by automated conveyor belts to the right truck where packers optimise 
box room allocation for shipment. 
 This is, thus, a depiction similar to our earlier descriptions of the Mitterrand 
BNF and the Bodleian, where interaction with stored objects at node locations is 
handled by human workers but catalogue consignation and storage transmission are, 
respectively, digitalised via barcodes and indexes and automated via rails or 
conveyor belts. Soon after, in early 2014, however, Bloomberg Business could report 
on “Amazon’s New Robot Army” handling 21.000.000 items within a single 
warehouse. The procedures of stowing and picking are now announced to have 
been profoundly changed, since “it eliminates the walk.” Storers and pickers no 
longer head for a specific shelf location, the shelf location comes to them in both 
cases. The shelves look like small high-rises with items stored on all sides and each 
shelf is carried atop a small flat robot.  
                                                            
152 Amazon, “Press Releases - Amazon.com to Acquire Kiva Systems, Inc.” 
153 Bloomberg Business, “A Day in the Life of an Amazon Package.” 
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Image from “Army of Amazon robots ready to help fulfill orders on Cyber Monday.” latimes.com. 
November 30, 2014. 
 
This procedure makes the Amazon warehouse more akin to the ASRS of the Oviatt 
or the Norwegian Repository Library in Mo i Rana: Random storage with automated 
storage and retrieval. The only human contact with items is at the barrier location.  
 
1.3.4	Netflix	
 
Library digitalisation explicitly took inspiration from commercial warehouses but what 
of digitisation? What of the democratising horizontality inherent to the convergence 
of digital infrastructures and digitised content described by Darnton as the opposite 
of commercial interests? Similar to the digitised libraries of Bokhylla.no and the 
DPLA, Netflix’s streaming service holds a plethora of digital content, accessible from, 
potentially, anywhere. Netflix has included in its bulging repositories a wide selection 
of films, television series, documentaries etc., accessible to the paying customer 
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within specific countries.154 The digital ramparts of Netflix thus protect the fortress 
against gratuitous soliciting and nationals foreign to the approved member states. 
The reasons for such a double bulwark are no mystery: Paying customers constitute 
the foundation of the business model and content licensing agreements tend to abide 
by national borders.  
 The digital ramparts protect the fortress, but although the repositories are 
bulging, they are in no danger of cracking. In contrast to Resnais’s BNF and other 
legal deposit libraries, Netflix is not an accumulative archive – there is no promise of 
pleroma. Not unlike the hard drive platters that contain it, the content rotates, i.e. the 
archive upholds but an ephemeral character of plethora via a number of ever-
expiring licensing agreements that differ from country to country. And instead of the 
centralised “mémoire universelle, abstraite, indifférente” of Resnais’s BNF, 
sometimes actualised in a call from the reading room, content is deployed in a 
distributed Content Distribution Network (CDN) consisting of storage pods holding 
the content most likely to be demanded at that given geographical location.  
 On June 4, 2012, Netflix announced its own CDN system called “Open 
Connect.”155 This distribution of local servers is meant to reduce transmission load 
and enhance the user’s experience of immediate access. Contrary to recurring 
perceptions of digital infrastructures as immaterial and embedded in “the cloud,” 
transmission of large digital files from Netflix headquarters in Los Gatos, California, 
to the suburbs of Europe does require time and resources. Storing oft-requested 
content at distributed network nodes is a way of alleviating such demand on 
resources. It operates its own distinction between Assmann’s archive and canon.  
 We shall return to the hardware characteristics of these CDNs but for now, 
suffice it to recognise in such distributed hardware a parallel to the DPLA “content 
nodes” described by Darnton. And consequently, that the commercial back end of 
Netflix is as distributed as the democratising horizontality of the DPLA. The 
centralised verticality criticised by Darnton, or which should at least be brought into a 
certain relation of balance with public interest, was exemplified by Google, but 
                                                            
154 There are, however, several ways in which the geographical restrictions can be circumvented. In 
this case as in the case of Darnton’s DPLA, “The main impediment to the […] growth is legal, not 
financial.” Darnton, “The National Digital Public Library Is Launched!” 
155 Florance, “Announcing the Netflix Open Connect Network.” 
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Netflix’s commercial deployment of the inherently democratising horizontality was a 
direct response to similar horizontality in the technical infrastructure of YouTube, a 
Google subsidiary, as described by Vice President of Content Delivery at Netflix, Ken 
Florance: “The world’s other major Internet video provider, YouTube, has long had its 
own content delivery network. Given our size and growth, it now makes economic 
sense for Netflix to have one as well.”156  
 Unsurprisingly, thus, Netflix shares many of the archival characteristics we 
have located in Resnais’s BNF as well as the different digitalised and digitised 
libraries. Where the BNF indicated the location of each object by a few numbers and 
letters, Netflix bestows upon each of its digital items an eight-digit “movieid.”  
 
Here for instance the URL for the movie Sharknado 2 (2014):  
http://www.netflix.com/WiPlayer?movieid=80011866&trkid=50263279&t
ctx=9%2C6%2C996a7c6d-f2df-43c0-acbf-c89a16fbb9c7-104674131 
 
The episodes of a television series have sequential ID’s but this is presumably more 
a result of the order of ingest than of the chronology of a narrative or their presumed 
consumption order. Just as a guest at the BNF requests a book and not its shelf 
location, the Netflix user is not supposed to interact with the object via the ID but via 
the other metadata elements such as, most importantly, title and genre, although it is 
also possible to search for actor and director.  
 More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that, although technical ingest is 
decidedly automated according to provenance and thus logistics, Netflix’s processes 
of consignation still remain profoundly hermeneutic. Apart from the standard 
metadata just mentioned, Netflix orders its objects according to an elaborate tagging 
scheme called the “Netflix Quantum Theory.” Each item is reviewed by a human 
tagger, adding several “microtags” to its description: 
 
“The Netflix Quantum Theory doc spelled out ways of tagging movie 
endings, the “social acceptability” of lead characters, and dozens of other 
facets of a movie. Many values are “scalar,” that is to say, they go from 1 
                                                            
156 Ibid. 
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to 5. So, every movie gets a romance rating […]. Every movie’s ending is 
rated form happy to sad, passing through ambiguous. Every plot is 
tagged. Lead character’s jobs are tagged. Movie locations are tagged. 
Everything. Everyone.”157  
 
 In Resnais’s BNF, “Ils les trient, les analysent, les classent, les numérotent 
méthodiquement.”158 Netflix does something similar, except that the final 
classification is automated. The hermeneutically created tags are but the data from 
which the so-called “altgenres” are formed algorithmically. Apparently, there are 
76.897 of them, including agid=2: “Scary Cult Movies form the 1980s”159 and 
agid=69513: “Hindi-Language Con-Artist Comedies.” In the case of Netflix, 
consignation via the establishment of kin and kind is hermeneutic initially, but the 
transformation of those humanly created data points only gain any sort of 
understandable meaning after the intervention of their algorithmic aggregation in 
altgenres.  
 
                                                            
157 Madrigal, “How Netflix Reverse Engineered Hollywood.” 
158 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 66. 
159 Ibid. 
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1.4	Tracing	the	archive	
 
1.4.1	Identifying	with	the	archive	
 
With the advent of the digital, both sides of the barrier between storage and memory 
retain many of the characteristics depicted by Resnais and yet, they have undergone 
profound metamorphoses, rendering them more abstract and diffuse. One final 
aspect of these metamorphoses needs to be introduced before we can move on to a 
historical problematization of these developments with regard to the cultural heritage 
archive as both a technological and discursive construct.  
 If the operations of Resnais’s BNF as well as the subsequent library 
metamorphoses via digitalisation and digitisation were intended to facilitate retrieval, 
the Netflix altgenres are intended for one specific instance of a very specific type of 
retrieval facilitation: the element of recognition in personalised recommendation. 
Recommender systems, “if you liked this, you might like that”, are widespread these 
days. The example usually given is Amazon’s tracking of search and purchase 
histories, which enables them to display “Customers Who Bought Items in Your 
Basket Also Bought” and “Your Recently Viewed Items and Featured 
Recommendations” when you are logged into your profile on the website. 
 Netflix once based its recommendations solely on the user’s rating of each 
movie within a five star system in order to build an individualised taste profile based 
on numeric values. When the actual rating corresponds to the predicted rating, one 
would consider the taste profile accurate. But Netflix “wanted to highlight our 
personalization because we pride ourselves on putting the right title in front of the 
right person at the right time.”160 Altgenres take a vital part in this highlighting since, 
as commented by the journalist Alexis Madrigal, “It’s not just that Netflix can show 
you things you might like, but that it can tell you what kinds of things those are. It is, 
in its own weird way, a tool for introspection.”161 
                                                            
160 Todd Yellin, Netflix Vice President of Product, quoted in Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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 Netflix thus emphasises yet another aspect of the archive: the relation to the 
self. You, the user, are not just presented with a selection of objects “you might like” 
but also with a formulation, a sensible form, of what these specific objects of insect 
hunger and desire are. Navigating the interface’s vertical genre listings with 
horizontal movie options for each altgenre, supposedly becomes an exploration of an 
impression of the self, left by patterns of former use: “Members connect with these 
[genre] rows so well that we measure an increase in member retention by placing the 
most tailored rows higher on the page instead of lower.”162  
 Resnais’s ideal line – the barrier between front end and back end, “un 
équateur plus décisif […] que la traversée du miroir” – in effect becomes exactly that: 
a mirror. “Putting the right title in front of the right person at the right time” is not just 
a matter of presenting an object of desire, but a matter of doing so in order to create 
a moment of recognition of the self. This specular aspect is, of course, not solely a 
characteristic of Netflix. Similar to Netflix, Amazon operates both with a 1 to 5 star 
evaluation system and algorithmically generated taste profiles. And just like Netflix, 
Amazon doesn’t just track which items you choose. Via their Kindle platform, they 
also track which search terms lead to the purchased book, how fast you read, when 
you pause, what you highlight, and what reading activity follows and at which 
intervals.163 Amazon’s version of Netflix’s presentation of the right title to the right 
person and the right time could be exemplified by the professor picking up his Kindle 
version of Jonathan Franzen: The Kraus Project and moments later receiving an 
email recommending related reading. 
 
1.4.2	Hypomnemata	and	correspondence	
 
This moment of recognition brings the user to what Lacan called “la limite extatique 
du « Tu es cela ».”164 The archival barrier becomes an ecstatic limit in the 
confrontation with the ideal ego, Freud’s Ideal Ich, the unified imago of the self. But 
this mirror image is not simply constructed by algorithms. Just as we know that a 
                                                            
162 Todd Yellin in Ibid. 
163 Alter, “Your E-Book Is Reading You.” 
164 Lacan, “Le Stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je,” 97. 
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waving hand will usually manifest itself in the mirror, the contemporary user knows 
that actions influence the algorithmically constructed mirror image and as much as a 
source of joy, the confrontation with how the algorithm perceives you and your 
actions can equally be a source of sorrow or ironic acknowledgement of one’s guilty 
pleasures: I’m starting with the man in the mirror, I’m asking him to change his ways. 
 Where we have thus far used the term hypomnemata, in a Derridean sense, 
to mean any archival object, any trace or sign consigned in the ideal archival corpus 
as opus, Foucault spent a part of his late work on the exact same concept, although 
from a different perspective:  
 
“En fait, l’hupomnêmata a une signification très précise. C’est un cahier, 
un carnet. Plus précisément, ce type de carnet était en vogue à l’époque 
de Platon pour un usage administratif et personnel. Cette nouvelle 
technologie était aussi révolutionnaire que l’introduction de l’ordinateur 
dans la vie personnelle. Il me semble que la question de soi et de 
l’écriture doit être posée dans les termes du cadre technique et matériel 
dans lequel elle s’est posée.”165 
 
 For Derrida, hypomnemata meant the material externalisation of memory, for 
Foucault, it is an object connected to a very specific practice. For both, it is a matter 
of technique, but for Derrida it is a technique of inscription while for Foucault it is a 
technique of the self.166 For Derrida, any consignation entailed interpretation of 
hypomnemata but not necessarily heritage. For Foucault, the hupomnemata167 were 
the result of an act of consignation via interpretation with the explicit purpose of 
continual reinterpretation and heritage: “Ils constituaient une mémoire matérielle des 
choses lues, entendues ou pensées; ils les offraient ainsi comme un trésor accumulé 
                                                            
165 Foucault, “À propos de la généalogie de l’éthique : un aperçu du travail en cours,” 1222. 
166 These techniques of the self are what Foucault called technê tou biou as part of the caring for the 
self, epimeleia heautou. Foucault’s insistence on hupomnemata as a techniques of the self instead of 
inscription can be read as a direct jab at Derrida’s reading of Plato in La pharmacie de Platon: “Il ne 
faudrait pas envisager ces hupomnêmata comme un simple support de mémoire, qu’on pourrait 
consulter de temps à autre, si l’occasion s’en présentait. Ils ne sont pas destinés à se substituer au 
souvenir éventuellement défaillant.” Foucault, “L’écriture de soi,” 1238. 
167 We shall distinguish between the Derridean hypomnemata and the Foucauldian hupomnemata 
according to their respective preferred spellings of the Greek ὑπομνήματα. 
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à la relecture et à la méditation ultérieures.”168 For Foucault there are no 
hupomnemata without the techniques of heritage. 
 The goal of hupomnesic consignation – based on the interpretation of things 
seen, heard and read – was reinterpretation via these re-readings and meditations 
and, finally, heritage in the form of “la constitution de soi.”169 It was a matter of caring 
for the self, of epimeleia heautou. It was the unification of heterogeneous elements in 
body and soul thus creating one’s own identity: “Par le jeu des lectures choisies et de 
l’écritures assimilatrice, on doit pouvoir se former une identité à travers laquelle se lit 
toute une généalogie spirituelle.”170 The writer of things read thus goes to encounter 
the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of his or her soul the uncreated 
conscience of individual identity as heritage of its chosen genealogical past. 
 While, on the one hand, the role of hupomnemata is the construction of the 
self, i.e. consignation in the specific notebook of a fragmented ancestry the 
interpretation of which may project a mirror image of heritage (genealogy) to be 
assumed, on the other, it is to establish the practical means of becoming this image: 
“constituer un logos bioèthikos, un équipement de discours secourables, 
susceptibles […] d’élever leur voix et de faire taire les passions comme un maître qui 
d’un mot apaise le grondement des chiens.”171 If we remember the Lacanian mirror 
stage and its ecstatic “Tu es cela”, this first construction of self is the individual 
construction of the Ich Ideal, while the second construction of the master, would be 
the Ideal Ich. If we translate this to a later Lacanian vocabulary, it is the little other 
and the big Other, the “semblable” on the one hand and the point from which the ego 
is judged on the other.  
 In “L’écriture de soi” (1983), to which I have primarily been referring, Foucault 
adds yet another aspect, however. As another example of the technê tou biou, 
Foucault examines correspondence. The letter is another way of self writing but not a 
simple elaboration of the techniques of hupomnemata. More than a training of the 
self, it is a manifestation and expression of the self in front of the other: “La lettre 
rend le scripteur « présent » à celui auquel il l’adresse. Et présent non pas 
                                                            
168 Foucault, “L’écriture de soi,” 1237. 
169 Ibid. 1238. 
170 Ibid. 1242. 
171 Ibid. 1238. 
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simplement par les informations qu’il lui donne sur sa vie, ses activités […]; présent 
d’une sorte de présence immédiate et quasi physique.”172 And this manifestation is 
presented as something visual: “Écrire, c’est donc « se montrer », se faire voir, faire 
apparaître son propre visage auprès de l’autre.”173  
 The whole point of this visual presentation of the constructed self in the form 
of letter writing is to re-establish the mirror image: “Dans le cas du récit épistolaire de 
soi-même, il s’agit de faire venir à coïncidence le regard de l’autre et celui qu’on 
porte sur soi quand on mesure ses actions quotidiennes aux règles d’une technique 
de vie.”174 The goal is to have the two gazes coincide: the gaze of the self as 
established via the hupomnesic construction of the big Other and the gaze of the 
little other of the letter recipient: the hypocritical reader, brother, semblable of the 
subject. 
 
1.4.3	Ethopoiesis	and	doxopoiesis	
 
Foucault calls both these practices, those of hupomnemata and correspondence, 
ethopoietic practices. They are practices through which the subject establishes an 
ethos, i.e. what Foucault has elsewhere characterised as an “attitude”: “je veux dire, 
un mode de relation à l’égard de l’actualité; un choix volontaire qui est fait par 
certains; enfin, une manière de penser et de sentir, une manière aussi d’agir et de se 
conduire qui, tout à la fois, marque une appartenance et se présente comme une 
tâche.”175  
 Just as consignation entailed an establishment of kin and kind on the storage 
side of the barrier, i.e. the side of the hupomnesic notebook, ethos establishes, on 
the side of living memory, a belonging and a task, which, incidentally, is what we 
have here called heritage: a genealogical belonging and the task of deferred 
obedience. But while the Derridean reading of hypomnemata ends with heritage and 
the Foucauldean version ends with ethos, which we shall then consider parallel 
structures, Foucault’s reading of correspondence adds the question of a community 
                                                            
172 Ibid. 1244. 
173 Ibid. 1244. 
174 Ibid. 1249. 
175 Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières ? 1,” 1387. 
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of values: collective heritage. If the goal of correspondence is to make the other 
agree with one’s own construction of truth as the basis for an ethos,176 then we can 
say that it engages in a negotiation of a doxa understood as the community of 
values, i.e. correspondence opens up what we could call a doxopoietic dimension.177 
 What happens in the algorithmic facilitation or, rather, control of archival 
interaction is, thus, a very specific mode of what Foucault called “l’écriture de soi.” 
Whenever the user selects an object, whether a movie on Netflix, a book on Amazon 
or a book on the DPLA, this leaves a trace, an inscription, in the database – not in 
the library catalogue, but a separate database concerning user data and 
preferences. This is what Felix Stalder and Christine Mayer have, with regard to 
Google’s tracking of search, called “The second index”: “This one is not about the 
world’s information, but about the world’s users of information.”178  
 Foucault’s hupomnemata could conceivably be a practice conducted in the 
reading rooms of Resnais’s BNF where the notes of things read, “indispensable[s] à 
son lecteur,” become digested and transformed into the body and soul of the reader 
as truth transformed into ethos, “les fragments d’un même secret, qui a peut-être un 
très beau nom, qui s’appelle le bonheur.” Contemporary digitalised and digitised 
archival operations, however, track user interaction, not simply in order to reply to the 
“appels” from the reading rooms, but in order to guide those “appels,” whether simply 
to guide a search towards “better” results, to guide towards the 
consultation/consumption of more objects, or towards user retention: “The resulting 
classifications are designed to influence and manage populations and persons thus 
directly and indirectly affecting the choices and chances of data subjects.”179 
                                                            
176 Ethopoiesis is described as “la transformation de la vérité en êthos.” Foucault, “L’écriture de soi,” 
1237. 
177 The term doxa is here used in the sense proposed by Deleuze and Guattari as the identification “à 
un sujet générique éprouvant une affection commune.” Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie?, 138. The term is almost completely absent from Foucault’s work. As far as I can 
ascertain, the only occurrence is made with regard to Deleuze’s opposition of doxa and paradox in 
Logique du sens, see e.g. Deleuze, Logique du sens, 93. Foucault writes: “Si, plutôt que d’admettre 
avec complaisance sa citoyenneté dans la doxa, elle pratiquait méchamment le biais du paradoxe? 
Si, plutôt que de rechercher le commun sous la différence, elle pensait différentiellement la 
différence?” Foucault, “Theatrum philosophicum,” 956. It is thus important for Foucault that the 
doxopoietic dimension does not end in codified doxa. It is the task of ethos to avoid such codification. 
As we shall see in the final chapter, however, the word doxa has an additional meaning. 
178 Stalder and Mayer, “The Second Index. Search Engines, Personalization and Surveillance.” 
179 David Lyon quoted in Ibid. 
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 Within Derrida’s notion of the archive, such a second index is inconceivable 
as distinct from the first index of the archive. As remarked in the beginning of this 
chapter, for Derrida “Il n’y a pas de méta-archive.”180 For Derrida, any interpretation, 
any heritage, is simultaneously a re-inscription into the archive, an enrichment of the 
archive. And he was right. The second index determines our selection and 
interpretation of hypomnemata. It operates something like a hermeneutic circle 
between individual and collective interpretations: individual interpretation, an 
aggregation of all interpretations on record by that same individual and an 
aggregation of all interpretations by other individuals, i.e. an aggregated collective 
interpretation.  
 The second index is distinct from the archival practice of individual 
interpretation – technically it is a radically separate entity, which is even, usually, 
opaque to the user. The user rarely has any idea of how the second index influences 
interpretation apart from its mediated expressions in something like Netflix’s 
altgenres. Nonetheless, this second index haunts the primary index of information. It 
is the spectral presence of the aggregated reading practices of Oxford students on 
the pages of Shakespeare’s first folio, just as it is the vague spectral impression of 
other readers’ underlining in a Kindle e-book. Where Foucault described a practice of 
knowingly constructing a self in relation to a Big and a little other, the digitised 
archive creates the Big and little others behind the user’s back via data aggregation.  
 What is missing in these computational archival practices as compared to its 
Greek predecessors is the ability for letter writer and letter recipient, the ego and the 
little other of correspondence, to reject each other’s projections of the unified imago. 
This possibility, only hinted at in “L’écriture de soi,” Foucault elsewhere called 
Parresia: "[...] le parrèsiaste met en jeu le discours vrai de ce que les Grecs 
appelaient l’êthos.”181 Parresia is a mode of frankness, of telling the truth of one’s 
view of the other; it is the possibility of challenging the mirror image:  
 
“En somme, pour qu’il y ait parrêsia, il faut que, dans l’acte de vérité, il y 
ait : premièrement, manifestation d’un lien fondamental entre la vérité 
                                                            
180 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 108. 
181 Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 25. 
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dite et la pensée de celui qui l’a dite ; [deuxièmement], mise en question 
du lien entre les deux interlocuteurs (celui qui dit la vérité et celui auquel 
cette vérité est adressée). […] le parrèsiaste risque de défaire, de 
dénouer cette relation à l’autre qui a rendu possible précisément son 
discours.”182 
 
Within the Foucauldean framework, parresia is the structure preventing what we 
have called doxopoiesis from ever attaining a state of codified doxa. Parresia is the 
necessary insistent and persistent negotiation of constitutions of self and community 
and although parresia is most definitely possible within digital communication, in the 
more restricted domain of archive interaction as depicted by Resnais and our 
digitalised and digitised metamorphoses, a certain aspect of such parresia is 
eliminated by the second index.  
 
1.4.4	A	diagram	of	relations	
 
We must make yet another effort, and still always another — this is the invisible 
irony. Our conclusion, barely hinted at, is still only just at its beginning. Archival 
formations and practices, barriers and mirrors abound and are articulated by various 
instantiations of consignation, interpretation and heritage. It is time to attempt a 
summary of the relations that have so far been proposed as part of archival 
operations, whether manual, digitalised or digitised.  
 We started out by accepting Derrida’s notion of the archive as a topo-
nomological distribution of elements, the nomos allowing for the inclusion of 
consigned signs and determining the access to this consignation which then again 
opens the possibility of interpretation and heritage. What then is the topology, the 
distribution of relations, of this topo-nomological structure of the archive? What is its 
diagram? Throughout the chapter we have established the relations between 
                                                            
182 Ibid. 13. 
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archival law (nomos, N), the archival object (hypomnemata, H), the subject (S)183, 
the Big other (Le Grand Autre, A) constructed by the practice of consignation 
(including Foucault’s practice of hupomnemata), and, finally, the little other (le petit 
autre, a’) of correspondence and the algorithmically generated mirror image.184 In the 
diagram below, A is oddly situated between N and a’, as the Big other is a slippery 
entity which can be both the vague faceless presence of the law N and the presence 
of the law incorporated in the little other a’. 
 
 
 
                                                            
183 The word is here taken in the double sense proposed by Foucault: “Il y a deux sens au mot « sujet 
» : sujet soumis à l’autre par le contrôle et la dépendance, et sujet attaché à sa propre identité par la 
conscience ou la connaissance de soi.” Foucault, “Le sujet et le pouvoir,” 1046. 
184 The designation of the little other as “a’” and the Big other as “A” appear in Lacan’s “schema L”, cf. 
Lacan, “Le Stade Du Miroir Comme Formateur de La Fonction Du Je,” 66, and Lacan, Le Séminaire. 
Livre II – Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse, 1954-1955, 284. 
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 The strict concept of the archive considers nothing but the relation |NH|. 
Ernst’s cold media-archaeological analysis of “dead media that operate”185 is focused 
strictly on the mechanical dominion of N over H or how the real is translated into H 
by the symbolising N of the recording apparatus. There is no room for S in this 
perspective other than as the excluded part, and instead of the implicit authority of 
ethos, A can only take the form of the ἄρχοντες – what Azoulay called the sentries 
“distancing those wishing to enter” and what Derrida, in addition, described as those 
with a monopoly of interpretation.186 Similarly, Assmann’s concept of the archive is 
the relation |NH| of non-interpreted cultural reference memory, except she focuses 
less on the active exclusion of S and considers |NH| to be in a state of latency 
potentially to be actualised as canon by the relation of community |Sa’|.  
 For the concept of the archive, any engagement of S in a relation to H and, 
further, a relation to a’ as semblable, would thus bring us into the spheres of library 
and canon. Ernst’s library is the possibility for H to become cultural knowledge and, 
similarly, Assmann’s canon is clearly the possibility for H to circulate in the cultural 
practices of S and its a’ semblables outside the well guarded fortress of |NH|.  
 The vertical axis of that well guarded prison of Resnais’s BNF connects the 
unordered, formless deep of the BNF with the clear-cut view of the barrier between 
storage and memory from the top of the dome. This vertical axis is, of course, still the 
relation |NH|. Resnais’s final shot from the dome is the view from N on not only the 
operations of consignation constituting H as part of the ideal totality of exemplary 
memory but also on the barrier excluding S and a’, keeping them at a distance from 
the archival operations of |NH| and surveying their interactions with H on the side of 
the reading room.  
 As was clear from Toute la mémoire du monde, the barrier excluding the 
reader insects from the operations of the archive divides the horizontal axis but this 
barrier gains its authority from the vertical axis. The horizontal axis |Sa’| is divided by 
|NH| and thus renders the position of the other impossible for the semblable and 
reserves it for the sentry, thereby leaving the position of a’ to A. If the digitalisation of 
                                                            
185 Cf. Section 1.1.3. 
186 “Les archontes en sont d’abord les gardiens. Ils n’assurent pas seulement la sécurité physique du 
dépôt et du support. On leur accorde aussi le droit et la compétence herméneutiques. Ils ont le 
pouvoir d’interpréter les archives. Confiés en dépôt à de tels archontes, ces documents disent en effet 
la loi : ils rappellent la loi et rappellent à la loi.” Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 13. 
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library operations and the consequent possibility for chaotic storage emphasised an 
archival aspect of the library, a schism expressed in the term Library Archive System 
(LAS), the above model illustrates the two sides of the schizophrenic institution: The 
library giving access to the reader is the △NHS (and a’ as another instance of S) 
whereas the archival aspect is the △NHA. A takes the place of a’ when the relation 
|Sa’| is so patrolled by N that the possibility of parresia disappears. This is where the 
ethopoietic relation |Sa’| is dissolved in the doxa of a purely specular relation of S to 
an A which is not established by the practice of hupomnemata but by the 
presuppositions of N. 
 Darnton’s hopes for the DPLA revolved around the free access of S to H in a 
pure relation of △HSa’. The only N inhibiting the access to or enjoyment of H is 
supposedly the law of copyright. One almost gets the feeling that the proposed 
democratising horizontality of the DPLA as opposed to the corporate verticality of 
Google would eliminate N altogether, that the uninhibited democratic relation △HSa’ 
would simply exclude N from the system. The problem is that Darnton fails to 
recognise that the distributed infrastructure of the back end does not dissolve the 
barrier between △NHS and △NHA. It does not allow for a pure △HSa’ relation. The 
protocols embedded in the API allowing for the relation between back end and front 
end, between △NHA and △NHS, are as strict an N as ever. Access can be gained 
but only on the strict codified conditions of the API. And the N governing the 
distributed locations of the various H is still completely centralised. Furthermore, as 
we saw in the examples of both the Amazon warehouse and the Netflix streaming 
platform, the democratising technologies behind the digitalised as well as the 
digitised libraries are exactly the same as the ones guarding their commercial 
counterparts.  
 Derrida’s “archontes,” the A as instantiation of N, were “ceux qui 
commandait.”187 Galloway has stated something similar in an analysis of mediation 
as such: “The rulers are the mediators. They arbitrate and exercise dominion in the 
middle of a kingdom of relations. The mediator is the one who takes care, who 
directs or leads with attention to the entities at play.”188 The archive is a distribution 
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188 Galloway, “Love of the Middle,” 65. 
 70 
of the mediations involved in the relation |SH|. Such a relation always entails the 
positions of N, A and a’.  As was illustrated by Foucault’s reading of ethopoietic 
practices, even the solitary consignation of fragments along |SH| establishes an N 
and an A, and any mediation between multiple subjects, i.e. any movement towards 
canon, engages a’ in a mirror relation.  
 Now that we have attempted to diagram the relations inherent to the archive 
we must engage with the problem of periodization. Which historical breaks have 
contributed to the specific historical instantiation of archival relations called the digital 
cultural heritage archive? We will turn our attention to this question in the second 
chapter. 
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2.	An	object	of	formations189	
 
 
In the first chapter we asked concerning the archive as notion, concept, technical 
construction and related practice and we did so in the Derridean terms of 
consignation, interpretation and heritage. In this second chapter we shall leave our 
erstwhile protagonist, Derrida, and the archive as topo-nomological structure and 
greet Foucault as a new guide. In the latter’s vain we shall suppose that the archive 
does not exist in the form of inherent distributions and relations. If we suppose that it 
does not exist, then, what can history make of these different events and practices 
that are apparently organised around this supposed something of the archive?190 
 As we have seen in our description of various developments within library and 
archival technology from Resnais’s BNF to Darnton’s DPLA, it is difficult to determine 
what is radically new and what is just a continuation of the archive as it has always 
been. The general gesture of the first chapter has been to demonstrate similarity. 
Resnais’s BNF and Netflix, the Bodleian and Amazon, they all operate, although in 
slightly different ways, along the same axes, connecting the same positions. Such 
similarity only serves the opening of the field of questioning, however. Our main 
question does not regard archival operations in general, but the phenomenon of the 
digital cultural heritage archive in particular. This poses a historical problem, which 
was clearly formulated by Jacques Ellul: “Etant donné que le phénomène technique 
est une constante de l’histoire des hommes, y a-t-il aujourd’hui quelque chose de 
nouveau?”191 Is the digital cultural heritage archive, as a specific instantiation of 
archival operations as described in chapter 1, something new and, if so, to what 
extent? And which events and practices constitute its historical trajectories? 
 Given that cultural heritage and its archives are both, in some form or other, 
constants of human history, is there really anything new here? Ellul proposes two 
                                                            
189 Parts of sections 2.2.2-2.2.4 of this chapter have previously been published in Andreasen: 
“Constructing the contemporary via digital cultural heritage.” 
190 “[…] supposons que la folie n’existe pas. Dès lors, quelle est donc l’histoire que l’on peut faire de 
ces différents événements, de ces différentes pratiques qui, apparemment, s’ordonnent à ce quelque 
chose supposé qui est la folie?” Foucault, Naissance de La Biopolitique : Cours Au Collège de France 
(1978-1979), 5. 
191 Ellul, La technique, ou, L’enjeu du siècle, 57. 
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attitudes towards this question. The first would claim that technological development 
is a constant in which each innovation corresponds more or less to the others. The 
development of a stone axe is neither more nor less terrifying than the atomic bomb. 
Knowing a hawk from a handsaw is fundamentally equivalent to knowing a fox from 
a fax machine, a serpent from a server and a toad from a touchscreen. Any 
technological development is just another instance in the steady and never ending 
succession of technological developments.192 Contrary to this first attitude, which 
Ellul calls optimist, the second attitude would claim that in the mid 1950s, when Ellul 
wrote the first edition of the book in question, we were confronted with something 
completely new, differing from earlier technical stages not only in quantity but also in 
quality.  
 It is interesting from this perspective that the very same literature that names 
and describes contemporary digital media as “new media” tends to go far back in 
time to find the resources for their explanation of the present. Galloway, for example, 
references Aeschylus’s play Agamemnon to describe the incompatible dual aspects 
between which any network oscillates: On the one hand, the “chain of triumph” is the 
“linear, efficient, and functional”193 communication from A to B, it is the accessibility 
of meaning exemplified by the figures of Isis and Hermes. On the other hand, the 
“web of ruin,” exemplified by the Furies or the “swarm,” is the “lingering threat of 
networked forms of being (if not networked vengeance).”194 
 Lev Manovich similarly turns to the past, although less distant, to describe the 
present. He opens The language of New Media (2001) by indicating two separate 
historical trajectories: computing and media technologies. The one is illustrated by 
Charles Babbage’s “Analytical Engine” (1833), the uncompleted plans for a 
mechanical arithmetic calculator, the other by Louis Daguerre’s optical reproduction 
device, the daguerrotype (1839). The even earlier invention of the Jacquard loom 
(1801), however, which could weave elaborate images as instructed by punched 
cards, is presented as an early convergence of these two later trajectories. This 
                                                            
192 As expressed by H.G. Wells who will play a significant role in the following: “The modern 
encyclopædia should bear the same relation to the Encyclopédie or the early Encyclopædia 
Britannica that a transcontinental railway engine bears to Cugnot’s steam road car.” Wells, The Work, 
Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, 767. 
193 Galloway, “Networks,” 281. 
194 Ibid. 282. 
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convergence or inter-translatability becomes pivotal for Manovich’s concept of new 
media: “All existing media are translated into numerical data accessible for the 
computer. The result: graphics, moving images, sounds, shapes, spaces, and texts 
become computable, that is, simply sets of computer data. In short, media become 
new media.”195 
 As mentioned in section 1.3.1, Kittler reproduces this pattern, although he turns 
it upside down, when he rejects Mnemosyne, goddess of memory and mother of the 
muses, as a means of reading different storage techniques from antiquity until today 
in favour of the computer’s distinction between ROM (Read-Only Memory) and RAM 
(Random Access Memory). Kittler, for example, describes both parchment and the 
blackboard as RAM, since the traces left on the substrate are erasable, while the 
printing press constitutes a traditional ROM medium, since it would be less than 
practical to have the printed letters of the book run off and get lost before the feeding 
of the insects in the reading room.196 
 These three examples clearly demonstrate the difficulty of determining when 
something begins. Ellul proposed the conclusion that, if we examine the intrinsic 
characteristics of a given technical instance nothing ever changes. In our case, the 
intrinsic relational characteristics of the archive remain the same across the ages. 
What does change, however, is the relation between a technology and society: “Ce 
ne sont pas les caractères intrinsèques qui peuvent nous dévoiler s’il y a quelque 
chose de changé ou non, mais les caractères de la relation entre le phénomène 
technique et la société.”197  
 But how, then, should we analyse the relation between technology and society, 
between the different techniques and technologies of the digital cultural heritage 
archive and the community of heirs of its content? Acknowledging the difficulties of 
writing history and commenting on his own attempts to abandon a view of history as 
a relation between temporal continuity and the consciousness of the subject in favour 
of an analysis of the discontinuities that allow isolated entities to appear,198 Foucault 
once stated:  
                                                            
195 Manovich, The language of new media, 25. 
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“Chaque périodisation découpe dans l’histoire un certain niveau 
d’événements, et, inversement, chaque couche d’événements appelle sa 
propre périodisation. C’est là un ensemble de problèmes délicat, 
puisque, selon le niveau qu’on choisit, on devra délimiter des 
périodisations différentes, et que, selon la périodisation qu’on se donne, 
on atteindra des niveaux différents. On accède ainsi à la méthodologie 
complexe de la discontinuité.”199  
 
 In the following we shall examine two different levels of events and their 
respective periodizations in the attempt to see their convergence in the 
establishment of the digital cultural heritage archive around the beginning of the new 
millennium: 1. Technological development as the material condition of possibility of 
the digital cultural heritage archive, 2. The discourse of cultural politics providing 
funding and the legitimising vocabulary of the digital cultural heritage archive. We 
shall leave the academic hopes for utilising these archives and the critical stances 
toward the new technologies to chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 The formations or trajectories of the present chapter will be exemplified by 
concrete actors, projects and inventions. Such a presentation should not, however, 
be considered an argument for the pivotal influence of actors, projects and inventions 
on the historical periodizations. The mind of the genius is not here considered the 
bringer of the event. The concrete examples should, rather, be seen as 
manifestations of more general tendencies of the time or, rather, participants in the 
event. The limits of the present dissertation unfortunately prevent a complete 
exploration of the many aspects and actors within the respective formations. As an 
archive of its own, this dissertation will never know pleroma. The material covered is 
fortunately well described within the separate domains, however, so although it is in 
the nature of any dissertation as well as any other archive to aspire for the fulfilment 
of plethora in pleroma, only the aspects needed to argue for the proposed 
periodizations are included in the present consignation.  
 
                                                            
199 Foucault, “Sur les façons d’écrire l’histoire,” 614. 
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2.1	Technological	development	
 
“Die Technik aber ist offenbar kein 
rein naturwissenschaftliger 
Tatbestand. Sie ist zugleich ein 
geschichtlicher.” 
 
Walter Benjamin: “Eduard Fuchs, 
der Sammler und der Historiker” in 
Gesammelte Schriften II · 2 p. 474 
 
 
2.1.1	1945:	Birth	of	the	computer	
 
In spite of the mentioned attempts to read antiquity or the nineteenth century as 
privileged predecessors to new media, and although the historical roots of the digital 
clearly reach far back into the depths of history, something new did happen in the 
period from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, leading to the traditional starting point 
for the history of the modern computer around 1945.200 Although Manovich’s 
genealogy is usually acknowledged, the standard account of the birth of the modern 
computer seems to be constituted by, roughly, the theoretical genesis of computing 
from Alan Turing’s “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem” (1937), John von Neumann’s “First Draft of a Report on the 
EDVAC” (1945) and Claude Shannon’s “A mathematical theory of communication” 
(1948) and their concrete instantiations in those cryptically named computers: ENIAC 
(1944), EDVAC (1949) and UNIVAC (1951) etc.201  
                                                            
200 For example, although he does problematize periodization, Paul E. Ceruzzi’s A History of Modern 
Computing takes 1945 as its point of departure. Contrary to our Foucauldean approach, however, 
Ceruzzi’s account of history as brought about by individual conscious will and creation is about as un-
Foucauldian as imaginable, cf. “The “computer age” […] was not just invented; it was willed into 
existence by people who wanted it to happen.” Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 15. 
201 This is, of course, a gross simplification. Jussi Parikka clearly described the predicament of writing 
a history of computers: “In a way, there is no history of computers, but multiple histories of computer 
technologies, components, and practices. […] In short, there is just too much for a single history of the 
computer. Any history of computing becomes suddenly a metaquestion of how to write a history of 
such complexity.” Parikka, “History of Computers,” 249. 
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 Again, although no one doubts their importance, these works are not 
manifestations of brilliant lightning from a clear blue sky of ignorance. Alonzo Church 
had written a demonstration of undecidability (the Entscheidungsproblem) a few 
months before Turing202. Von Neumann drew enough on the work of John Presper 
Eckert and John Mauchley to drive a yearlong patent feud. And Shannon’s 
contribution to the “statistical theory of the amount of information, in which the unit 
amount of information was that transmitted as a single decision between equally 
probable alternatives” should be seen in the general context of the day, where, 
according to Norbert Wiener, this “idea occurred at about the same time to several 
writers […]”203.  
 Turing’s paper demonstrated the logical foundation of computational 
machines, which Turing himself called “the universal computing machine” and 
Alonzo Church soon after dubbed the “Turing machine.”204 Turing concluded: “It is 
possible to invent a single machine which can be used to compute any computable 
sequence.”205 Such universality arises through a specific machine figuration’s 
operation of logical steps on symbols on a string of paper tape where the machine’s 
scanning of symbols can lead to a change in the logical figuration.206   
 Building on Turing’s description, Von Neumann’s report described what has 
come to be known as the “von Neumann architecture.” This architecture describes a 
“stored-program” computer, meaning that it keeps program instructions and data in 
the same read-write random-access memory (RAM).207 Von Neumann’s computer 
model contained five elements: a central arithmetic element; a logical control unit 
                                                            
202 Augarten, Bit by Bit : An Illustrated History of Computers, 1944. 
203 Wiener, Cybernetics, or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 10. 
204 Church, “Review: A. M. Turing, On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem,” 43, see also Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral, the Origins of the Digital Universe, 
250. 
205 Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” 241. 
206 It should be noted that Turing’s paper was not a proposed computer design but a hypothetical 
machine used to demonstrate a theoretical solution to David Hilbert’s so called Entscheidungsproblem 
regarding the demonstrability of the solvability of logical problems, see Augarten, Bit by Bit : An 
Illustrated History of Computers, 143. 
207 It should be mentioned that although he received most of the credit, von Neumann was not the 
originator of the stored-program computer. John A. P. Eckert and John Mauchly had already arrived at 
the idea during their construction of the ENIAC and their conception of the EDVAC, cf. Ibid. 139. 
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ordering the logical steps described by Turing; a memory unit which would store both 
instructions and data; and finally input and output.208  
 As suggested by its title, Shannon’s paper describes the formal structure of 
information communication systems consisting of five parts:  
 
“1. An information source which produces a message or sequence of 
messages to be communicated to the receiving terminal. […] 
2. A transmitter which operates on the message in some way to produce 
a signal suitable for transmission over the channel. […] 
3. The channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal from 
transmitter to receiver. […] 
4. The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of the done by 
the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal. 
5. The destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is 
intended.”209  
 
Information here takes the form of binary digits (“bits”), what Gregory Bateson 
famously described as “a difference which makes a difference.”210 It is interesting 
that the receiver and the destination are necessary elements of the formal structure 
of information. If we consider message reconstruction as an act of consignation of 
signal from noise in the channel, we can inscribe this process in our diagram from 
chapter 1, where the rules of reconstruction (N) and the bits of information (H) will 
always require, as a minimum, a virtual destination (A in the position of a’).  
 It is possible to consider these three papers as crucial expressions of, first, 
the birth of computational logics, next, the birth of the contemporary computer as the 
implementation of those logics in a structure with addressable memory and, finally, 
the birth of information science. But we can also consider them as instantiations of 
what Kittler describes as the necessary and sufficient elements of new media: 
computation, storage and transmission. Kittler saw all three of them in the von 
                                                            
208 See Johnston, “Technology,” 206. 
209 Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” 2. 
210 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, 
and Epistemology, 321. 
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Neumann architecture: “Structurally, the bits stored in registers perform logical 
operations and arithmetical calculations, the multiple busses transport commands, 
data, and addresses, whereas the RAM supplies storage places for commands, 
addresses and data.”211 And this architecture then enables the generalised 
convergence detected by Manovich in the Jacquard loom. For Kittler, the 
consequence of this universality of the computer means the end of all media. What 
made new media new for Manovich, for Kittler meant the transition of media in the 
plural to media in the singular:  
 
“Vor dem Ende, geht etwas zu Ende. In der allgemeinen Digitalisierung 
von Nachrichten und Kanälen verschwinden die Unterschiede zwischen 
einzelnen Medien. Nur noch als Oberflächeneffekt, wie er unterm 
schönen Namen Interface bei Konsumenten ankommt, gibt es Ton und 
Bild, Stimme und Text.[…] Und wenn die Verkabelung bislang getrennte 
Datenflüsse alle auf eine digital standardisierte Zahlenfolge bringt, kann 
jedes Medium in jedes andere übergehen. Mit Zahlen ist nichts 
unmöglich. […] ein totaler Medienverbund auf Digitalbasis wird den 
Begriff Medium selber kassieren. Statt Techniken an Leute 
anzuschließen, läuft das absolute Wissen als Endlosschleife.”212 
 
 As we shall see several times along the way, such eschatology of media 
holds its own pleromatic markers, although in this instance not without a certain 
irony: Nothing is impossible, absolute knowledge engages in its own eternal 
feedback loop.  
 
2.1.2	The	World	brain	&	the	Memory	Extender	
 
                                                            
211 Kittler, “Towards an Ontology of Media,” 30. 
212 Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 8. 
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During these years when the computer was born, or, rather, went from designating a 
human to designating a machine,213 two more or less concrete hardware suggestions 
were made, which have both been considered precursors of contemporary digital 
archives: H.G. Well’s World Brain (1938) and Vannevar Bush’s Memex (1945).214 
Neither was digital and neither entailed actual computation but they should be seen 
in the context of the technical dreams and ambitions that, according to historian 
James R. Beniger, abounded before the formal formulations of computing: “The 
concepts of information processing, programming, decision, and control and the 
intellectual stimulation of the relationships among them seemed “in the air” among 
European and American engineers, mathematicians, and philosophers by the mid-
1930s.”215  
 As mentioned above, Darnton considered the DPLA “a technological 
infrastructure that makes [collections] instantly available to the user with one click on 
an electronic device.” A remarkably similar dream was expressed by H.G. Wells 
when, in 1938, he declared: “The time is close at hand when any student, in any part 
of the world, will be able to sit with his projector in his own study at his or her 
convenience to examine any book, any document, in an exact replica.”216 While for 
Darnton, “we have the technological and economic resources,” for Wells, “The time 
is close at hand.” 
 A few years later, in 1945, Vannevar Bush, formulated a similar vision for the 
problem to which scientists, whose time had been liberated by the end of the war, 
should turn their attention: “Science has provided the swiftest communication 
between individuals; it has provided a record of ideas and has enabled man to 
manipulate and to make extracts from that record so that knowledge evolves and 
endures throughout the life of a race rather than that of an individual.”217 One is 
                                                            
213 “The word ‘‘computer’’ originally meant a person who solved equations; it was only around 1945 
that the name was carried over to machinery.” Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 1. 
214 Cf. e.g. Hillis, Petit, and Jarrett, Google and the Culture of Search, 15, Chun, Programmed Visions, 
Software and Memory, 137., Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, the Original Design and Ultimate 
Destiny of the World Wide Web by Its Inventor, 5. 
215 Beniger, The Control Revolution, Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society, 
403. It should be noted here, that Wells had no formal knowledge of computation and that Bush was 
sceptical of the prospects of projects such as the ENIAC, see Augarten, Bit by Bit : An Illustrated 
History of Computers, 137. 
216 Wells, World Brain, 54. 
217 Bush, “As We May Think.” 
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reminded of the beginning of Toute la mémoire du monde: “Parce que leur mémoire 
est courte, les hommes accumulent d’innombrables pense-bêtes.” Much like the 
operations of the BNF, Bush proposed a device to avoid drowning in the formless 
depths depicted at the beginning of Resnais’s film. 
 Both Wells’ World Brain and Bush’s Memex are regularly mentioned as 
forerunners of later digital archives and both were profoundly analogue. When Wells 
mentioned the student’s “projector,” he imagined the projection of microfilm, 
referencing that the British Museum had recently made microfilm replicas of 4.000 
books published before 1550. And just as Darnton saw the technological road clear 
for archival pleroma, so, too, Wells only scoffed at technological challenges:  
 
“There is no practical obstacle whatever now to the creation of an 
efficient index to all human knowledge, ideas and achievements, to the 
creation, that is, of a complete planetary memory for all mankind. And not 
simply an index; the direct reproduction of the thing itself can be 
summoned to any properly prepared spot.”218 
 
 Bush also saw in the medium of microfilm the promise of overcoming the 
technological challenges that had prevented Leibniz and, later, Babbage from 
completing their respective plans of calculating machines: “The world has arrived at 
an age of cheap complex devices of great reliability; and something is bound to 
come of it.”219 The level of technological progress at the time seemed finally to fulfil 
the archival promise. But in contrast to Wells, Bush is less enthralled by the 
pleromatic prospects of “the complete planetary memory for all mankind” than he is 
about the possibility for the individual to safely sail the rising archival seas without 
risking engulfment. He, too, saw the need to imprison the record in order for 
humanity to keep its liberty. Extending the record is easy; the challenge is how to 
consult it. Where Wells focused on centralised storage and access, Bush was 
interested in individual storage and techniques of retrieval. 
                                                            
218 Wells, World Brain, 60. 
219 Bush, “As We May Think.” 
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 For both, such consultation is not just a matter of scientific consignation and 
interpretation, it is also a matter of heritage: “This is a much larger matter than 
merely the extraction of data for the purposes of scientific research; it involves the 
entire process by which man profits by his inheritance of acquired knowledge.”220 
Similarly, for Wells, the necessity of the World brain for a development of the 
planetary memory of mankind regarded “what we are doing with this precious 
inheritance of ours […]”221 This, of course, is not “cultural heritage” in the emphatic 
institutional sense to which we shall return, but a certain notion of heritage which we 
can include in our Derridean sense.  
 Where Wells shrugged off technical detail with a laugh, Bush, an engineer, 
proposed a desk with screens for scanning and projecting documents. His intent was 
to leave “repetitive thought” to the machines in order to let humanity get on with the 
creative side of things. One such machine alleviation of repetitive thought is 
exemplified by Herman Hollorith’s punched card machine, developed for the 1890 
US census and since used for a wide array of bureaucratic purposes. In general, “the 
creative aspect of thinking is concerned only with the selection of the data and the 
process to be employed” whereas “the manipulation thereafter is repetitive in nature 
and hence a fit matter to be relegated to the machines.”222  
 According to Bush, selection is, however, severely inhibited by prevailing 
indexing systems. The alphabetical or numerical filing of documents in only one 
location as we saw in the BNF and its library successors is, for Bush, fundamentally 
at odds with the workings of the human mind which, quite the contrary, operates by 
association. The Memex is therefore “an enlarged intimate supplement to [individual] 
memory” which, in addition to “the usual scheme of indexing,” would allow the owner 
to join items into a web of numerous associative trails. Bush proposes the trail 
example of texts relating to the failed adoption of the Turkish bow in Europe. Each 
relevant document is thus adorned with a code indicating its association with such a 
trail and the trail could be called forth on the projection screen and played through at 
a desired speed. 
                                                            
220 Ibid. 
221 Wells, World Brain, 130. 
222 Bush, “As We May Think.” 
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 This associative linking of documents has repeatedly been seen as the 
precursor to hyperlinking, i.e. digital links between documents or elements thereof. 
This notion was initially developed by Ted Nelson with regard to his on-going Xanadu 
project – “The Original Hypertext Project” – founded in 1960, which in a 1972 paper 
he inscribed as a direct descendant of Bush’s vision.223 One could imagine the 
Memex trails as a precursor to Wikipedia where terms of a certain relevance are 
linked to a page of their own. But although the Memex does enable a web of trails it 
is far from networked. It has the form of a wooden desk with no connectivity for 
automated document exchange with similar machines.  
 
Illustration of Bush’s Memex from the reprint of the original article in Life Magazine, November 19, 
1945. 
 
 Exchange is possible but only via microfilm hardcopies that can be carried 
and manually installed in another isolated machine. Along with the material substrate 
of microfilm, this non-networked setup is the object of Nelson’s suggestions 
regarding a “general transmission network [which] will carry requested documents 
from libraries to users, new documents form users to libraries, and communications 
                                                            
223 Nelson, “As We Will Think.” 
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and documents between users.”224 Such a general network was, however, not yet 
technically feasible when Bush wrote his article. The general technologies of 
networking had to be invented first.  
 
2.1.3	Networked	libraries	
 
Twenty years after the publication of Bush’s article on the Memex, J.C.R. Licklider 
published the report Libraries of the Future (1965). Only having “heard about Memex 
and its “trails of references””225, Licklider was but indirectly influenced by the earlier 
article. During the book’s editing, however, someone noticed the article’s absence 
from the references whereupon Licklider finally read Bush’s piece and, ultimately, 
dedicated the book to him. Licklider recognised in Bush a semblable and, like Nelson 
later on, inscribed himself and his work as heir, as genealogical successor.  
 Although his optimism seemed more deeply rooted in a concrete technological 
evaluation and projection, Licklider joined Wells and Bush in deeming the 
technological obstacles to the fulfilment of archival desire surmountable: 
“Extrapolation, however uncertain, suggests that the basic “mechanical” constraints 
will disappear […] Thus in the present century, we may be technically capable of 
processing the entire body of knowledge in almost any way we can describe […]”226  
 Licklider shared with Bush the idea that, given the tremendous size of the 
human record, the necessary invention would free the user to engage with the 
creative part of thinking and leave the practicalities to the new device:  
 
“It no longer seems likely that we can organize or distill or exploit the 
corpus by passing large parts of it through human brains.”227  
 
“[The user] will still read and think and, hopefully, have insights and make 
discoveries, but he will not have to do all the searching himself nor all the 
                                                            
224 Ibid. 448. 
225 Licklider, Libraries of the Future, xii. 
226 Ibid. 19–20. 
227 Ibid. 28. 
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transforming, nor all the testing for matching or compatibility that is 
involved in creative use of knowledge.”228  
  
 Similar to the Memex, Licklider’s device was to take the form of a desk, but 
contrary to Bush, Licklider envisioned a networked version: “[...] the concept of 
“desk” may have changed from passive to active: a desk may be primarily a display-
and-control station in a telecommunication-telecomputation system,” and the stores 
of knowledge as well as the computational power allowing retrieval and manipulation 
of relevant information would happen via connection “into the procognitive utility 
net.”229  
 Like Wells and Bush, Licklider was thus clearly thinking of an extension of the 
human mind but his vision was influenced by a new technological situation. Libraries 
of the future was the report of a research project, launched by the Council on Library 
Resources in 1961.230 In October 1962, Licklider took a year’s leave of absence in 
order to head the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)’s newly founded 
Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). He did, however, continue to 
survey the project at a distance and published the book as its final report. At IPTO, 
Licklider was to have a profound impact on the decision to engage in the 
development of communication networks and what became the ARPAnet and then 
the Internet. 
 In 1960, Licklider had published a paper called “Man-Computer Symbiosis” 
where he formulated the hope “that, in not too many years, human brains and 
computing machines will be coupled together very tightly, and that the resulting 
partnership will think as no human brain has ever thought and process data in a way 
not approached by the information-handling machines we know today.”231 So far, in 
symbiosis as the perfect extension of the mind, the indirect heritage from Bush was 
                                                            
228 Ibid. 32. 
229 Ibid. 33. Licklider proposed the term “procognitive systems” instead of the historically burdened 
“library”: “Since the systems are intended to promote the advancement and application of knowledge, 
they are “for knowledge,” and thus procognitive systems. When this term is used in the plural, it refers 
to specialized systems as well as to the general, neolibrary system, and sometimes to successive 
generations of such systems. When it is used in the singular, it refers to the neolibrary system of the 
assumed epoch.” Ibid. 6. 
230 Incidentally, The Council on Library Resources was founded in 1956, the year of Resnais’ss 
depiction of the BNF. 
231 Licklider, “Man-Computer Symbiosis,” 4. 
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clear. But six months after his arrival at IPTO, Licklider wrote a memo arguing for the 
necessity to “develop a capability for integrated network operation.”232 This hope for 
a human symbiosis with networked computing should be considered in the context of 
two concepts much discussed at the time: time sharing233 and packet switching – the 
one relating to computing resources, the other relating to the establishment of a 
robust network of transmission, i.e. the two sides of Licklider’s proposed 
“telecommunication-telecomputation system.” 
 Time sharing was conceived as an alternative to the earlier predominant 
computing form of “batch processing.” This latter type of processing was sequential 
in nature and ran a program from start to finish without any possible interaction or 
interruption. The program and data were fed to input via, e.g., punched cards, and at 
some point an output would arrive and the next job in line could be entered.234 Such 
processing meant queuing individual jobs, which resulted in a lot of wasted time 
waiting for access to computing resources. If we consider the computational process 
an archival instance of mechanically interpreting consigned data, the hermeneutic 
privilege remained in the hands of the archontic computer operator and was granted 
to the users in turns.  
 Time sharing, on the other hand, allowed multiple terminals to interact with the 
mainframe computer via such technologies as “polling” and “interrupt.” In the first 
case, the mainframe would poll the terminals at intervals to see if additional data or 
instructions were available which could then be inserted in the processing queue. In 
the case of interrupt, instructions from the terminal could engage and determine the 
running process and deliver inputs when wanted. The interrupt “makes software 
“social,” making its performance dependent upon associations with “others”—
processes and performances elsewhere. These may be human users, other pieces 
of software, or numerous forms of phenomena traced by physical sensors such as 
                                                            
232 Licklider quoted in Lyon and Hafner, Where Wizards Stay up Late, the Origins of the Internet, 38. 
233 Time sharing is first mentioned in Bemer, “How to Consider a Computer.” 
234 An illustration can be found in Stanford student, Ellis D. Kropotchev’s short silent film depicting the 
“trials and tribulations of batch processing” (1967). 
http://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/punched-cards/2/211/2253. 
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weather monitors and security alarms. The interrupt connects the dataspace of 
software to the sensorium of the world.”235   
 In this sense, both polling and the interrupt can be seen as a redistribution of 
archontic power. In the first case, the archon actively checks if anyone has anything 
to add or enquire. In the second, although still strictly limited by the protocols of the 
computer and network, the interrupt establishes the possibility of actively taking 
hermeneutic privilege instead of waiting for an open slot in the queue. 
 In a first step, however, time sharing remained a limited distribution of access 
as in the case of terminals’ communication with specific mainframes. Packet 
switching breaks with this paradigm. Ensconced within the military horizon of the 
RAND Corporation, Paul Baran sought a solution to the problem of a potential 
communications breakdown during nuclear war. If a first enemy strike were to 
damage the communication infrastructure, how would the nation deploy a 
coordinated defence or counterattack?236 Baran’s response was to break up 
messages into small fragments or packets to be sent along various routes in a 
distributed network. Should one or several nodes in the network become unavailable, 
the packet would simply find a different available route on its own and finally 
reconstitute the message at the receiving end.237  
 
                                                            
235 Yuill, “Interrupt,” 162. As can be deduced from the wording, Yuill uses the term “social” in a 
Latourean vain. 
236 It should be noted that Baran was trying to avoid war, not to help win such a war. The argument 
was that the inability to continue fighting after being the victim of a first attack would increase the 
desire to strike first. Baran’s network was to decrease the importance of the first strike. “Indeed, Baran 
and his colleagues even advocated sharing the packet-switching technology with the Soviets, on the 
grounds that having survivable communications on both sides would be the most stable configuration 
of all.” Waldrop, The Dream Machine, J.C.R. Licklider and the Revolution That Made Computing 
Personal, 276. 
237 We should not forget that at more or less the same time, Donald Davies invented a network 
technology very much similar to that of Baran. Contrary to Baran, however, Davies had no military 
purpose in mind for his invention. He “simply wanted to create a new public communications network.” 
The term “packet switching” comes form Davies. Baran had proposed the somewhat more clumsy 
name “distributed adaptive message block switching.” Lyon and Hafner, Where Wizards Stay up Late, 
the Origins of the Internet, 66–67. 
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Baran’s illustrations of network types, Baran, “On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to 
Distributed Communications Networks,” 2. 
 
 This double invention of distributed computing resources and distributed 
transmission networks thus seems to have been very much “in the air” when 
Licklider’s research group conceived of its future “procognitive systems.”238 For not 
only did these systems involve networked terminals, they also re-evaluated our 
habitual information entities: 
 
“[...] the difficulty of separating the information in books from the pages, 
and the absence, in books, of active processors, are the roots of the 
most serious shortcomings of our present system for interacting with the 
body of recorded knowledge. We need to substitute for the book a device 
                                                            
238 In the mentioned documents, Licklider makes frequent reference to time-sharing but does not 
explicitly evoke packet switching. He does however refer to “survivability”: “First, for the sake of 
reliability and what the military calls “survivability,” the top-echelon subsystem should be replicated.” 
Licklider, Libraries of the Future, 40-41. Survivability was the goal of packet switching, Baran’s 
description of his proposed future systems: “We will soon be living in an era in which we cannot 
guarantee survivability of any single point. However, we can still design systems in which system 
destruction requires the enemy to pay the price of destroying n of n stations. If n is made sufficiently 
large, it can be shown that highly survivable system structures can be built – even in the 
thermonuclear era.” Ibid. 16. 
 88 
that will make it easy to transmit information without transporting material 
[…]”239  
 
 Licklider dissolved the material substrate of the book in its various functions. Its 
“positive attributes all relate, as indicated, to the display function. The tallies that 
could be made for the storage, organization, and retrieval functions are less 
favorable.”240 His interpretative elements were clearly units of facts, answers to 
concrete questions.241 Licklider himself describes “facts” as “items of information or 
knowledge derived form one or more documents and not constrained to the form or 
forms of the source passages.”242 Wells’ reproductions are no longer of interest, only 
the information they could yield. And Licklider is less interested in Bush’s individual 
associative trails between locally stored microfilm documents than in the possibility 
of a computational association of disembodied data. Where the propositions of Wells 
and Bush focused on storage, i.e. access to information stored on microfilm, 
Licklider’s library project is interested in computation and transmission of fragmented 
data packets distinct from the traditional library object.  
 
2.1.4	From	networks	to	storage	
 
We have looked at the theoretical foundations of computing and the accompanying 
visions for either the isolated organisation of knowledge in the individual’s Memex or 
centralisation of all knowledge in a World Brain.243 It may seem odd that the time of 
                                                            
239 Licklider, Libraries of the Future, 6. 
240 Ibid. 4. 
241 Cf. the examples Ibid. 29. 
242 Ibid. 36. 
243 It could be argued that Wells’s World Brain is in fact decentralised. He consistently speaks of 
concentration of knowledge in the Brain, and the organisation thus seems centralised, but he does 
occasionally acknowledge the possibility of something like a decentralised network: “The 
Encyclopaedic organization need not be concentrated now one place; it might have the form of a 
network. It would centralize mentally but perhaps not physically. Quite possibly it might to a large 
extent be duplicated. It is its files and its conference rooms which would be the core of its being, the 
essential Encyclopaedia. It would constitute the material beginning of a real World Brain.” Wells, 
World Brain, 49. Wells acknowledges the possibility of decentralisation but it would only be a 
decentral distribution of reproductions of centralised knowledge. The organisation of knowledge as 
such is still completely centralised in a “new centralising and unifying organ, which I have called the 
Permanent World Encyclopaedia.” Wells quoted in Rayward, “H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World Brain,” 
560. 
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computation would foster fantasies of storage. But although computation in the 
1940’s was mainly applied to specific tasks extensively related to war and science, 
new forms of material storage of information had proven useful for decades. 
Hollerith’s punched cards had already revolutionised bureaucratic technology.  
 What the future should hold was contested, however. As Ceruzzi notes, 
Wallace Eckert who worked with IBM at Colombia University opposed the radical 
new design of the EDVAC stored-program computer in favour of further 
“modifications to punched card machines.”244 Howard Aiken, who had worked on the 
IBM Mark I computer, was unable to see the radical innovations within computing as 
relevant beyond the specific domains already tested. He did not think that “the basic 
logics of a machine designed for the numerical solution of differential equations 
[could] coincide with the logics of a machine intended to make bills for a department 
store.”245 In the midst of such multifaceted and contested development, it seems 
comprehensible that whatever was “in the air” could provide an open space for the 
projection of fantasies. As Bush said: “something is bound to come of it” but what, 
exactly, was still very much a matter for the imagination. 
 Licklider’s report was written at a time when the basic principles of computing 
were better known and understood and the network had taken the role of primary 
contested element.246 After a first successful ARPAnet transmission between UCLA 
and Stanford Research Institute at 10.30 AM October 29, 1969, the digital network 
could finally claim technological victory around 1990. And for two reasons. For one 
thing, December 1990 saw the first running “WorldWideWeb browser/editor” running 
on Tim Berners-Lee’s NeXT computer at CERN.247 For another, according to a study 
performed by Martin Hilbert and Priscila López, 1990 was the year where more than 
50% of the worlds telecommunication became digital.248  
 Again we have the double trajectories of technological development and the 
visions for how this development could be useful – technologies and imaginaries – 
                                                            
244 Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 25. 
245 Aiken quoted in Ibid. 
246 For a rendition of Baran’s problems with persuading AT&T to participate in the development of 
distributed networks, cf. Lyon and Hafner, Where Wizards Stay up Late, the Origins of the Internet, 
62–63. 
247 Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, 30. 
248 Hilbert and López, “The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute 
Information,” 63. 
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two trajectories finally about to converge. In his invention of the World Wide Web and 
its Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), Berners-Lee recognised a conceptual 
genealogy in Vannevar Bush and his Memex, Ted Nelson’s notion of Hypertext and 
its implementation in what he called Xanadu and, finally, Doug Engelbart’s proposed 
NLS (oN Line System). But he claims that “Unfortunately, just like Bush and Nelson, 
Doug was too far ahead of his time.” Berners-Lee mentions Donald Davis and Paul 
Baran as developers of the technologies behind the Internet, which had existed since 
the 1970s249 but was “only just becoming pervasive. I happened to come along with 
time, and the right interest and inclination, after hypertext and the Internet had come 
of age. The task left to me was to marry them together.”250 
 In our periodization, then, computation had its early development period from 
the 1930s to the 1950s. The distributed network was contested and developed in the 
1960s until around 1990, culminating with the opening of the World Wide Web to free 
private as well as commercial use in 1993. The next, and for our purposes final, 
stage is the predominance of digital storage. According to the study by Hilbert and 
López, 2002 marks the point where the majority of all information on earth was 
stored digitally.251 This indicates a drastic acceleration from 25% digital information 
in 2000, 50% in 2002 and 94% in 2007 (e.g. hard drives, servers, DVD and Blu-Ray). 
In comparison, they mention that in 1986, 58% of the world’s information was stored 
on analogue videotapes, 14% on vinyl records, 12 % on analogue audiotapes, 8% on 
photographic positives and 5% on photographic negatives.252 
 
                                                            
249 It should be noted that the term Internet here describes any kind of transmission using the TCP/IP 
suite (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), whereas the World Wide Web as invented by 
Berners-Lee around 1990 is a network of hypertext documents linked by HTTP (Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol). The World Wide Web is thus a subsection of the Internet. 
250 Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web, 6. 
251 Vastag, “Exabytes.” 
252 Hilbert and López, “The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute 
Information,” 61. 
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Illustration of the rise in digital storage from Vastag, “Exabytes.” 
 
 As we shall see, the shift in storage from analogue to digital in 2002 coincides 
more or less with the advent of the concept of digital cultural heritage. For now, it is 
interesting to note that the turn of the millennium was the target date for Licklider’s 
future libraries or procognitive systems.253 He had taken as “the working assumption 
that there will be 2 · 1015 bits in 1980 and 5 · 1015 bits in the year 2000.”254 According 
to Hilbert and López, the actual storage capacity was more along the lines of 2,6 
exabytes in 1986, “15,8 in 1993, over 54,5 in 2000, and to 295 optimally compressed 
exabytes in 2007.”255 In order to fully understand the difference, we should 
remember that one exobyte is 1018 bytes and that one byte is eight bits. The number 
                                                            
253 “The “future,” in “libraries of the future,” was defined at the outset, in response to a suggestion from 
the council, as the year 2000.” Licklider, Libraries of the Future, 2. 
254 Ibid. 15. 
255 Hilbert and López, “The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute 
Information,” 62. 
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presented by Hilbert and López for 2000 thus corresponds to 4,36 · 1020 bits, i.e. 
almost 100.000 times more than predicted by Licklider in 1965.256 
 
2.1.5	Infinite	storage	
 
We have already seen some of the archival fantasies that co-occurred with the rise 
of computation (1930s - 1950s) and networked transmission (1960s-1990s), and we 
have now almost arrived at the imaginaries of the digital cultural heritage archive as 
co-occurring with the rise to prominence of digital storage around the beginning of 
the new millennium. This prominence is the result of a drastic acceleration of the 
capacity of an invention from the time of transition between our ages of computation 
and networks. The hard drive as we know it today and which still holds the 
information in, e.g., Amazon’s and Netflix’s servers, was first presented in 1956 and 
thus the same year as Resnais’s Toute la mémoire du monde. But, as predicted by 
Licklider, “For several decades, indeed, it seems likely that the limitations on memory 
size will completely dominate the picture […]”257 
 On September 14, 1956 IBM made a press release announcing the 305 
RAMAC and the 650 RAMAC, “two electronic data processing machines using IBM’s 
random access memory, a stack of disks that stores millions of facts and figures less 
than a second from management’s reach.”258 RAMAC stood for “Random Access 
Method of Accounting and Control” and the disk stacks in question were the first hard 
drives – the 350 Disk Storage Unit and the 355 Disk Storage Unit for the 305 and the 
650 respectively. The 50 disks of the 350 could store 5 million 6-bit characters 
                                                            
256 In Licklider’s defense, it should be noted that his conception of what should be stored was far from 
more recent notions of multimedia. By limiting his scope to “the facts, concepts, principles, and ideas 
that lie behind the visible and tangible aspects of documents,” or what he called “transformable 
information,” he excluded much of what we would now consider crucial parts of the archive: “Works of 
art are clearly beyond that scope, for they suffer even from reproduction. Works of literature are 
beyond it also, although not as far.” Licklider, Libraries of the Future, 2. For other measurements of 
the recent growth in digital storage, cf. Gantz and Reinsel, “Extracting Value from Chaos”; Short, 
Bohn, and Chaitanya, “How Much Information? 2010 Report on Enterprise Server Information”; 
Zikopoulos, Understanding Big Data, Analytics for Enterprise Class Hadoop and Streaming Data. All 
are referenced alongside Hilbert and López in Kitchin, The Data Revolution, 69–70. 
257 Licklider, Libraries of the Future, 43. 
258 https://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/exhibits/650/650_pr2.html. We can note that the IBM 650 was 
the first computer in history to reach a production number above 1000 and it reached nearly 2000 
before production ceased in 1962. Cf. http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/exhibits/650/650_intro.html 
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equivalent to 3.75 megabytes. They spun at 1200 RPM, whereas current hard drives 
spin at 5400 or 7400 RPM in laptops or stationary computers that haven’t already 
switched to flash storage, and contemporary servers can see rotation speeds up to 
10.000 or 15.000 RPM. The radical aspect of this invention was the Random Access. 
In contrast to the earlier sequential retrieval methods of tape, wire or punched cards, 
this technology assured that “any piece of data was as accessible as any other.”259 If 
the codex was the first break with the linearity of the scroll, the random access hard 
drive would support the notion of facts as distinct from books. 
 The presentation of these new storage devices at the 1958 World’s Fair in 
Brussels was accompanied by yet another imaginary vision of technological 
development. The IBM computer was presented to the crowd as “Professor 
RAMAC,” described as an “electronic “genius”” with “almost total historical recall and 
the ability to speak 10 languages […]” and with the ability to answer user queries 
regarding history from “[…] the birth of Christ to the launching of Sputnik 1.”260 The 
dream of total historical recall as an instance of archival pleroma was thus nourished 
by the invention of the hard drive. The accessibility of stored data was immediately 
linked to the personification of omniscience.  
 The new dominance of digital storage in 2002, thus, entails the technological 
culmination of a shift that began in 1956.261 A shift which was always, however, 
profoundly linked to cultural imaginaries, or as Matthew Kirschenbaum wrote in his 
forensic rendition of digital storage: “The question, in other words, is not whether we 
will have the storage capacity to accumulate copies of every book, film, song, 
conversation, e-mail, etc. that we amass in a lifetime (yes, eventually) but how do 
these accumulations, these massive drifts of data, interact with irreducible levels of 
lived experience?”262 Even after the predominance of digital storage we are still just 
ever so close to fulfilling the technological conditions of archival pleroma. Not quite 
there, but the solution to the last technological challenges is just around the corner: 
“yes, eventually.” But the overwhelming question, of course, remains the one we 
                                                            
259 Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 70. 
260 The Times from San Mateo, California on March 22, 1958, p. 23 quoted in Kirschenbaum, 
Mechanisms, New Media and the Forensic Imagination, 76. 
261 Of course, it didn’t simply begin in 1956. Although the presentation was in 1956, the underlying 
patent (3,134,097) was filed December 24, 1954. And, obviously, much work preceded the patent 
filing. 
262 Ibid. 105. 
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inherited from Ellul about the relation between technology and society, between 
technology and culture.  
 
  
 
2.2	Cultural	politics	
 
“Now is the time to move our project, 
and we must do it in a definite and 
political way.” 
 
Hendrik Andersen, letter to Paul 
Otlet, November 11, 1918, quoted in 
Wright, Cataloging the World, Paul 
Otlet and the Birth of the Information 
Age, 163. 
 
2.2.1	World	brain,	World	city,	World	Museum	
 
Well’s notion of a World brain is often mentioned as an early vision of what was to 
become the digital cultural heritage archive. Contrary to what we have claimed so 
far, however, Wells’ World Brain was only barely a vision of technology. It was no 
doubt inspired by the on-going technological development, but in addition to the easy 
dismissal of technological and financial obstacles to the project, Wells explicitly 
wanted to leave the specificities in the dark: “for the present it is desirable to leave 
this project of a World Encyclopaedic organization vague – in all but its essential 
form and function. […] If a thing is really to live it should grow rather than be 
made.”263 He focused strictly on the essential form and function, and they primarily 
amounted to a political vision for the role of knowledge in society – a vision which, in 
the case of Wells, sprang from an Enlightenment notion of the Encyclopaedia.264  
                                                            
263 Wells, World Brain, 52. 
264 The entry Encyclopédie from the Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie clearly expresses the 
scope of knowledge organization in terms of human betterment: “Le but d’une encyclopédie est de 
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 Wells explicitly inscribed himself in the heritage from Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie265: Diderot made a “heroic effort” which, unfortunately amounted to 
“hurried summaries”266 altogether insufficient from the point of view of the present 
described by Wells where “I doubt if in the past the gap was so wide as it is now 
between the occasions that confront us, and the knowledge we have assembled to 
meet them.”267 The “modern World Encyclopaedia” or World Brain, “should consist of 
selections, extracts, quotations, very carefully assembled with the approval of 
outstanding authorities in each subject, carefully collated and edited and critically 
presented. It would be not a miscellany, but a concentration, a clarification and a 
synthesis.”268 Three times it is described as a “clearing house” – “of 
misunderstandings,”269 “for the mind”270 and “for universities and research 
institutions”271 – thus clearly indicating the desire to canonise acknowledged truth 
once and for all on a collective, individual and institutional level, to “compel men to 
come to terms with one another,”272 of establishing “a system of mental control about 
the globe,” and of “directing without tyranny.”273  
 The goal of the proposed organisation of knowledge is thus a certain political 
organisation of society – a form of knowledge-based control that would eliminate all 
forms of strife and disagreement and create “a common interpretation of reality”274 as 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
rassembler les connaissances éparses sur la surface de la terre ; d’en exposer le système général 
aux hommes avec qui nous vivons, et de le transmettre aux hommes qui viendront après nous ; afin 
que les travaux des siècles passés n’aient pas été inutiles pour les siècles qui succéderont ; que nos 
neveux devenant plus instruits, deviennent en même temps plus vertueux et plus heureux ; et que 
nous ne mourions pas sans avoir bien mérité du genre humain.” Didérot & d’Alembert, 
“Encyclopédie,” 635. 
265 “It was the genius of Diderot (1713-84) which first revealed the power and importance latent in 
these great gatherings of fact and theory. […] the Encyclopédistes constituted a definite movement 
towards a new education and a new social life.” Wells, The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, 
765. In World Brain, which he also calls a World Encyclopaedia, however, Wells underlines that the 
times have changed: “Our present circumstances are altogether different from [those of Diderot].” 
Wells, World Brain, 13. We have more material so a stronger structure and more resources are 
needed to create “an undogmatic Bible to a world culture. It would do just what our scattered and 
disoriented intellectual organizations of today fall short of doing. It would hold the world together 
mentally.” Ibid. 14. 
266 Ibid. 13. 
267 Ibid. 7. 
268 Ibid. 13–14. 
269 Ibid. 15. 
270 Ibid. 49. 
271 Ibid. 50. 
272 Ibid. 16. 
273 Ibid. 23. 
274 Ibid. 24. 
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the basis of a “World Pax.” And since Wells was in no way ignorant of the 
geopolitical climate at the time of publication of World Brain, he presented his 
political case with a certain urgency: “catastrophe lies ahead”275 so it is a matter of a 
“New world or nothing.”276 An urgency, which, as forcefully demonstrated by W. Boyd 
Rayward,277 turns tyrannical in its own way, when it attempts to create what Wells 
described as “an intellectual authority sufficient to control and direct our collective 
life.”278  
 Wells’ proposed guardians of knowledge are clearly supposed to live up to the 
double meaning of the ἄρχοι as both rulers and guardians of the archive. “The rulers 
are the mediators,” Galloway said, and Wells meant it literally: “Why should not a 
dictatorship – not of this or that man, nor of the proletariat, but of informed and 
educated common-sense – some day rule the earth?”279 This dictator-like rule of 
common sense was to be guarded by what he at one point called “sources”: “They 
are the men and women who know best, the men and women who think and express 
best, the sources”280 that assure unanimity: “there can be no two respectable and 
antagonistic opinions […]”281 For Wells, the doxopoietic negotiations between the 
subject and its other are not, as in Foucault’s rendition, supposed to take place along 
the axis |Sa’| with the possibility of parresia to break the connection. Instead, the 
collective relation |Sa’| is supposed to be wholly determined by the constitution of a 
common sense N with regards to the world of H.282  
                                                            
275 Ibid. 25. 
276 Ibid. 32. 
277 Cf. Rayward, “H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World Brain.” 
278 Wells, World Brain, 68. 
279 Wells, After Democracy: Addresses and Papers on the Present World Situation, 203, cf. Rayward, 
“H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World Brain,” 569. 
280 Wells, The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, 771. 
281 Wells, The Shape of Things to Come, 256, quoted in Rayward, “H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World 
Brain,” 569. In his earlier work, Wells proposed secluding those not unable to accept the ruling order 
on islands and possibly prohibiting their reproduction, cf. Wells, “Memorandum on the Project of a 
World Encyclopaedia,” 161–162, Rayward, “H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World Brain,” 566. In 1933, 
though, he still wrote of eugenics as a way of furthering the indoctrination of the citizen in the social 
order, cf. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come, 426 and Rayward, “H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World 
Brain,” 567. Finally, in order to purge his technocratic society from “criminals” or “recalcitrants,” he 
also imagined the tracking of citizens via biometric indexing, cf. Wells, “Memorandum on the Project 
of a World Encyclopaedia,” 184–185. 
282 We have already referred the present use of doxa to Deleuze. Wells’s essentially double motion of 
the distribution of good sense by the intellectual organ of common sense is what Deleuze called the 
two sides of doxa: the distribution of or inscription under good sense and the recognition of common 
sense Deleuze, Logique du sens, 93–96. We shall return to this point in Chapter 5. 
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 Again, however, it is important to emphasise that the perception of a direct link 
between a universal organisation of knowledge and global political doxa were very 
much “in the air” at the time. Paul Otlet, who is sometimes considered the father of 
information science,283 had a similar encyclopaedic vision towards the end of the 19th 
century. In 1895 in Brussels, along with his colleague Henri Lafontaine, he founded 
the Institut International de Bibliographie, the major goal of which was the 
development of the Répertoire bibliographique universel. At the Grand Pavilion of the 
Paris world fair in 1900 they presented an excerpt of over two million index cards 
from the repertories, which earned them a Grand Prize. In 1897, Otlet described the 
project as follows: “This repertory will consist of an inventory of all that has been 
written at all times, in all languages, and on all subjects.”284 The goal of archival 
pleroma is manifestly present. 
 Like Licklider, Otlet’s project of cataloguing all the information in the world 
went as far as imagining the separation of the physical books from their facts. Unlike 
the computational abstractions proposed by Licklider, however, Otlet’s separation 
was to be done by hand: “This systematic recording of facts, statistical data and 
interpretations of them in the final analysis will be work undertaken by only a few 
individuals: the creation of a kind of artificial brain by means of cards containing 
actual information or simply notes of references.”285 The technical abstraction and 
synthesis of knowledge in the bibliography index were, thus, considered an artificial 
brain. Index cards were originally conceived as the substrate for these facts, but, like 
Wells and Bush, Otlet soon became fascinated by microfilm. “If one had the 
necessary resources at one’s disposal all of Human Thought could be held in a few 
hundred catalogue drawers, ready for diffusion and to respond to any request.”286  
 Otlet imagined such a centre of human thought in the form of, first, the Palais 
Mondial, whose “collections will tend progressively to constitute a permanent and 
complete representation of the entire world”287, and, next, the Mundaneum, a world 
centre, “réalisant, au degré mondial, et avec la coopération des organismes officiels, 
                                                            
283 By its mere title Alex Wright’s biography of Otlet implies as much: “Cataloguing the World – Paul 
Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age.”  
284 Otlet quoted in Rayward, The Universe of Information, 114, cf. Wright, Cataloging the World, Paul 
Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age, 76. 
285 Otlet, International Organisation and Dissemination of Knowledge: Selected Essays, 17. 
286 Ibid. 93. 
287 Otlet quoted in Rayward, “Visions of Xanadu,” 240. 
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les cinq grandes institutions traditionnelles du Travail Intellectuel : Bibliothèques, 
Musée, Association scientifique, Université, Institut.”288  
 
“Le désir est : Qu’en un point du Globe, l’image et la signification totales 
du Monde puissent être perçues et comprises; – Que ce point devienne 
un lieu sacré, inspirateur et coordinateur de grandes idée, de nobles 
activités; – Qu’il y soit formé un Trésor, fait de la somme des œuvres 
intellectuelles, apporté comme une contribution à la Science et à 
l’Organisation Universelle, comme un élément de l’immense Epopée et 
de l’Aventure magnifique poursuivies à travers les âges par 
l’Humanité.”289 
 
We should notice the fantasy of concentrating the entire world in a single point. Like 
a Camera Obscura this one point should internalise all that is external. The 
pleromatic archive should consign everything. A clear inspiration for this notion is 
Patrick Geddes’ 1892 purchase of the Short’s Observatory in Edinburgh. This 
observation tower had been fitted with a periscope and a number of mirrors to 
operate like a Camera Obscura projecting images of the outside world onto a 
wooden table in a darkened room290: “The general principle is the synoptic one, of 
seeking as far as may be to recognise and utilise all points of view—and so to be 
preparing for the Encyclopaedia Civica of the future.”291 Otlet had met Geddes at the 
1900 Paris World Fair and they had since corresponded occasionally regarding their 
common interest in the relation between knowledge organisation and social 
organisation.292  
                                                            
288 Otlet and Le Corbusier, Mundaneum, 1. 
289 Ibid. 42. 
290 Cf. Wright, Cataloging the World, Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age, 108. 
291 Geddes, Cities in Evolution, an Introduction to the Town Planning Movement and to the Study of 
Civics, 320. Cf. also Wright, Cataloging the World, Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age, 
110. 
292 It is possible to consider Borges’ famous Aleph as, at least in part, inspired by Geddes’ and Otlet’s 
fantasies of the camera obscura internalising everything external in a single focal point. We know that 
Borges was aware of Otlet. The famous passage from “El idioma analítico de John Wilkins,” which 
Foucault quoted in the introduction to Les mots et les choses (p. 7), seems to be a clear ridicule of 
Otlet and the Bibliographical Institute of Brussels. Immediately after the passage quoted by Foucault, 
Borges continues: “El instituto Bibliográfico de Bruselas también ejerce el caos: ha parcelado el 
universo en 1000 subdivisiones, de la cuales la 262 corresponde al Papa; la 282, a la Iglesia Católica 
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 Like Wells, Otlet wanted to go further than the mere index. As quoted above, 
Wells was not satisfied with just an index; he wanted the ubiquitous accessibility of 
the “reproduction of the thing itself.” And like Bush, Otlet soon considered an 
interactive desk as the point of interaction. Otlet proposed the Mondothèque, a 
microfilm-wielding desk not unlike Bush’s Memex.  
 
 
Unpublished illustration of the Mondothèque (1941) 
 
What Otlet saw as the reduction of the human record to catalogue drawers and then 
a desk could, according to Bush, be fit in a moving van: “a total record, in the form of 
magazines, newspapers, books, tracts, advertising blurbs, correspondence, having a 
volume corresponding to a billion books, the whole affair, assembled and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Romana; la 263, al Día del Señor; la 268, a las escuales dominicales; la 298, al mormonismo, y la 
294, al brahmanismo, budismo, shintoísmo y taoísmo.” Borges concludes: “He registrado las 
arbitradiedades de Wilkins, del desconocido (o apócrifo) enciclopedista chino y del Instituto 
Bibliográfico de Bruselas; notoriamente no hay calsificación del universo que no sea arbitratia y 
conjetural. La razón es muy simple: no sabemos qué cosa es el universo.” Borges, Otras 
inquisiciones, 142–143. 
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compressed, could be lugged off in a moving van.”293 But unlike Bush’s desk of 
1945, Otlet’s desk of 1934 was networked: “Ici la Table de Travail n’est plus chargée 
d’aucun livre. A leur place se dresse un écran et à portée un téléphone. Là-bas au 
loin, dans un édifice immense, sont tous les livres et tous les renseignements, avec 
tout l’espace que requiert leur enregistrement et leur manutention […] un Wells 
certes l’aimerait.”294 Otlet saw kinship in Wells and clearly describes his project as 
“un véritable cerveau mécanique et collectif.”295 
 Otlet’s vision, like that of Wells, was based on a political notion of 
centralisation. As indicated by the name, the networked Mondothèque was 
connected to the Mundaneum, the centre of all knowledge, which was to be placed in 
a World city that would house a world government. Otlet was engaged in two 
projects for such a city: First with Norwegian-American artist Hendrik Christian 
Andersen and then with Le Corbusier. Andersen’s project was published in 1913 in a 
substantial volume entitled Creation of a World Centre of Communication, with urban 
plans by the architect Ernest M. Hébrard.  
 Contact between Andersen and Otlet and Lafontaine was established in 1911 
and in February 1912, the two latter wrote Andersen to express the compatibility of 
their respective visions for the organisation of knowledge, government and urban 
space: “the center you have dreamed of in its architectural realization, we have 
imagined in its functional activity.”296  
 
                                                            
293 Bush, “As We May Think.” 
294 Otlet, Traité de documentation, le livre sur le livre, théorie et pratique, 428. This passage refers to 
the desk before it received the name Mondothèque. 
295 Ibid. 391. 
296 Otlet and La Fontaine, letter to Andersen quoted in Wright, Cataloging the World, Paul Otlet and 
the Birth of the Information Age, 134. 
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Drawing of the World City from Andersen & Hébrard, Creation of a World Centre of Communication 
 
Funding was to come from Scottish-American industrialist and philanthropist Andrew 
Carnegie and the millions left from King Leopold II’s colonial pillaging of the Congo. 
In November 1913, King Albert I of Belgium expressed the same optimism about the 
easy inevitability of the project as we have seen in Wells and Bush: “[...] this plan is 
practical, there is nothing here that cannot be turned into a reality. […] One day it 
must exist.”297  
 The outbreak of World War I, of course, hindered the internationalist 
aspirations of Otlet and his collaborators, which Otlet formulated in his 1914 
manifesto La fin de la guerre. Here, he envisioned the world as a single territory, 
united under a “Société des nations” with the motto: “Per Orbem Terrarum 
Humanitas Unita” – “Humanity United throughout the World.”298 Faced with the World 
War and upon learning about the death in it of his son, Otlet concluded the necessity 
of his vision: “décrire les conditions d’une Cité humaine supérieure entièrement 
vouée à la Paix.”299 After the war such a project would find its collaborator in Le 
Corbusier. In 1928, they published a grand plan for a world city in Geneva but the 
stock crash of 1929 brought an end to their hopes for funding just as the 
                                                            
297 Andersen’s diary as quoted in Ibid. 143. 
298 Cf. Ibid. 152–153. 
299 Otlet quoted in Levie, L’homme qui voulait classer le monde, Paul Otlet et le Mundaneum, 176. 
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internationalist aspirations for the site to be classified as international territory 
received a less than favourable response from the Swiss government.  
 With regards to our archival model from Chapter 1, we should recognise in 
these fantasies of the deterministic relation between the organisation of knowledge 
and the political organisation of society the notion, that the correct knowledge 
relation |NH| would engender the correct social relation |Sa’|. The knowledge relation 
is supposedly established by the hermeneutic privilege of the ἄρχοι, Well’s sources 
or Otlet’s bibliographical institute, and such canonised “common sense” (N) 
establishes the mirror in which S and a’ can see their supposed ideal image, i.e. for 
each S the position of a’ is taken by A as the representative of N. This is the 
attempted establishment of doxa via archival pleroma.  
 
2.2.2	The	presence	of	the	past	
 
These imaginaries of centralised knowledge as the foundation for centralised world 
government as well as the imaginaries relating to technological access to such 
knowledge are more or less contemporary with the first international treaties for 
preservation of cultural heritage. 1931 saw the First International Congress of 
Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments, which resulted in the Athens 
Charter for the Restoration of historic Monuments. This was followed in 1935 by the 
so-called Roerich Pact (Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions 
and Historic Monuments).300 1954 delivered The Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict under the auspices of 
UNESCO. The Second International Congress of Architects and Specialists of 
Historic Buildings took place in 1964 and resulted in The Venice Charter for the 
Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites and the creation of ICOMOS 
(International Council on Monuments and Sites). And, in 1972, UNESCO adopted 
The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage. 
                                                            
300 The draft for the Roerich Pact was approved by the League of Nations but was ultimately ratified 
by only ten states in the Americas. 
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 These treaties were the first international legal frameworks for such heritage 
preservation, but the preservation of specific monuments has, of course, been a 
priority for millennia, although the scope of the preservation effort has varied greatly 
through the ages. Two conditions of possibility should be mentioned for the rise of 
international cultural heritage charters in the beginning of the thirties. One is the 
internationalist scope of the organisation of knowledge just described; the other is 
the actual institutional foundation for such a scope.  
 As mentioned, such a scope had been under development throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century but it had lacked the international organisations to 
support it. In 1910, Otlet and Lafontaine had founded the Union des Associations 
Internationales in the hope of furthering “l’élaboration d’une organisation mondiale, 
fondée sur le droit, sur le progrès scientifique et technique et sur la libre 
représentation de tous les intérêts communs à l’humanité.”301 In the subtitle to La fin 
de la guerre, Otlet called it a “Traité de paix générale basé sur une charte mondiale 
déclarant les droits de l’humanité et organisant la confédération des états.” The 
desire for international organisations to take on the responsibility of the 
internationalist scope was clear.  
 The League of Nations was created in 1920 and thus formed the background 
for Wells’ views of political organisation. He was, however, disappointed. In The 
Work, Wealth & Happiness of Mankind (1932) he described it as potentially “anything 
or nothing” and emphasised the necessity for a common understanding of universal 
man before such an endeavour would be fruitful.302 The establishment of doxa would 
then be the condition of possibility of its own institutionalisation. In World Brain, he 
similarly emphasised the League’s horrible lack of knowledge “about the formative 
forces of history. […] [P]ractically nothing had been assembled, practically nothing 
had been thought out, nothing practically had been done to draw that knowledge and 
these ideas together into a comprehensive conception of the world.”303 
 Under the auspices of the League of Nations, however, a certain institutional 
foundation for such an internationalist scope had been established. The Committee 
on Intellectual Cooperation was established in order to promote cross-border 
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dialogue and exchange. As described by historian Akira Iriye: “This committee was 
the predecessor to UNESCO, with its unabashedly straightforward proclamation that 
peace among nations hinges on cross-cultural understanding.”304 The naming of this 
Committee echoes the Union established by Otlet and Lafontaine in 1910 and, in a 
certain way, appears as the intermediary stage between the scope and its 
institutional formation in UNESCO. 
 The above mentioned international agreements were thus a result of the 
international organisations that began to take form, the Hague Convention being the 
result of the newly formed UNESCO.305 As can be somewhat deduced from the 
“monuments,” “property” and “buildings” figuring prominently in the titles of the 
charters, pacts and conventions, this is a strain of cultural politics which, at least 
initially, focused on the very tangible masses of constructed edifices which had, first, 
been a task of private and, then, of national engagement. UNESCO’s 1972 
convention, however, presented a two-fold change in the previous approach to 
heritage. First, the convention subsumed both cultural and natural heritage of 
“outstanding universal value” as crucial constituent parts of the overall term “world 
heritage of mankind as a whole.”306 Second, the term “cultural heritage” operated its 
own subsumption:  
 
“For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as 
“cultural heritage”:  
- monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and 
painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, 
cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;  
- groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, 
because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the 
landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science;  
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- sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and 
areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal 
value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point 
of view.”307 
 
The term “cultural heritage” here subsumes the term “monument” and thus 
obliterates the distinction between “monument” and “historical monument,” which had 
been codified by Alois Riegl in his classic text “Der moderne Denkmalkultus - Sein 
Wesen und seine Entstehung” (1903). According to Riegl, antiquity and the Middle 
Ages acknowledged only “monuments” or “gewollten Denkmale”, i.e. “diejenigen 
Werke, die mit Willen ihrer Urheber an einen bestimmten Moment der Vergangenheit 
(oder einen Komplex mehrerer solcher) erinnern sollen […]”308 Should the historical 
occasion of a given monument fade in importance or “Erinnerungswert” for its 
preservers, the monument’s protection would cease and its materials simply be 
repurposed for other endeavours. 
 Around the Italian Renaissance,309 antiquity’s appreciation of intentional 
monuments was joined by certain “unintentional monuments” or “ungewollte 
Denkmalen” in obtaining either an artistic or a historical value transcending the 
specific identifications of “diejenigen, für die sie bestimmt waren und die ein stets 
gegenwärtiges Interesse an ihrer Erhaltung hatten […]”310 The difference between 
the intentional and unintentional monument, i.e. between the monument and the 
historical monument, is, as the names suggest, that the commemorative value of the 
first is attributed to the monument by its makers, whereas the latter gains its value 
from the recipients of the monument if they recognise in it elements of historical or 
aesthetic value.  
 We can, although somewhat reductively, distinguish three main Riegelian 
periods in our attitude towards monuments:311 Antiquity and the Middle Ages were 
primarily interested in the monuments explicitly meant for their attention and 
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commemoration. This meant claiming a sort of immortality of a specific genealogical 
past, its unceasing monumental persistence in the prolonging of the present.  
 Next, Renaissance Italy gained interest in non-intentional monuments but still 
favoured monuments with an affiliation to related cultures of antiquity as the 
recovered source of their true identity. This meant including the achievements of 
earlier generations in an “Entwiklungsgedanke” from past artefacts to a future destiny 
which amounted to assuming a notion of genealogical succession in the form of a 
“kulturellen Nachfolge der stammverwandten antiken Völker.”312 This attitude, 
prevalent until the eighteenth century, acknowledged the passing of time but, 
nonetheless, attempted to suspend it by granting the past “einen Gegenwartswert für 
das moderne Leben und Schaffen.”313  
 Finally, it is not until the nineteenth century and the new prominence of cultural 
history that an interest in the tiniest minutiae of historical development was 
established and the historical interest found its modern form: “[…] des Interesses für 
alle, auch die geringsten Taten und Geschicke selbst der geringsten, von der 
eigenen Nation durch unüberbrückbare Charaktergegensätze geschiedenen Völker, 
des Interesses für die Geschichte der Menschheit überhaupt, in deren jedem 
einzelnen Individuum wir ein Stück unser selbst wiedererkennen.”314 In our Derridean 
terms we could say that these Riegelian periods demonstrate a development from a 
time where intentional monuments could only survive if they were considered 
heritage to a modern conception where anything provides the potential mirror for the 
recognition of the self. And, according to our conceptual framework, such recognition 
in anything is, of course, not heritage since that would require affirmation and choice. 
In the final Riegelian period, actual affirmation of a heritage relation of kinship has 
lost its role as condition of possibility for the survivability of the monument.  
 In addition to this enlarged scope that allows man to encounter himself where 
e’er he walk, this last Riegelian attitude is also characterised, at least in its early 
twentieth century incarnation, by the appreciation of “Alterswert,” i.e. the visible signs 
of time’s passing in the decay of monuments. From the point of view of preservation, 
this age-value was at odds with the goal of historical value to preserve the 
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monument in its given state of decay – neither allowing complete restoration 
(Neuheitswert) or further decay (Alterswert).315 But already for Riegl, developments 
within the technical means of reproduction and dissemination of artefacts were seen 
as a way to ease the tension between such opposing values:  
 
“Anderseits darf man aus der stetig zunehmenden Ausbildung der 
kunsttechnischen Reproduktionsmittel die Zuversicht schöpfen, daß in 
absehbarer Zukunft (namentlich nach Erfindung einer absolut 
stichhaltigen Farbenphotographie und einer Verbindung derselben mit 
faksimilemäßigen Formkopien) möglichst vollkommene Ersatzmittel für 
urkundliche Originale gefunden werden dürften und damit derjenigen 
Forderung der wissenschaftlichen Geschichtsforschung, die einzige 
Quelle eines möglichen Konfliktes mit dem Alterswerte darstellt, 
wenigstens annähernd Genüge geleistet würde, ohne das Original durch 
menschliche Eingriffe für den Alterskultus zu entwerten.”316 
  
We should notice here, that similar to Wells, Otlet and Bush, Riegl repeats the 
imminence of the archival promise by seeing “in absehbarer Zukunft” a potential in 
the techniques of reproduction for the solution to the problems at hand. However, 
Riegl was neither trying to attain archival pleroma, i.e. the access to the complete 
human record, nor to solve the related problem of world government. He simply 
hoped to solve very concrete tensions in conflicting preservation rationalities.  
 What seems to happen, then, in the 1972 UNESCO convention is a 
radicalisation of the interest in everything everywhere, detected by Riegl as 
characteristic of the new century. A radicalisation, which, by a mere definition, 
abolishes the tensions, Riegl hoped to alleviate by technology. “Outstanding 
universal value” is now presented as a globally operable category that seems to 
obliterate the Riegelian distinction between “monuments” as a global phenomenon, 
inherent to any human cultural formation anywhere, and “historical monuments” as a 
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distinctly occidental phenomenon with a localisable origin in Renaissance Italy. 
Françoise Choay concludes: “Était ainsi proclamée l’universalité du système 
occidental de pensée et de valeurs en la matière.”317  
 That such a universalization of a more general and abstract concept of cultural 
heritage arrived around 1972 should be seen in the technological context described 
in the first half of this chapter. Just as Licklider formulated the principles for an 
abstraction of facts from their substrate in books, cultural heritage begins to become 
detached from the local contexts of its edifice substrates and begins moving toward 
anything from anywhere which could be ascribed “outstanding universal value,” or, in 
Riegelian terms: universal historical or aesthetic value. Such abstraction was not 
complete in 1972, however. It saw a much fuller manifestation in the later treaty 
regarding Intangible Cultural Heritage as the UNESCO counterpart to World 
Heritage. Incidentally, the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage was drafted in 2003, just around the time when digital cultural heritage 
archives rose to institutional prominence on international as well as supranational 
and national levels.  
 
2.2.3	Building	blocks	of	the	future	
 
The constitution of UNESCO was signed on November 16, 1945 and came into force 
on November 4, 1946. Since its early beginnings, UNESCO shared Riegl’s interest in 
the capacity of the latest technologies to both preserve that which could be lost and 
disseminate that which was not easily accessible: “The Department of Cultural 
Activities also tries to recommend and promote the use of the most modern methods 
in the pursuit of its permanent aims — the preservation and enhancement of the 
cultural heritage of mankind, and the dissemination of culture.”318 
 At this time, UNESCO’s “modern methods” comprised the preservation of art 
and music reproductions on film, microfilm and records and dissemination was done 
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via television, radio and “special vans” bringing reproductions and books to remote 
locations.319 The goal was to enlist the “help of modern technology […] to encourage 
a taste for, and knowledge of, the arts, […] to raise the average cultural level and to 
promote international artistic exchanges […] with the object of improving the 
standard of living of contemporary man.”320 
 UNESCO’s “modern methods” did include computers at quite an early stage, 
although more for scientific work than dissemination. In August 1949 a committee 
meeting proposed, in addition to an International Brain Institute and an International 
Social Sciences Institute, an International Computing Centre (ICC). The centre was 
created in 1951 and in 1952 the decision was made to open the centre in Rome 
although it did not receive its computer until 1961 – an Olivetti ELEA 6001.321 For 
many reasons, however, the ICC was never much of a success, and in spite of its 
new focus and name in the beginning of the 1970s – the new Intergovernmental 
Bureau for Informatics changed its focus to informatics as a means of contributing to 
UNESCO’s educational mission in non-industrialised countries322 – it was closed in 
1988. Where the ICC started with a scientific focus it thus slowly turned towards 
education and development, and thus dissemination, in the 1970s.  
 The promotion of education via modern technology clearly embraced the digital 
in the late 1980’s and 1990’s where the use of ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) figured prominently in many UNESCO documents: “Recognizing the 
important role that the new information and communication technologies, and 
particularly informatics, can play in extending educational services to new sections of 
the population, and in improving the quality and efficacy of the educational 
process.”323  
 UNESCO’s educational effort explicitly demonstrated the understanding of the 
past as an untapped potential for driving the present into the future, when, in 1993, 
UNESCO established a World Commission on Culture and Development, claiming 
that “Genuine development can only be built on the basis of culture, which is its 
source, its mainspring and its ultimate goal. Ready-made imported development 
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models have collapsed, because they have neglected the circumstances specific to 
each society, and the untapped potential of cultures.”324 In spite of a certain 
metaphorical confusion, culture is clearly presented as: first, a source or potential; 
second, the driving mechanical force of development; and finally, the goal of this 
development.  
 The reason for this final emphasis, on culture as goal, is further illustrated in 
1996: “[…] culture shapes all our thinking, imagining and behaviour.”325 The idea was 
to implement “culture” in “development strategies” as “a central variable […] if not the 
essence itself, of sustainable development, since attitudes and life-styles govern the 
ways we manage all our non-renewable resources.”326 Culture is thus crucial to 
“humankind’s creative capacities in the face of a treasured past and an unpredictable 
future.”327  
 We should note here the similarities between what UNESCO calls “culture” and 
what Foucault called ethos. Both are described as an attitude. Both have to do with 
life-styles or what Foucault called either aesthetics or techniques of life. Both have to 
do with the subject’s relation to the world and its resources. But of course, they 
remain profoundly different. In the case of the Foucauldean ethos, S is constructed 
via the ethopoietic construction of A as virtual incorporation of the hupomnesic order 
of truth N and the doxopoietic negotiation of communal values in a parresiastic mirror 
relation to a’. In the Foucauldean framework, both ethopoiesis and doxopoiesis are 
without presuppositions. They remain dynamic in a continuous negotiation of 
practices and perceptions. In the case of UNESCO’s culture, however, the notion of 
“development” takes the place of presupposed N and the “culture” of S and a’ should 
be educated in accordance with that N. The presupposition that H is “culture” gives 
|NH| free reign over |Sa’|. 
 Whereas Riegl presented different commemoration values and strategies of 
preservation and wondered how to solve their inherent tensions, UNESCO focuses 
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on the use-value of “a treasured past” (H) in “the educational process”328 to further 
“human development” and “human betterment”329 (|Sa’| as determined by |NH|). For 
Riegl, use-value – a subcategory of present-day value – is expressed, for example, 
in the inhabitability of a house, which, if inhabitable, must not be left to the decay of 
age-value. For UNESCO, the use-value of heritage is a way of encountering an 
“unpredictable future.” There are no tensions between conflicting commemoration 
and preservation values, only the “untapped potential of cultures.” This is the 
ideological framework into which the term “digital heritage” was inscribed when, in 
2001, it first found its firm place within major UNESCO documents such as the 
Medium-Term Strategy and the General Conference Resolutions.  
 The movement from analogue to digital modes of use-value is evident in the 
way 1952’s coupling of “preservation” and “dissemination” was succeeded by the 
frequent coupling of “preservation” with “access”: “preservation and continuing 
accessibility” or “preservation of and permanent access to digitally produced 
materials.”330 According to UNESCO, the preserved past should have a “permanent” 
present-day use-value via access: “The purpose of preserving the digital heritage is 
to ensure that it remains accessible to the public.”331 And finally, the “digital 
information life cycle” is described as going “from creation to access.”332 Access as 
both the telos of creation and the potential for new creative capacities. 
 UNESCO’s focus on access reorders Riegl’s perception of use-value and age-
value. For Riegl believed that use-value would usually triumph over age-value, as it 
makes no sense to leave a perfectly useful house to decay. However, if use-value 
were diminished enough, then age-value could reign free: “Nur die 
gebrauchsunfähigen Werke vermögen wir vollständig unbeirrt durch den 
Gebrauchswert rein vom Standpunkte des Alterswertes zu betrachten und zu 
genießen, während wir bei den gebrauchsfähigen stets mehr oder minder daran 
gehindert und gestört werden […]”333 For UNESCO, however, age-value and 
historical value’s concern for “authenticity” and “an authentic record” serve the 
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purpose of optimising use-value in the form of the “potential of the heritage” as “the 
building blocks of the future.”334 The digital cultural heritage archive focuses on the 
preserved past as the building blocks of the future that need to be assembled in the 
present via unfettered access. 
 
2.2.4	Three	strategic	axes	of	digital	cultural	heritage	
 
The goal of preserving the past in order to make it accessible in the present as 
building blocks of the future manifests itself in the general interest in digital cultural 
heritage archives from 2001 onwards across UNESCO, the EU and nation states.335 
UNESCO clearly recognises that “the preservation of the digital heritage will 
constitute an important aspect […]” of the “[...] endeavour to encourage access to 
and participation in all forms of intellectual activity […]”336 This digital heritage is 
considered as resources that “are increasingly produced, distributed and accessed 
only in digital form (born-digital materials) […]”337 
 On the one hand, these statements from the Medium-Term Strategy (2002-
2007) and the Resolutions (2001) inscribe themselves in succession to or kinship 
with the “Memory of the World” programme, founded in 1992, and, on the other, they 
lay the ground for the final UNESCO Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage 
from 2003. 
 The name, “Memory of the world,” should remind us of two of our previous 
objects of analysis: First, in 1903, Henri-Marie Lafontaine, Otlet’s long-time 
collaborator, wrote a short piece called “Une mémoire mondiale” about his and 
Otlet’s project of a universal bibliography. Here, Lafontaine expresses the archival 
promise of pleroma as potentially delivered by the “Répertoire Bibliographique 
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Universel” as world memory: “[…] de posséder enfin l’inventaire complet de tout ce 
que la pensée humaine a produit sous une forme écrite.”338 According to Markus 
Krajewski, the term “Memory of the world” was, in fact, coined by Otlet and 
Lafontaine.339 And second, of course, Resnais’s film from 1956 does not limit itself to 
evoking a similar notion in its title Toute la mémoire du monde. The term “mémoire 
du monde” is used numerous times in the preparatory documents340, and as stated 
above, the library prison promises pleroma in ways reminiscent of Lafontaine’s 
description: “On y trouve tout ce qui s’imprime en France. Tous les signes que la 
main de l’homme a tracés […]”341 
 UNESCO’s “Memory of the world” programme aimed at preserving and 
providing access to “documentary heritage,” a notion which should “inclure au-delà 
des manuscrits et des documents précieux et rares de bibliothèques et d’archives, 
les documents sur tous supports, notamment les documents audio-visuels et les 
traditions orales […]”342 We see that Ernst’s diagnosis that the distinction between 
archive and library is getting lost in the new technologies could also detect symptoms 
in UNESCO’s pleromatic inclusion of everything precious and rare in either libraries 
or archive under its own purview. These recommendations from the first meeting 
remained hesitant towards the new technologies of digitisation, however, and thus 
agreed on photography as the continued recommended medium of preservation.343 
The overall goals, then, remained compatible with the discourse of UNESCO in 
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1952, although in the form of “preservation” and “access” instead of 1952’s 
“preservation” and “dissemination.”344 
 After the turn of the millennium, the 2003 charter on digital heritage recognised 
the “new [digital] legacy” as an entity under documentary heritage although not 
reducible to it, i.e. UNESCO recognised that “resources of information and creative 
expression are increasingly produced, distributed, accessed and maintained in digital 
form, creating a new legacy – the digital heritage.”345 Something new was at play. 
 Interestingly, the notion of documentary heritage as guarded by the Memory of 
the World programme, was updated in 2002. In the original guidelines from 1995, 
there is very little mention of anything digital. Documentary heritage was presented in 
addition to natural heritage and cultural sites, and thus in addition to the natural and 
monumental heritage presented in the World Heritage convention from 1972. Just as 
reproductions were seen as crucial to dissemination in 1952, in 1995, especially, the 
compact disk was seen as a promising but still uncertain medium for future access:  
 
“The greatly enhanced access opportunities provided by digital 
technologies stimulate the development of a range of products such as 
CD-ROMs, digital tapes and audio CDs. These products will play an 
important role in providing increased access to documentary heritage, 
but, owing to uncertainties about their long term survival, will not 
generally be used as the sole preservation method.”346  
 
 The digital is here not just promising because of its potential for global access 
but also because of the promised compromise between use value and historical 
value described by Riegl. The 1995 document thus described a pilot project at the 
National Library in Prague: “Beautiful manuscripts and early printed books are being 
transferred to digital form to avoid handling of these delicate and endangered 
documents, and to make them accessible through electronic means.”347  
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 In the 2002 guidelines, which then coincide with the rise of the “new legacy” of 
“digital heritage,” the focus on CD-ROM had been replaced by a focus on the 
Internet as a means for “much faster streaming of data” and, hence, the ability to 
overcome “the tyranny of distance.”348 The goal is “democratized, universal access to 
the whole of documentary heritage”349 and “preservation” is defined as “the sum total 
of the steps necessary to ensure the permanent accessibility – forever – of 
documentary heritage.”350 It is emphasised that “Permanent access is the goal of 
preservation: without this, preservation has no goal except as an end in itself.”351 
Universal access to the eternal presence of the entirety of heritage, pleroma. The 
use-value of access as the goal of all other commemorative values.  
 With the documentary notion of the new millennium, we thus see a further 
generalisation and expansion of the notion of cultural heritage. One that was to 
manifest itself, as we shall see below, not just within the international scope of 
UNESCO but also within, e.g., the EU and the Danish national state. Intentional and 
unintentional monuments, documents and intangible heritage are all subsumed 
under the regime of universalised “democratising” access to the complete preserved 
stores as resource. 
 This strategic construction of universal present access to the eternal presence 
of the past as resource seems to operate along three axes: 
 
⁃ Unity in diversity by facilitating knowledge of the other;  
⁃ Regional and national identity through the knowledge of the self;  
⁃ Entrepreneurial creativity and innovation through the knowledge and possible 
exploitation of the abundant cultural resources inherited from our common 
forebears 
 
Admittedly, these axes are not new but in the shift from dissemination of selections 
to universal access to permanent storage their scope has changed. Neither “special 
van” nor CD-ROMs are needed, now, to transport reproductions to remote locations. 
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In fact, both temporal and spatial remoteness seem to have been vanquished 
altogether: “The digital heritage is inherently unlimited by time, geography, culture or 
format. […] The digital heritage of all regions, countries and communities should be 
preserved and made accessible, so as to assure over time representation of all 
peoples, nations, cultures and languages.”352 This goal of global representation, this 
overcoming of “the tyranny of distance” and its beneficial consequences for our 
relation to the other, are not unique to UNESCO but are further expressed as part of 
a general discourse of cultural heritage in the plans for the European Union’s digital 
library Europeana: “Improved access to our cultural heritage will create “unity in 
diversity.””353  
 Not surprisingly, the second axis takes “identity” as its watchword and is more 
prominent in supranational or national contexts, since global identity coincides with 
the question of “unity in diversity”: “[…] through the meeting, exchanging and sharing 
that culture entails, it can help to bring the European Union into closer contact with 
its citizens and a true European identity to take root and find expression.”354 Culture 
is thus not an expression of identity but that through which identity is constituted. And 
not just any identity, a truly European identity. And such an identity, forged by the 
hypomnesic organisation mastered by the European Union should establish a closer 
relation between institutional framework and citizen.  
 Access to culture as the root of identity is also found on a national level. A 
2009 report on the state of digitised cultural heritage in Denmark, for instance, clearly 
states: “Cultural heritage is of significant importance for the Danish sense of identity 
in a globalised world, and in these years, the importance of art and culture will 
increase. The government will therefore continue the work with communicating 
Danish cultural heritage, nationally and internationally.”355 Although culture provides 
the foundation for global or international unity in diversity, it also protects 
supranational and national identities against globalisation. 
 We have already seen the third axis in UNESCO’s 1996 call for a closer 
coupling of “culture” and “development.” It finds a more recent expression in a 
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current UNESCO theme, “Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativity,”356 which 
in November 2013 fostered UNESCO’s fifth most popular tweet of the month: “Put 
culture & creativity at the heart of sustainable development & public policy! 
#supportcreativity pic.twitter.com/dcdCr1zk1B.”357 Preservation and access – also 
referred to as “safeguarding” and “sharing” – are aimed at supporting “creativity, 
innovation and the emergence of dynamic cultural sectors.”358 And furthermore: 
“Both heritage and creativity lay the foundations for vibrant, innovative and 
prosperous knowledge societies.”359  
 These three axes also form the three main aims of the EU Horizon 2020 Work 
Programme for 2014-2015, although in a different order:  
 
“The first aim is […] to analyse and develop social, economic and political 
inclusion and positive inter-cultural dynamics in the EU. […] The second 
aim is to foster the development of innovative societies and policies in 
Europe through the engagement of citizens, civil society organisations, 
enterprises and users in research and innovation […] The third aim is to 
contribute to an understanding […] of its cultural heritage and of its 
identities in order to strengthen cohesion and solidarity and to encourage 
modern visions and uses of its past.”360 
 
The first aim corresponds to our first axis of “unity in diversity,” the second is our third 
axis of creativity and innovation, and the third aim of culture as the basis of identities 
coincides with our second axis of identity. The formulation of each aim ends with the 
proclamation of its ability to support a general notion of innovation as bringer of 
economic growth. The third aim (and second axis) of identity thus concludes: “In 
these efforts, new technologies and digital cultural heritage should play an important 
innovative role as they enable new and richer interpretations of our common 
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European culture while contributing to sustainable economic growth.”361 All strategic 
axes are subsumed under the overall strategic goal of economic growth. 
 These three aims of the EU Horizon 2020 are formulated in the context of the 
current financial crisis. As has hopefully been demonstrated, though, these aims did 
not appear within the discourse of cultural heritage as a result of the crisis. They are 
but the culmination of a long development of a cultural heritage discourse, which has 
gained a global scope along with specific technological developments. A scope that 
is summed up nicely by Director-General of UNESCO Irina Bokova’s quote from 
Arjun Appadurai – a quote also used on numerous other occasions by UNESCO, 
including on Twitter: “Culture is the resource that society needs to move from today 
to tomorrow.”362 
 
 
2.2.5 Access, Evidence, Control 
 
The movement from preservation of intentional monuments to unintentional 
monuments of particular historic or aesthetic value and, finally, to a generalised 
notion of heritage of “outstanding universal value” entails certain spatial dynamics. 
Intentional monuments are decidedly local. Unintentional monuments gradually 
extend the domain of interest toward the surrounding world and establish hopes to 
widely disseminate reproductions of that which is otherwise bound to a specific 
location. And, finally, the “outstanding universal value” of an expanded notion of 
cultural heritage soon establishes the global reign of universal access.  
 As we have seen, these imaginaries are not new. In the cases of Wells and 
Otlet, imaginaries of access to the central stores of knowledge already existed in the 
beginning of the twentieth century and, even then, inscribed itself in the heritage from 
Enlightenment. At the time of Wells and Otlet, certain experiments within exhibition 
design proposed similar ways for art to be projected into the home. In his 1927 
description of a Haus-Pinakothek, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy wrote of future radio image 
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projections: “[…] wenn auch als Quelle entwickelter Verbreitung wahrscheinlich der 
Radiobilderdienst vorbehalten sein wird.”363 And only a couple of years later, 
Frederick Kiesler described a similar contraption under the name The Telemuseum:  
 
“Just as operas are now transmitted over the air, so picture galleries will 
be. From the Louvre to you, from the Prado to you, from everywhere to 
you. You will enjoy the prerogative of selecting pictures that are 
compatible with your mood or that meet the demands of any special 
occasion. Through the dials of your Teleset you will share in the 
ownership of the world’s greatest art treasures.”364  
 
We can say that the visions for technological access were present before the 
institutional operationalization of such imaginaries and, after the establishment of 
such an institutional framework, during a time when the technical limitations of 
cultural politics dictated dissemination.  
 We shall return to the notions of image displays and their potential for 
individual experience and political emancipation but, for now, we should notice a 
forceful convergence around the beginning of the new millennium of networked 
technologies and cultural politics in the structure of access: technological access as 
the condition of possibility for the notion of heritage as resource. In 2006, EU 
Information Society and Media Commissioner Viviane Reding explained the purpose of the 
European Digital Library, Europeana: “Information technologies can enable you to tap 
into Europe’s collective memory with a click of your mouse.”365 This notion was 
repeated in 2008 as the title of a document on the progress of digitisation and online 
accessibility of cultural material: “Europe’s cultural heritage at the click of a 
mouse.”366 It was further echoed in relation to the Norwegian National Digital Library: 
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“Cultural heritage just a few clicks away.”367 Similarly in the Danish government 
report on digitisation (2009): “When the cultural heritage is digitised, suddenly it can 
be made accessible by the click of a mouse.”368 Finally, in addition to the in Section 
1.3.2 quoted passage from Darnton, in which he claims that digital collections within 
a technological infrastructure “makes them instantly available to the user with one 
click on an electronic device,”369 he emphasises the relation between the digital, the 
click and access:  
 
“It would be the digital equivalent of the Library of Congress, but instead 
of being confined to Capitol Hill, it would exist everywhere, bringing 
millions of books and other digitized material within clicking distance of 
public libraries, high schools, junior colleges, universities, retirement 
communities, and any person with access to the Internet.”370  
 
 “A click”, “a few clicks”, “one click”, “clicking distance.” We shall return to the 
abolition of distance inherent to this discourse but, for now, we should note the 
prevalence of the discourse of access in the convergence of technological 
development and cultural politics in the digital cultural heritage archive – a 
prevalence often manifested in the easy access proffered by the click of a mouse.   
 We should further note that such access does not stand alone. Access to a 
resource opens a potential for evidence and control. As was already clear in Wells, 
access to knowledge organised by the “sources” should “be brought into a 
conscious, effective, guiding and directive relationship to the control of human 
affairs.”371 Access to the well-organised archive should bring cognitive evidence and, 
finally, lead to control. The individual student’s imminent ability “to sit with his 
projector in his own study at his or her convenience to examine any book, any 
document, in an exact replica”372 is conceived as inherently related to the submission 
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to “an intellectual authority sufficient to control and direct our collective life.”373 The 
difference between this and Foucault’s practice of hupomnemata is, of course, that 
ethopoiesis entails the individual production of such an authority (A) in a doxopoietic 
negotiation of values with the other (a’), whereas the control (N) established via the 
access to the evidence of H forecloses any such negotiation in the determination of 
doxa. In Wells, A is the direct projection of N, and since this A, then, holds for 
everyone, there is no possible parresia between S and a’.  
 As demonstrated, a similar connection between evidence and control 
prevailed in Otlet’s attempts to organise a world government on the basis of a world 
organisation of knowledge as presented above. We have, furthermore, seen the later 
link between access and our three strategic axes of cultural politics that very much 
appear as similar regimes of control: access to the evidence of culture as 
behavioural control in the form of the non-antagonistic relation to other (unity in 
diversity), a stable relation to the self (identity) and entrepreneurial creativity of the 
subject. The attempt to tap into the potential of the archive and steering it along the 
three strategic axes turns the archive back toward its cybernetic origins described by 
Ernst.374 It becomes a matter of controlling potential, of establishing productive and 
subjective feedback loops. The fullness of the archive, i.e. archival pleroma, seems 
to promise the unobstructed churning of the cybernetic machine, the smooth flows of 
a society of control.375 
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3.	A	three-fold	Thing376	
 
While chapter 1 described the general topology of the archival relations of 
consignation, interpretation and heritage, chapter 2 engaged with two historical 
trajectories: technological development and cultural politics. Chapter 1 described 
similarities between different archival forms, while chapter 2 demonstrated a more 
complex intermingling of technological and conceptual developments and related 
imaginaries converging in the current paradigm of access-based cultural heritage.  
 Technological development was described via the logical foundation of 
computation from the late 1930s to the late 1950s, the development of the protocols 
necessary for networked transmission from the late 1950s to the early 1990s and, 
finally, the slow movement from the development of the hard drive in the 1950s to 
the drastic explosion of storage capacity around the beginning of the new 
millennium.  
 The side of cultural politics was described via the Riegelian attitudes towards 
monuments in antiquity, the renaissance and modernity and UNESCO’s early efforts 
were described as a further development in two tempi of Riegl’s modern attitude. 
First, the analogue paradigm of dissemination, i.e. the physical transportation of 
mechanically reproduced material to remote locations, and second, the digital 
paradigm of access, i.e. the access via a computer terminal to digitally stored 
material. This access paradigm was then described as operating along three 
strategic axes, those of “unity in diversity,” identity, and creativity and innovation. 
 The general topology of chapter 1 can be considered an abstract diagram 
operated in various ways by different concrete technological, conceptual and 
imaginary assemblages described in chapter 2. The respective paradigms of 
analogue dissemination and digital access thus operate within the same diagram. 
Dissemination is basically akin to Resnais’s depiction of the movement from stores 
to reading room in Toute la mémoire du monde and what is still implemented in the 
digitalised libraries described in section 1.3.1. Access, on the other hand, blurs the 
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imaginary barrier, depicted by Resnais. The physical barrier becomes imaginary in a 
different sense, it becomes portable, storage is supposedly always already there as 
resource, the reading room is any- and everywhere. As mentioned briefly in the end 
of the previous chapter, this universal access nourishes imaginaries of evidence 
ands its potential for control. Let us now turn to this three-fold thing of the digital. 
 
3.1	Digital	humanities	and	the	elusive	thing	
 
“Ce qu’il y a dans das Ding, c’est le secret véritable.” 
Lacan, Le Séminaire. Livre VII  
– L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 58 
 
No, digital humanities is nothing new. Let us dutifully mention the name Busa and be 
done with it. It might have been called something else, it might have been performed 
on a smaller scale and in simpler ways, but the digital has long since penetrated the 
perennially thick walls of the ivory tower. The short distance between Busa’s work 
and the current understanding of digital humanities can be gleaned from Lisa 
Gitelman’s short summary:  
 
“The field had “a very well-known beginning” in 1949, when Father 
Roberto Busa sought to use computers in preparing a concordance of 
the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. More recently the field has had the 
primary, practical result of designing scholarly resources and publishing 
them online: editions and collections, certainly, but also tools for data 
mining, analytics, and visualization.”377  
 
From 1949 to “more recently” without a pause. Busa’s punched card concordance is 
but the ancestor to our present stage where both objects and tools of analysis have 
gone digital and online. This would be the optimistic view of historical development, 
presented by Ellul: Between Busa’s concordance and contemporary digital 
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humanities there is but a difference of scale. Such optimism also allows Andrew 
Prescott to see in the Middle Ages the “direct ancestor of all later alphabetical and 
searchable tools” for this is when they happened upon the happy notion “that texts 
could be arbitrarily arranged according to an abstract system such as the letters of 
the alphabet.”378 Prescott’s example is a much earlier concordance than Busa’s, the 
first one in fact, compiled to the holy scriptures between 1235 and 1249 by 
Dominican monks in Paris.  
 Something is new, though, isn’t it? In the quintessential academic acts of reading 
and writing, the hand once wrote and the eye read. Then, the machine took over the 
feeding of the reading mind. At some point, in the midst of battle, a machine 
COLOSSUS read the writing of a machine ENIGMA. Now, the machine not only 
reads the machine, it reads the reader and writes of its own accord. When the 
computer reads, it writes elsewhere; but now, in addition, when the eye reads the 
computer, the computer reads and rewrites the eye and feeds it back into the writing 
process.379 The colossal ubiquity of read/write operations almost seems to intimate 
that enigma is no more.  
 Speaking of the word processor, Derrida once said:  
 
“[...] je me demande tout le temps ce qui serait arrivé à Platon, à 
Descartes, à Hegel, à Nietzsche et même à Heidegger (qui, au fond, a 
connu l’ordinateur sans le connaître), s’ils avaient rencontré cette « 
chose », non seulement comme un instrument disponible mais comme 
un thème de réflexion. […] Mais comment auraient-ils interprété une 
culture qui tend ainsi à être dominée, dans sa quotidienneté même, et à 
travers tout l’univers, par de tels dispositifs techniques d’inscription et 
d’archivation ?”380  
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 Taking Paul Valéry, Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger as points of 
departure, this third chapter wonders about the current academic encounter with 
“cette « chose »” as an object of study, as a tool and the constitution of new 
practices. The “thing” is presented from the threefold perspective of access, 
evidence and control: access as the newfound availability and emancipation of the 
digital object, evidence as the cognitive approach marshalled in response to the 
surge of data and control as the new ruling practice, whether academic, ethical or 
critical. In the previous chapters we have already encountered these terms in various 
ways. The desire for the subsumption of plethora in archival pleroma is a matter of 
any- and everyone’s access to any- and everything from any- and everywhere. And 
the result of such pleroma is the evidence of the one true opinion, since “there can 
be no two respectable and antagonistic opinions […]” And as we have seen, such an 
access to the evidence of truth – Resnais’s promise of happiness – entails its own 
form of control. As Austerlitz pointed out, the Islands of the Blest are remarkably 
similar to a penal colony.  
 Access, evidence and control allow us not to grasp but to close in on the “thing,” 
which seems to have forced us to redefine so many – once steady – pillars of 
academia: the humanities (digital or not), the archive, the relevance of theory, etc. 
But if this disciplinary frenzy, this conceptual confusion, is something new, then what 
is its cause? What is the thing of the something?381  
 There is a general sentiment that it has to do with the digital: “Everyone now 
accepts that digital technology is changing scholarship.”382 And “[n]o one can 
seriously doubt that the intercourse of the humanities research community will be 
digitally organized.”383 The digital is clearly having a profound impact on every single 
aspect of scholarship, both on an institutional, theoretical, methodological, 
conceptual and objective level. “That is, computational technology has become the 
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very condition of possibility required in order to think about many of the questions 
raised in the humanities today.”384 
 If the thing is the digital, then what is the digital thing? Is it the constitutive 
elements of zeros and ones? Their electromagnetic inscription on spinning platters 
or solid state drives? Their operationalization via code instructions? Or is it, rather, 
the executed code as runtime experience and interface? Is the digital best perceived 
as a cloud-like network of software nodes or the universal archive as the ready 
availability of all digital objects?  
 The present chapter proposes a mapping of the on-going frenzy and confusion 
from the calm conceptual collection of access, evidence and control.385 They each 
represent a response to the elusiveness of the digital “thing.” Access has hopes and 
fears for the digital object and mostly wants it to stay in its place. Evidence tries to 
study it and gain from it all the knowledge that was so frustratingly unattainable in its 
arcane analogue ancestors. Control seeks to establish new practices that let us 
harvest from its digital soil academic mastery, personal edification and communal 
benefit. 
 
3.2	Closing	in	on	the	thing	
 
Let us begin with a pre-digital encounter with the “thing.” In 1928, in a manner 
remarkably similar to the contemporary propositions by Moholy-Nagy and Kiesler as 
well as those of Wells and Otlet, Paul Valéry expressed amazement regarding the 
impact of technological development:  
 
“Les œuvres acquerront une sorte d’ubiquité. Leur présence immédiate ou 
leur restitution à toute époque obéiront à notre appel. Elles ne seront plus 
seulement dans elles-mêmes, mais toutes où quelqu’un sera, et quelque 
                                                            
384 Berry, Understanding Digital Humanities, 3. 
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appareil. Elles ne seront plus que des sortes de sources ou des origines, et 
leurs bienfaits se trouveront ou se retrouveront entiers où l’on voudra.”386 
 
 The object will be ubiquitous, it will be available – and fully so (“entiers”) – for 
pure access. It is difficult to read the following and not think of contemporary 
streaming services: “il sera merveilleusement doux de pouvoir changer à son gré 
une heure vide, une éternelle soirée, un dimanche infini, en prestiges, en 
tendresses, en mouvements spirituels.”387 
 Whatever your taste or poison – Beethoven or Beyoncé, Brötzmann or 
Bacharach – Spotify, Wimp, Deezer and its siblings now give any given Sunday its 
musical fill just as the Berliner Philharmoniker application happily notifies your 
gadget of choice whenever its audience is settling into their seats so that you may 
privately do the same and virtually join their number. Valéry noted that, at the time, 
visual phenomena had yet to be mastered in the same way as the audible; but, as 
demonstrated by services as diverse as Netflix and the Google Art Project, he 
rightfully predicted: “Cela se fera.”388  
 Walter Benjamin quoted Valéry at length in the beginning of “Das Kunstwerk im 
Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit.”389 The quoted passage, which 
claims that “Noch die Materie, noch der Raum, noch die Zeit sind seit zwanzig 
Jahren, was sie seit jeher gewesen sind,”390 simply hovers uncommented en 
exergue before the preface. Something has happened as described by Valéry, and 
Benjamin sets out to trace its consequences with regard to the authenticity of the 
work of art: Mechanical reproduction depreciates the presence of the object, its aura, 
because it severs the object’s ties to its history or tradition.391 Benjamin, of course, 
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saw this as a political potential and focused on film’s influence on individual 
apperception, private property and mass mobilisation.  
 Martin Heidegger, on the other hand, was less hopeful regarding the ability of the 
then new media to bring near that which is far. While Valéry focused on music and 
Benjamin on film, Heidegger’s essay on Das Ding (1951) saw the epitome of these 
technological developments in television: “Den Gipfel der Beseitigung jeder 
Möglichkeit der Ferne erreicht die Fernsehapparatur, die bald das ganze Gestänge 
und Geschiebe des Verkehrs durchjagen und beherrschen wird.”392 In this “Teleset” 
he saw a catastrophe where the technological ability to bring near creates “dieses 
Gleichförmige, worin alles weder fern noch nahe, gleichsam ohne Abstand ist,” a 
state where “Alles wird in das gleichförmig Abstandlose zusammengeschwemmt.”393 
Heidegger thus insists: “Allein das hastige Beseitigen aller Entfernungen bringt keine 
Nähe; denn Nähe besteht nicht im geringen Maß der Entfernung.”394 
 Thus, we have three readings of technological access to that which was once far 
away: Valéry’s pleasure in mediated spiritual pursuits; Benjamin’s recruitment of 
media’s destruction of aura in the service of emancipatory politics; and, finally, 
Heidegger’s insistence that modern media cost us our understanding of actual 
nearness.395 These are all three aspects of our technologically renewed relation to 
the Thing. Heidegger explicitly tried to rethink das Ding with regards to nearness in 
the new technological era and ended up with his famous fourfold: “Erde und Himmel, 
die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen gehören, von sich her zueinander einig, aus der 
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technology could be overcome by enthusiasm for television as a means for bringing the Gods near, if 
it showed the masterful football skills of Franz Beckenbauer and his “Mannschaft”, cf. Kittler, “Martin 
Heidegger, Medien und die Götter Griechenlands - Ent-Fernen heißt die Götter nähern,” 390. 
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Einfalt des einigen Gevierts zusammen.”396 This fourfold is gathered in the thing: 
“Das Ding verweilt das Geviert. Das Ding dingt Welt. Jedes Ding verweilt das Geviert 
in ein je Weiliges aus Einfalt der Welt.”397 Unlike an object (Gegenstand), 
Heidegger’s fourfold thing gathers and assembles the high and the low, the eternal 
and the mortal, the abstract and the material in a specific way. Only by thinking this 
gathering, this assemblage, are we able to think the thing and its relation to the world 
as something that concerns and conditions us instead of merely as a resource to be 
stored and exploited.398  
 Let us try, then, to consider the thing that seems to be happening within or 
around the digital humanities as the current academic mode of approaching digital 
evidentiality. Thinking the thing instead of the object should, hopefully, allow us to 
circumvent the deluge of questions surrounding the digital – is it this or is it that? – as 
well as the often comical attempts to patent the best possible terminology or 
disciplinary approach. Our goal here is to close in on the “thing” via the threefold 
perspective of access, evidence and control as the specific gathering that both 
conditions and haunts contemporary humanities and hence our ability to understand 
something like digital cultural heritage. 
 
3.3	Access	
 
In a certain way, Valéry, Benjamin and Heidegger all took transmission, i.e. access 
to something via the transmissions of sound and image, as their point of departure. 
New modes of transmission influenced the spiritual formation of the self, property 
relations and the mobilisation of the masses and, finally, our cognitive relation to the 
world. In our day, this access via transmission is, of course, epitomised by the 
                                                            
396 Heidegger, “Das Ding,” 172. 
397 Ibid. 173. 
398 Cf. Heidegger’s critique of modern technology as the challenging of nature: “Das in der modernen 
Technik waltende Entbergen ist ein Herausfordern, das an die Natur das Ansinnen stellt, Energie zu 
liefern, die als solche herausgefördert und gespeichert werden kann.” Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der 
Technik,” 18. We shall return to this reading of technology in the two last chapters. 
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distributed digital network: “Inside the dense web of distributed networks, it would 
appear that everything is everywhere.”399  
 But is the network, then, the “thing” of the digital? Is the rise to prominence of the 
distributed network the central paradigm of our contemporary societies, cultures and 
academic trepidations? And, in that case, what is the network as thing? Is it the 
rhizome, a collection of protocols, or is it the swarm of the Furies?  
 The network obviously plays a pivotal role in digital access as its dominant form 
of transmission, but as was already clear in Shannon, it is nothing but an abstraction, 
a set of unemployed conventions noted in the RFCs,400 without some form of 
transmitted content, without that of which the network is a transmission. Kittler 
always insisted on the “notwendigen und hinreichenden” trinity of transmission, 
storage and computation.401 Sending and receiving via the network requires 
read/write operations within computer memory and between memory and storage. 
So, what about storage, access to the digitally stored object? 
 Apart from transmission, storage and computation, Kittler was fond of another 
conceptual triplet, that of Lacan’s distinction between the real, the symbolic and the 
imaginary, which he found expressed in the phonograph, the typewriter and the 
cinematograph, respectively. Thus, Kittler would to some extent agree with Valéry’s 
description of the fullness of access to sound – not because there is no possible 
quality loss but simply because the sound of the real itself inscribed traces in the 
substratum. When, in July 1877, Edison shouted his famous “Hullo” into the 
mouthpiece of what was to become the phonograph, the vibrations of his voice left 
an imprint, which to this day allows a faint echo of that primordial bellow to resound 
from the past. The real ceased not to write itself, as Kittler would echo Lacan.  
 Benjamin’s perception of cinema, on the other hand, is that of a break with our 
commonplace images:  
 
                                                            
399 Galloway and Thacker, The Exploit, a Theory of Networks, 4. 
400 The RFCs (Request for Comments) are a “document series contain[ing] technical and 
organizational notes about the Internet. They cover many aspects of computer networking, including 
protocols, procedures, programs, and concepts, as well as meeting notes, opinions, and sometimes 
humor.” http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html. 
401 Cf. for example, Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 353. 
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“Unsere Kneipen und Großstadtstraßen, unsere Büros und möblierten 
Zimmer, unsere Bahnhöfe und Fabriken schienen uns hoffnungslos 
einzuschließen. Da kam der Film und hat diese Kerkerwelt mit dem Dynamit 
der Zehntelsekunden gesprengt, so daß wir nun zwischen ihren 
weitverstreuten Trümmern gelassen abenteuerliche Reisen 
unternehmen.”402  
 
If, for Kittler, the imaginary has “den Status von Kino” because of its flickering mirror 
edition of the “real” world,403 then, for Benjamin, this ability to produce a new 
imaginary and new ways of consuming image worlds is the key to the future. If, as 
Althusser would have it, ideology is the imaginary relation of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence,404 Benjamin’s cinema is, in its very technological form, the 
foundation of a new critique of ideology. Just as Assmann’s archive destroys the 
aura of “cultural reference memory,” the new archival operations of Benjamin’s 
cinema destroy the aura of the prison world of canon.405 
 Finally, Heidegger’s sense of technologically induced loss extended to the 
typewriter, whose machine writing reduced the word to a means of transmission and 
effaced the individual character of expression in favour of mechanic 
standardisation.406 Kittler similarly noted the digital as a renewed monopoly of the 
symbolic and, although Heidegger never experienced the contemporary 
pervasiveness of the digital, his response to digital inscription can be gathered from 
his clear statement that philosophy has met its end in the new unification of the 
sciences in the informational manoeuvres of cybernetics.407 
 
3.4	Bits	and	archives	
 
                                                            
402 Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit - Dritte Fassung,” 
499-500. 
403 Ibid. 29. 
404 Cf. Althusser, “Idéologie et Appareils Idéologiques d’État,” 101. 
405 Cf. section 1.1.2. 
406 Heidegger, Parmenides, 119, cf. also Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 26. 
407 Heidegger, “Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens (30. Oktober 1965),” 623. 
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What we are getting at is access to the stored object as inscription on a substrate. 
The voice itself held the pen when its vibrations were etched into Edison’s receiving 
cylinder, and photographed faces impressed themselves on the camera lens with a 
painful light.408 Sound and image on the computer, however, are literally reduced to 
the symbolic writing of the computerised typewriter; and, thus, much more than the 
sciences has fallen under the aegis of cybernetics.  
 Digital inscription does not, of course, consist in the actual writing of “1s” or “0s”; 
neither is it a simple binary of electrically charged or uncharged locations: “the 
magnetic patterns on the surface of the disk are not a direct representation of bit 
values but an abstraction of those values, filtered through a range of encoding 
schemes […]”409 In addition to the voltage flux reversals indicating the given value (1 
or 0), the disc requires inscribed flux reversals to indicate location. Deciphering a 
hard drive through a magnetic force microscope is, thus, akin to deciphering Morse 
code without ever having learned the representational system: “What we see here 
are not simply bits, but patterns of magnetic flux reversals, a number of which may 
be necessary to constitute a single bit […]. Thus while bits are the smallest symbolic 
units of computation, they are not the smallest inscribed unit […]”410 Without knowing 
the encoding scheme, deciphering and, thus, grasping the sense of flux reversals 
become more than a bit of a challenge.  
 Digital inscription is meaningless without the law N that governs the semiotic 
function of flux reversals on the substrate as well as the retrievability of their 
semantic content H; and we could, therefore, argue that digital inscription is always 
already an archive. This is a proposition that is bound to annoy the pundit who, like 
Ernst, detects a current lamentable “conflation of libraries, museums, and archives” 
and bemoans an “inflation of the term ‘archive’ […]”411 Granted, the term is wearing 
thin and should not be used lightly; but, as noted from Derrida to Ernst and Azoulay, 
the archive is different after the advent of the digital.  
                                                            
408 Cf. “[...] la Photographie — ma Photographie — est sans culture : lorsqu’elle est douloureuse, rien, 
en elle, ne peut transformer le chagrin en deuil.” Barthes, La Chambre Claire, 141. 
409 Kirschenbaum, Mechanisms, New Media and the Forensic Imagination, 90. 
410 Ibid. 61. 
411 Manoff, “Theories of the Archive from Across the Disciplines,” 10. Manoff herself is not such a 
pundit. On the contrary, she argues for an expansion of the debate concerning the archive. 
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 As already noted by Valéry, the immediacy caused by the time of transmission 
approaching zero also applies to the time of memory: Works of art can supposedly 
be restored from the past with no hint of the ghostly horrors that so often haunt such 
summons. According to Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, this summonable availability of the 
past is often perceived to assure the future:  
 
“The major characteristic of digital media is memory. […] Memory allegedly 
makes digital media an ever-increasing archive in which no piece of data is 
lost. This always-thereness of new media is also what links it to the future 
as future simple, as what will be, as predictable progress. By saving the 
past, it was supposed to make knowing the future easier.”412  
 
 But the “archival promise” of the complete mnemonic accumulation of the past 
and the subsequent cybernetic calculation of the future on the basis of this 
completed data set is an illusion. Digital memory fades. As Chun argues, digital 
memory is an enduring ephemeral depending on persistent rewriting; and, thus far, 
even non-volatile memory has limited read-write capacity.413  
 From cathode ray tubes to DRAM, SSDs and RAIDs containing multiple hard 
drives ever in danger of spinning out of control and into a twirling encounter with the 
all-too-tactile inscriptions of the real, digital memory is not the assured storage once 
hoped for. The RAID (Redundant Array of Inexpensive/Independent Disks) is an 
example of large-scale storage based not on the assumption but on the sure 
knowledge that participating disks will fail.  
 Instantaneous access to ephemeral digital inscriptions on networked substrates 
makes the digital archive a question of time: “Thus, the so-called Internet “archive” 
becomes radically temporalized. It is rather hypertemporal than hyperspatial, based 
on the aesthetic of immediate feedback, recycling and refreshing rather than on the 
ideal of locked-away storage for eternity.”414 Storage itself then becomes a mode of 
transmission with data constantly being moved around or rewritten. Access is no 
longer the simple transmission of an object from one location to another. It is not a 
                                                            
412 Chun, “The Enduring Ephemeral, or the Future Is a Memory,” 154. 
413 Ibid. 166. 
414 Ernst, “Cultural Archive versus Technomathematical Storage,” 68. 
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case of Galloway’s “chain of triumph.” The object itself is a spectral inscription 
constantly rewritten in a black box that, when opened, reveals nothing legible to the 
naked eye. And even the right optics reveal only flux reversals indecipherable 
without knowledge of the encoding scheme. Any act of reading is an act of 
deciphering, i.e., “[o]bjects exist only upon use.”415 
 
3.5	Code	
 
Digital inscription in transmission, this constant flux of networked read/write 
operations,416 is, then, finally, nothing without the computational operationalization of 
the very same inscriptions. From the encoding scheme to the interface of web 
applications, the digital operates by code. But, here again, we run into the same 
problem: What is the code thing? Is it the programmer’s source code, compiled 
machine code, electromagnetic disk inscriptions or possibly the execution of code?   
 Just as digital inscription requires an encoding scheme in order to make sense, 
“the complete syntactic and semantic rules of a computer language must be defined 
and written into any environment designed to interpret, parse, or execute it.”417 
Hence, software only works via what Galloway calls its own “meta-medial reflection,” 
which determines the conditions for its execution and, thus, its existence. We see 
higher-level expressions of these “meta-medial” environments whenever we need to 
update Flash, Java or Silverlight on our computers. Streaming services have a 
tendency to rely on these. Netflix, for example, requires Silverlight to stream content, 
and streaming the concerts of the Berliner Philharmoniker requires Flash.418  
 But we only ever notice these interpreting layers when they stop working or they 
themselves announce that it is time for an update. The surface tends to eclipse what 
goes on in the machine room. Galloway calls this the occult logic of software: 
                                                            
415 Galloway, Protocol, How Control Exists after Decentralization, 74. 
416 Cf. “computer reading is a writing elsewhere” Chun, Programmed Visions, Software and Memory, 
5. 
417 Galloway, “Language wants to be overlooked,” 322. 
418 Flash is rapidly disappearing and Microsoft’s enthusiasm for Silverlight seems to have waned, so 
what was the case at the time of writing may very well have changed by the time of reading. 
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“software hides itself at exactly the moment when it expresses itself most fully.”419 Or 
“what you see is not what you get.”420 When gazing at the interface, its surfaces and 
functions are created and recreated elsewhere. When reading the source code, its 
ultimate expression, its telos, is an execution waiting to happen. Source code is 
always, in a certain way, on death row.  
 Chun, on the other hand, would argue that it only becomes source code after the 
execution: “source code only becomes a source after the fact. […] Source code is 
more accurately a re-source, rather than a source. […] Source code becomes a 
source only through its destruction, through its simultaneous nonpresence and 
presence.”421 The readable source is nothing without its destruction in the 
executable. Chun’s argument is based on a Derridean perception of writing as 
spectral. The appearance of the ghost is always a re-appearance; software is always 
already undead.422  
 It is, of course, possible to claim some form of primacy, to hierarchize the 
“layers” of code. The two extreme positions in this regard are Kittler’s famous 
statement that “[t]here is no software”423 and Manovich’s recent reply that “[t]here is 
only software.”424 For Kittler, it all comes down to operations in the substrate in the 
form of voltages and logic gates, a position unsurprising for a man who, as we have 
already mentioned, chose the RAM/ROM distinction over Mnemosyne as a 
conceptual instrument for describing the history of memory organisation.  
 Manovich, on the other hand, takes issue with our initial assumption that the 
“thing” of the digital humanities has something to do with the digital: “None of the 
new media authoring and editing techniques we associate with computers are simply 
a result of media “being digital.” The new ways of media access, distribution, 
analysis, generation, and manipulation all come from software.”425 For Manovich, 
software is the thing. As was already apparent in The Language of New Media 
(2001), Manovich is interested in what happens after the execution of code, its 
                                                            
419 Galloway, “Networks,” 292. 
420 Galloway, The Interface Effect, 69. 
421 Chun, Programmed Visions, Software and Memory, 24-25. 
422 Ibid. 25. Cf. also Derrida: “[…] un spectre est toujours un revenant. On ne saurait en contrôler les 
allées et venues parce qu’il commence par revenir.” Derrida, Spectres de Marx, l’État de la dette, le 
travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale, 32. 
423 Kittler, “There Is No Software.” 
424 Manovich, Software Takes Command, 147. 
425 Ibid. 148. 
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resurrection in “the techniques, the tools, and the conventions”426 of the runtime 
experience or interface.  
 Both Galloway and Chun explicitly try to negotiate the many aspects of code 
without reducing them to one primary layer. Spectral or occult, the operationalization 
of digital inscription in computation is as difficult to pin down as networked 
transmission and storage were. Deploying our folded notion of the “thing,” we can 
push the meta-medial reflexivity of code awaiting execution as well as its undead 
mirror image a bit further and consider the different aspects of source, assembly and 
binary executable as different reflections of each other that engage in a vivid mirror 
dance en abyme. The different specular images are not equivalent, nor are they 
reducible to one another. Whether code awaits execution in the electrical circuits of 
the CPU or only ever awaits execution once the undead walks again matters less. 
What matters is the dance that reveals its participants in a new light and in new 
formations as the beat goes on. 
 
3.6	Evidence	
 
The digital thing remains elusive. Whether as transmission, inscription in storage or 
computation, access is nothing but a dance of shadows. And, yet, access is claimed 
to cast new light and deliver a new form of clarity: evidence. Former editor-in-chief of 
WIRED and current drone manufacturer, Chris Anderson, even went so far as to 
claim the death of theory as access to enormous amounts of data will allow it to 
speak for itself, the archival promise of “big data”:  
 
“The new availability of huge amounts of data, along with the statistical tools 
to crunch these numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding the 
world. Correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance even 
without coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic 
                                                            
426 Ibid. 149. 
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explanation at all. […] It’s time to ask: What can science learn from 
Google.”427  
 
 Access to unfathomable data stores, new computational tools and the networked 
transmission and distribution of the cloud supposedly open a whole new world in 
which, with “enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.” Although Chris 
Anderson’s comments have a certain evocative power, they provide little 
demonstrative value. But they are nonetheless interesting because of the 
imaginaries they express and the impact they had.  
 Matthew L. Jockers, a frequent collaborator of Franco Moretti, opens his book 
Macroanalysis (2013) with a reference to Chris Anderson’s proposition. Surprisingly, 
Jockers takes its title, “Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete”, less as a 
problematic and contestable provocation than as a given, now finally manifest within 
the humanities: “Now slowly and surely, the same elements that have had such an 
impact on the sciences are revolutionizing the way that research in the humanities 
gets done.”428  
 Interestingly, this digital revolution hinges on two terms, access and evidence: 
“massive digital corpora offer us unprecedented access to the literary record and 
invite, even demand, a new type of evidence gathering and meaning making.”429 The 
revolution is even an automatic result of access to “both large and easily accessible” 
data stores: “We have built it, and they are coming.”430 
 Data is not evidence in itself; it becomes evidence when gathered or, in our 
terminology, consigned. Access to data permits evidence consignation, which then 
again enables “accessing details that are otherwise unavailable, forgotten, ignored, 
or impossible to extract;” it allows “the computer to help us see even more, even 
deeper […]”431 Access enables evidence, which then again enables cognitive 
access, ultimately expressed by the metaphor of sight. 
 The digital is clearly not just the bringer of new evidence but also new ways for 
data to give evidence. But what is the new Thing of evidence? Data or, possibly, 
                                                            
427 Anderson, “The End of Theory.” 
428 Jockers, Macroanalysis, Digital Methods and Literary History, 3. 
429 Ibid. 8, my emphasis. 
430 Ibid. 12. 
431 Ibid. 27. 
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metadata? And what is the evidential difference between data and metadata? 
Jockers begins with metadata as a “wealth of information,” but it seems, 
nevertheless, to be the next best thing: “In the absence of full text, this bibliographic 
metadata can reveal useful information about literary trends.”432 In this context, one 
might consider bibliographic metadata to be the data about the data of the text. But 
metadata constantly slips back into the role of “data” in references to metadata as 
“bibliographical data,”433 “title data”434 and, from the end of the chapter on metadata: 
“The data discussed in this chapter […]”435 
 Bibliographical metadata is “meta-” with regards to “full text” data but becomes 
data in its own right when serving as the object of study. Yet again, we notice the 
shadowy mirror dance in which different aspects of the digital thing switch places 
and reveal different sides of themselves. But the whole point of evidence is that data 
reveal something new, that, “[g]iven enough digital records and enough computing 
power, a new vantage point on human culture becomes possible.”436 As the subtitle 
of Aiden and Michel’s book indicates, “big data” itself functions as a lens on human 
culture. 
 What, then, is the object of this lens? How does the evidential dance of access to 
data and metadata cast light on the cultural phenomenon? In a recent article, Franco 
Moretti refers to Alexandre Koyré’s distinction between a utensil and an instrument, 
the utensil being a sensory amplification of our common sense appraisal of the world 
and the instrument a “materialisation of thought … the conscious realisation of 
theory,” which allows us to “reach what does not fall under the domain of our senses 
[…].”437  Moretti claims that, within literary analysis, “the protagonist” is a utensil, 
while “character-space” as the measure of narrative space allotted to a single 
character, is an instrument. According to Koyré, both Galileo’s telescope and 
microscope are such instruments.  
 Big data is the lens through which the computer helps us see, and something like 
“character-space” could, then, be likened to the adequate direction and focalisation 
                                                            
432 Ibid. 35-36. 
433 Ibid. 54. 
434 Ibid. 55. 
435 Ibid. 64. 
436 Aiden and Michel, Uncharted, 12. 
437 Koyré as cited in Moretti, “‘Operationalizing,’” 113. 
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of the gaze, a direction and focalisation based on theoretical lines of questioning that 
transform the lens from an optical curiosity into an instrument. Chris Anderson 
expressed the old scholarly desire for the “thing” to stop hiding and reveal itself, but 
the scholars faced with its ghostly formations recognise that there is more to it than 
that. Computation does not allow immediate access to the thing-in-itself, thus 
obliterating theory. The thing, rather, “has theoretical consequences.”438 
 For Moretti, these consequences are best expressed in the – almost unbearably 
ugly – concept “operationalizing,” conceived as a “bridge from concepts to 
measurement, and then to the world. In our case: from the concepts of literary 
theory, through some form of quantification, to literary texts.”439 Character-space is, 
thus, an instrument, the “operationalizing” of which produces new categories. It 
casts, for instance, the “protagonist” to be a “special instance of the more general 
category of “centrality”.”440  
 No doubt, access provides new evidence; but, presented with the character-
space visualisations provided by Moretti, one is tempted to grant that it is correct yet 
still ask whether it is true?441 Is this really what concerns us in the thing? In a tone 
reminiscent of the quotes from Heidegger at the beginning of this chapter, Georg 
Simmel once wrote of the telescope that “das Näher-Herankommen an die Dinge uns 
sehr oft erst zeigt, wie fern sie uns noch sind […]”442 Evidence as cognitive access 
via computation of transmitted data storage brings near but, perhaps, at the cost of a 
certain loss.  
 If the digital is the reign of the symbolic, as Kittler would have it, then the digital 
promise of access and evidence aims, as Moretti states it, to reunite the symbolic 
with the empirical world or, rather, to achieve an adequate symbolic representation of 
the real. The problem is, though, that the Lacanian real is not that which resists 
“being caught in the symbolic network, but the fissure within the symbolic network 
itself. […] for Lacan the Real – the Thing – is not so much the inert presence that 
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curves symbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, an 
effect of these gaps and inconsistencies.”443 This is a point that Kittler keeps missing. 
For Kittler, the Lacanian symbolic is always an inadequate encoding of the Lacanian 
real; but, for Lacan, the ever improving symbolic “encoding” of the real is exactly 
what reproduces the real as traumatic Thing, as unknowable abyss. Thus, digital 
evidence in the sense of access to data as self-evident when observed via the 
proper instrument is a discourse of truth that eludes itself. 
 
3.7	Discipline	
 
Moretti delivered “operationalizing” as a process “absolutely central to the new field 
of computational criticism, or, as it has come to be called, of the digital 
humanities.”444 More than simply proclaiming its able entry into the thick of the fray 
that is the digital humanities, Moretti here airdrops his conceptual fighter into the 
absolute centre of the battle to determine its outcome.  
 Manovich claims a similar centrality of his own champion: “Regardless of which 
new dimension of contemporary existence a particular social theory of the last few 
decades has focused on — information society, knowledge society, or network 
society — all these new dimensions are enabled by software.”445 Moretti believed his 
contestant could ensure a bridge between concept and world via measurement in an 
adaequatio rei et intellectus. Manovich, on the other hand, is more interested in the 
“thing” as the sine qua non of everything else of importance these days: “Software is 
the invisible glue that ties it all together. […] If we don’t address software itself, we 
are in danger of always dealing only with its effects rather than the causes […].”446 
And, furthermore, “I think of software as a layer that permeates all areas of 
contemporary societies. […] our analysis cannot be complete until we consider this 
software layer.”447 
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 Maybe academia always did this, but it seems that the digital provokes a special 
desire to claim one’s own approach or perspective as the thing that restores peace to 
the gap between res cogitans and res extensa, the thing that lies at the foundation of 
everything else or the thing singularly best equipped to handle the haunting of the 
new thing.   
 N. Katherine Hayles was clearly in marketing mode when, in How We Think 
(2012), she all but trademarked the term “Comparative Media Studies” as a crucial 
academic approach:  
 
“Comparative Media Studies provides a rubric within which the interests of 
print-based and digital humanities scholars can come together to explore 
synergies between print and digital media, at the same time bringing into 
view other versions of Comparative Media Studies, such as the transition 
from manuscript to print culture, that have until now been relegated to 
specialised subfields.”448  
 
 Note that she writes “Comparative Media Studies” in title case, thus evoking the 
trademark effect. Comparative Media Studies is exemplary in its capacities 
expressed by terminology such as “provides,” “synergy,” “bringing into view,” 
“enriches” and “would have wide appeal;” and, finally, she adds: “A principal aim of 
this book is to excavate these layers, showing through specific case studies what 
Comparative Media Studies involves.”449 In other words, the book’s main aim is to 
establish this trademarkable disciplinary entity. 
 In Comparative Textual Media (2013), which Hayles edited along with Jessica 
Pressman, the brand name “comparative media studies” is written in lower case 
italics and, then, abandoned in favour of “comparative textual media” in italics and, 
later, in the logo form of “CTM” in order to comply with the focus of that particular 
book.450 All this, of course, is nit-picking, but it is an interesting case of disciplinary 
                                                            
448 Hayles, How We Think, 7. 
449 Ibid. 10. 
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Era, vii. 
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marketing, especially as “the rapidly emerging field of media archaeology,”451 a field 
which, no doubt, holds its own when it comes to marketing tactics, receives no 
comparative trademark insignia. 
 James Beniger argues that developments within rationalisation, bureaucracy and 
information, communication and processing “served to contain the control crisis of 
industrial society in what can be treated as three distinct areas of economic activity: 
production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.”452 Beniger claims 
that, just as industrialisation required theoretical developments to grasp capital, 
energy and material processing, the information society requires reanalysis of 
storage, computation, transmission, and control.453  
 From this perspective, we could, then, compare the numerous attempts to obtain 
conceptual or disciplinary dominance to Henry P. Crowell, who invented the first fully 
automatic production of oatmeal. “His plant literally received raw oats at one end and 
shipped cartons of packaged oatmeal out of the other.”454 But the efficiency of this 
mode of production also drove him to invent “breakfast cereal.” Since his production 
method produced twice the amount absorbed by the national market, he had to turn 
to national advertisement to create demand. And, thus, Quaker Oats was born in an 
attempt to avoid the threats of overproduction by inventing a new field of 
consumption. Similarly, the sheer efficacy of new modes of evidence demands 
disciplinary responses to the academic control crisis fostered by the digital thing. 
 
3.8	Control	
 
Access to the new evidence of the digital thing has created an academic crisis of 
control, inviting frantic scholarly attempts to contain it and profit from it. As I have 
tried to demonstrate above, the situation has fostered countless questions regarding 
the ontological and epistemological complexities of the digital. It would, however, be 
yet another case of missing the thing if we only consider the new object of study and 
                                                            
451 Ibid. xi. 
452 Beniger, The Control Revolution, Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society, 
16. 
453 Beniger uses the terms “storage, processing, communication, and control” Ibid. 32. 
454 Ibid. 265. 
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the tools and disciplines used to describe it. Galloway argues that the likes of 
McLuhan, Kittler and Manovich have taken a metaphysical approach to the medium 
as object and, instead, proposes an ethical approach to the computer-based medium 
as practice.455 
 Galloway bases this argument on the double meaning of the word techne: one 
as “substrate and only substrate”, another as “technique, art, habits, ethos, or lived 
practice.”456 One considers media as externalisations of man; the other asks the 
more political question of “middles and interfaces,” i.e., modes of mediation.457 One 
asks the questions of formal characteristics of layers and their primacies (e.g., 
voltages vs. software) as well as the historical incorporation of one medium into 
another (print as the content of the telegraph); the other questions the relations of 
command expressed and executed by the computer.  
 Not unlike the present chapter, Galloway tries to circumvent the “is it this or is it 
that?” questions of the digital scholarly sphere. Instead, he seeks out the injunction; 
he demands a theoretical discourse equal to the action and command structure of 
the computer. This motivates his proposed shift from thinking the “black box cypher” 
to thinking the “black box function”:458 We should not look for the inherent qualities of 
the Enigma machine that will allow us to decipher all its operations. Instead of 
building the COLOSSUS, we should analyse and exploit ENIGMA’s programmability. 
The political subtext of this media reading is that instead of critiquing ideology we 
should analyse and exploit the glitches in the society of control. 
 Although from a manifestly different political position, Bruno Latour has engaged 
in a similar line of questioning by arguing for a shift of focus from “matters of fact” to 
“matters of concern,” from Gegenstand to Ding. Latour accepts the Heideggerian 
distinction but claims that Heidegger “traced a dichotomy between Gegenstand and 
Thing that was justified by nothing except the crassest of prejudices.”459 Latour 
references the 2003 crash of the space shuttle Columbia as the “metamorphosis of 
an object into a thing,” a matter of fact becoming a matter of concern. But he 
                                                            
455 Galloway, The Interface Effect, 16-24. 
456 Ibid. 16. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Cf. Galloway, “Black Box, Black Bloc.” 
459 Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” 234. 
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criticises Heidegger for a poor understanding of science and technology: “he had 
only four folds, while the smallest shuttle, the shortest war, has millions.”460 
 While Galloway explicitly deals with the importance of things not working, the 
inoperable as a political countering of computational operationality,461 Latour deploys 
a mode of technocratic control whose goal is the optimisation of the machine beyond 
obsolete and troublesome criticism. The problem with Latour is his view of the thing 
as mechanic assemblage.462 If each element of the thing is a fold, then what is the 
thing but the sum of its folds, the sum of its elements? Latour’s folds include 
“passions, controls, institutions, techniques, diplomacies, wits,”463 but they remain 
operational parts in the mechanic assemblage. It is “the problem of composing one 
body from the multitude of bodies […].”464 
 Latour retransforms the thing into an object if the inoperable pieces are merely 
reassembled into a working whole without recognising its haunting spectrality and, 
thus, its power. The technocratic control deployed is clear in Latour’s use of the word 
“manage”: “How do [things as assemblages] manage to bring in the relevant parties? 
How do they manage to bring in the relevant issues? What change does it make in 
the way people make up their mind to be attached to things?”465 The thing as an ever 
elusive and haunting assemblage of modes of access, evidence and control is most 
certainly a matter of concern, but definitely not a management of relevance or a 
choice of attachment.  
 Instead of Galloway’s political future or Heidegger’s “always already,” Latour 
seeks to abandon the critique of power in order to take account of the present. He 
wants us to “abstain as much as possible from using the notion of power.”466 For 
                                                            
460 Ibid. 235. 
461 Cf., e.g., Galloway, “The Unworkable Interface.” 
462 The following criticism of Latour is limited to his reading of the Heideggerian Thing in Latour, “Why 
Has Critique Run out of Steam?” and Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things 
Public.” A larger discussion of the Latourean framework in general and his specific conceptualization 
of the digital in particular are, thus, omitted, as are related philosophical discussions of the Thing 
within Object Oriented Ontology and Speculative Realism in works such as Harman, Tool-Being, 
Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Bennett, Vibrant Matter, a Political Ecology of Things, 
Olsen, In Defense of Things, Archaeology and the Ontology of Objects, Morton, Hyperobjects, 
Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World, Garcia, Form and Object and Hansen, Feed-
Forward. This discussion must, however be relegated to later work. 
463 Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” 235-236. 
464 Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public,” 28. 
465 Ibid. 24. 
466 Ibid. 29. 
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Latour, “[r]evolutionary time, the great Simplificator, has been replaced by 
cohabitation time, the great Complicator.” We are moving towards a world “where 
more and more elements are taken into account.”467 Latour sees “contemporary 
means and media”468 as a way of finally taking account of everything. Everything 
shall be illuminated; new access to new evidence will enable new control free from 
the transcendent dominion of such master signifiers as “nature” and “capitalism.”469 
While Galloway wants to basically hack the society of control by exploiting its 
vulnerabilities, Latour wants to patch its every vulnerability by including everything in 
his network. Latour’s taking into account is the hope to consign everything so that a 
new and “better” (I would say “technocratic”) society of control. 
 For Latour, the media-induced contractions in time and space evoked by Valéry, 
Benjamin and Heidegger – spiritual edification, political emancipation, and cognitive 
danger – are replaced by a different injunction: “Give me one matter of concern and I 
will show the whole earth and heavens that have to be gathered to hold it firmly in 
place.”470 This is the exact problem depicted throughout the present chapter: The 
desire to hold the thing firmly in place no matter the cost, to control its spectral 
apparitions by including all aspects in the assemblage, as though such a 
consignation were possible without including a certain lack.  
 Though much is taken, much abides; and, perhaps, it us our task to counter this 
desire to move earth and heaven in the attempt to hold the thing firmly in place by 
demonstrating that access, evidence and control engage in a seductive dance of 
shadows in which the thing hides in its very appearance. 
 
                                                            
467 Ibid. 30. 
468 Ibid. 28. 
469 Cf. Latour’s critique of the political uses of the word “nature” as a way of establishing the distinction 
between truth and social world: “Although the world of truth differs absolutely, not relatively, from the 
social world, the Scientist can go back and forth from one world to the other no matter what: the 
passageway closed to all is open to him alone.” Latour, Politics of Nature, How to Bring the Sciences 
into Democracy, 11. This analysis is based on a reading of Plato’s cave as the constitution of “two 
houses”: one being the social life of the ignorant masses, the other being the domain of truth only 
accessible to the high priests of science. This dominion of an always challenged transcendent truth on 
social life is, for Latour, the neutralisation of democracy. He therefore proposes to collapse the 
distinction between the two houses in an analysis of the assemblages of humans and non-humans to 
allow for politics “conceived as the progressive composition of the common world.” Ibid. 18. Latour 
replicated the argument with regard to “capitalism” in a talk given in Copenhagen on February 26, 
2014: “On some of the affects of capitalism.” http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/136-
AFFECTS-OF-K-COPENHAGUE.pdf 
470 Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” 246. 
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3.9	In	closing	on	the	thing	
 
This chapter has questioned the “thing” of the digital humanities, the cause of its 
current conceptual and disciplinary frenzy. The goal of the chapter has not been to 
proffer a solution, the best possible approach, or the best possible terminology. The 
goal has been, rather, to demonstrate that the thing cannot be immediately grasped 
or pinned down, that whenever you think you have it, it turns out to be somewhere 
else. Rather than operators of the archival promise, the threefold prism of access, 
evidence, and control should be conceived as but a way of closing in on a thing that 
remains forever elusive. 
 The network has often been presented as so central a component of our age that 
we supposedly live in a network society. But what is the network without the 
transmitted object? Without the connected nodes of storage and software? Storage 
is itself a ghostly inscription that seems to evade us even when we try to stare at it 
through electronic microscopes. And the archives of such digital inscriptions, 
although they held great promise as the providers of the eternal presence of 
everything, seem to be far more ephemeral than their predecessors. Finally, 
computation is a many-layered thing disappearing in a mise en abyme between 
source, assembly and execution.  
 Access is quite clearly an essential aspect of the digital. But one of the reasons 
for the frenzy regarding the digital is the new forms of evidence provided by such 
immense access. Access to data has allowed for a new data object called big data. 
This data is sometimes data and sometimes metadata; one sometimes becomes the 
other depending on the perspective, but, as part of “the archival promise,” the 
measurability of data has led to hopes of a pure evidence, a self-revealing of the 
“thing” that will free us from ever having to deal with theory or models again. 
Supposedly, we no longer have to model the world; the world will reveal itself to us. 
But does this new evidential form actually mean access to the thing in itself? Or must 
we recognise that the new lens on human culture only demonstrates the distance to 
the thing and that, instead of bringing us ever closer to the real thing, digital 
symbolisation, in fact, produces the thing as haunting abyss of the real? 
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 The new forms of evidence have yet to settle in a disciplinary framework and 
there is much competition about providing the one, the train of thought or line of 
questioning that will dominate this new field and enact the instance of control in the 
counting and measuring of new evidence. But this instance of control goes beyond 
mere academic disciplines. It is also a matter of ethics, of how we relate to others 
and ourselves via the digital. It is important not to forget that control entails new 
agencies, ethics and politics. This is also why criticism is crucial with regards to the 
thing. To obliterate criticism in the name of the thing, of a technocratic analytical 
efficiency that prides itself on the newly won evidential capacities for complexity and, 
therefore, no longer sees the need for a time of succession, for a future beyond 
calculation, is exactly to miss the thing. 
 The threefold perspective of access, evidence and control attempts an ever-
distant approach. It does not aspire to disciplinary acceptance or dominance, nor do 
the three terms claim to provide the last word; they merely intimate a way of closing 
in on the thing while remembering that the digital thing remains ever elusive and that 
to grasp it is to lose it. To close in on the thing, one needs to leave it in the open. 
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4.	Scholion:	larm.fm471	
 
Section 2.2.4 briefly mentioned the Danish 2009 report on the state of digitised 
cultural heritage in Denmark and emphasised its expression of the strategic axis of 
national identity. This report was also mentioned in section 2.2.5 with regards to the 
easy accessibility of cultural heritage via the click of a mouse: “When the cultural 
heritage is digitised, suddenly it can be made accessible by the click of a mouse.”472 
The same year as that proud proclamation, the research project LARM received a 
grant of 25 million DKK from the national pool for research infrastructures. The goal 
of the project was to build a digital research infrastructure for radio sound, i.e. a 
digital radio archive with an interface to take advantage of the digital format to 
develop new research and dissemination formats, i.e. the goals of evidence and 
access. 
 The platform of the LARM project is called larm.fm, and it “gives the student 
access to 1.000.000 hours of radio from DR P1, DR P2, DR P3, DR P4, DR P5, DR 
P6 Beat, DR P7 Mix, DR P8 Jazz, DR P2 Klassisk, DR Ramasjang, DR Mama, DR 
Online, DR P5000, The Voice, TV2 Radio, Radio 100FM, Nova FM, Radio 2 and 
many more.”473 
 If we accept a notion of cultural heritage as the decision within cultural politics 
of preserving and making accessible the on-going accumulation of human artefacts 
and traces as both presence of the past and resource for the future, larm.fm. is quite 
clearly a digital cultural heritage archive. The purpose is unequivocally expressed as 
giving access to preserved historical material as resource: “LARM Audio Research 
Archive is an interdisciplinary project, the goal of which is the production of a digital 
infrastructure to facilitate researchers’ access to the Danish radiophonic cultural 
heritage. […] today, radio broadcasts form an invaluable, yet untapped, source to 
                                                            
471 This chapter is based on a previously published book chapter: Andreasen: “Det digitale 
kulturarvsarkiv – medie og dispositiv.” 
472 Digitaliseringsudvalget, “Digitalisering af Kulturarven - Endelig Rapport fra Digitaliseringsudvalget,” 
7. 
473 LARM, “Kom Godt I Gang.” 
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Danish culture and history.”474 The notion of “untapped potential” which we saw from 
UNESCO in 1993 persists.475 
 After the approaches presented in the initial three chapters – the topology of 
the archive, an archaeology of its historical conditions of possibility within 
technological development and cultural politics and, finally, the attempt to analyse 
the archival promise as imaginaries caught in the mirror dance of the three-fold thing 
– how should one now understand a concrete digital cultural heritage archive? How 
should one analyse a phenomenon such as larm.fm? It is an infrastructure giving 
access to a resource via an interface. Is there anything else to say about the digital 
archive and the interface than that the user can access large quantities of radio 
sound? 
 As mentioned in section 3.8, Galloway indicated two quite different 
approaches to the question of how to analyse an interface. One considers the 
technical medium, the techne of the medium, as object, i.e. as substrate and 
technique for storage and distribution of information. In this perspective, a stone 
tablet is characterised by its quality as a comparatively durable medium, which 
primarily allows for shorter texts. The impression of writing is slow, the tablet is less 
than ideal for transportation and distribution and the surface is less than forgiving of 
trespasses against orthography. The specific physical and technical characteristics 
of the medium thus limit its use. This is what a certain strand of media theory would 
call the medium’s affordances.476  
 The computer, on the other hand, is flexible with regard to length of text and 
speed of writing, it has a certain capacity for both storage and editing, and the digital 
format is easily distributed. Galloway emphasises that for this first approach, the 
medium is exclusively a question of Platonic hypomnesis, i.e. materialised or 
externalised memory in the form of e.g. writing as opposed to the human anamnesic 
memory. The task of this type of analysis thus becomes to describe the formal 
characteristics of each medium as hypomnemesic machine, i.e. machine of 
inscription.  
                                                            
474 LARM, “About LARM.” 
475 See section 2.2.3. 
476 The concept comes from the psychologist James Gibson, cf. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception, chap. 8. 
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 The other approach does not consider the medium as technical object but, 
according to the other meaning of the word techne, as practice. The medium then 
ceases to be an object with inherent affordances and characteristics and becomes a 
structure constituted by its use, by the practices surrounding it and occasioned by it. 
Instead of the ways in which the medium’s mode of inscription determines the 
cultural heritage archive, this approach considers the ways in which the archive is 
constituted as the centre of diverse practices related to the inheritance of culture.  
 While Galloway relates the first approach to the object and the second to 
practice, this distinction could also be related to two distinct notions of the term 
hypomnemata. In section 1.4.2, we distinguished between the Derridean 
hypomnemata and the Foucauldean hupomnemata, the one being the objective 
trace, the other being the practice related to certain traces. These two sides of the 
ὑπομνήματα correspond to the two sides of the word techne indicated by Galloway. 
One is a matter of technical modes of inscription; the other is a matter of the 
dispositif. This chapter will propose perspectives on larm.fm along both axes. 
 
 
 
4.1	The	medium	as	massage	
 
The concept of hypomnesis found a canonical description in Plato’s analysis of 
writing as a lack in the phenomenal adumbration of the purity of the idea. This is the 
version vigorously discussed by Derrida and Stiegler in relation to the pharmakon. 
Foucault, on the other hand, chose other sources for his version of the 
hupomnemata. When Galloway mentions the medium as hypomnesis, however, he 
references a quite different media-analytical tradition consisting of McLuhan, Kittler 
and Manovich, and we could add Wolfgang Ernst for good measure.  
 Granted, McLuhan did not use the term hypomnesis but similar to that 
tradition he defined media as “extensions of man,” i.e. exteriorisations of human 
practice. These extensions are the pharmacological prostheses that Derrida found 
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criticised in Plato.477 Modern means of transport are thus exteriorisations of the feet 
and the back, the telephone and the television are exteriorisations of the voice and 
bodily communication and money is the exteriorisation of human labour.478 This also 
allows him to claim that the content of any medium is another medium. Just as 
money contains labour, television contains film, film contains the novel, the novel 
contains the typescript etc.479 The extensions of man thus succeed and subsume 
one another.  
 Larm.fm can without further ado be described as a digital Internet-based 
medium, the content of which is the radio medium. The digital platform contains the 
radio.480 But such is, of course, far from a sufficient analysis. In addition to basic 
archive functions such as storage, search and playback, larm.fm is equipped with 
annotation functions that allow the researcher to tag entire broadcasts and describe 
or comment upon timeline excerpts of each broadcast. Larm.fm thus contains both 
the researcher’s notebook and the index cards of the analogue archive. The personal 
notes become a general enhancement of the archived object by their inscription on 
the digital index card’s metadata, which also make them accessible to and useful for 
others.  
 Contrary to its analogue predecessors, many digital archives let their users 
describe the archival objects either by tagging or free form annotation. These 
annotations let users communicate, directly or indirectly, via inscriptions in the 
object’s metadata. Just as the traces of Oxford student engagement with the first 
Shakespeare folio speak of past desires, perceptions and perspirations, scholarly 
                                                            
477 “Ce que Platon vise donc dans la sophistique, ce n’est pas le recours à la mémoire, mais dans un 
tel recours, la substitution de l’aide-mémoire à la mémoire vive, de la prothèse à l’organe, […]” 
Derrida, “La pharmacie de Platon,” 123–124. 
478 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, the Making of Typographic Man, 4–5. Stiegler comes from the 
Derridean strain of this thought of exteriorization that owes a great deal to André Leroi-Gourhan 
according to whom human memory has always been hypomnesic. Or in McLuhanesque terms: There 
have always been media: “Human memory is originally exteriorized, which means it is technical from 
the start. It took shape first as a lithic (or stone) tool, two million years ago.” Stiegler, “The Industrial 
Exteriorisation of Memory,” 67. 
479 This string of examples is from Kittler, Optische Medien : Berlinger Vorlesung 1999, 24. 
480 The somewhat problematic word “platform” is here used to designate the technical unity of front 
end and back end, i.e. interface and server-side operations. For a problematization of the term and its 
related imaginaries with regard to YouTube, cf. Gillespie, “The Politics of ‘Platforms’”: “This more 
conceptual use of ‘platform’ leans on all of the term’s connotations: computational, something to build 
upon and innovate from; political, a place from which to speak and be heard; figurative, in that the 
opportunity is an abstract promise as much as a practical one; and architectural, in that YouTube is 
designed as an open-armed, egalitarian facilitation of expression, not an elitist gatekeeper with 
normative and technical restrictions.” (p. 352). 
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annotations made as mere individual memory aids – “Parce que leur mémoire est 
courte, les hommes accumulent d’innombrables pense-bêtes” – testify to specific 
research interests and insights. But such annotations can also be explicit 
communication between collaborating researchers. By such im- and explicit 
communication via hypomnemata, the traces left in the archive in some sense 
participate in the hopes Brecht expressed for the radio medium:  
 
“Und um nun positiv zu werden, das heißt, um das Positive am Rundfunk 
aufzustöbern, ein Vorschlag zur Umfunktionierung des Rundfunks: Der 
Rundfunk ist aus einem Distributionsapparat in einen 
Kommunikationsapparat zu verwandeln. Der Rundfunk wäre der denkbar 
großartigste Kommunikationsapparat des öffentlichen Lebens, ein 
ungeheures Kanalsystem, das heißt, er wäre es, wenn er es verstünde, 
nicht auszusenden, sondern auch zu empfangen, also den Zuhörer nicht 
nur hören, sondern auch sprechen zu machen und ihn nicht zu isolieren, 
sondern ihn in Beziehung zu setzen.”481  
 
 As noted by Ernst, the clear distinction between archive as inaccessible 
storage and the library’s occasional distribution in the reading room has ceased. 
With the advent of the digital, the archive has gone from a medium of storage to a 
medium of communication. McLuhan is probably most famous for his classic dictum: 
“The medium is the message.”482 He thereby emphasised that media do not neutrally 
convey a given message. Money, for example, has a crucial influence on the social 
structure of work. This means that media contain formal characteristics that 
“massage” society, which he cheerfully and with a certain amount of irony expressed 
in the title of his book The medium is the massage (1967): “Societies have always 
been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate than by 
the content of the communication. […] It is impossible to understand social and 
cultural changes without a knowledge of the workings of media.”483 The formal 
characteristics of media allow for the inclusion of communication within the realms of 
                                                            
481 Brecht, “Der Rundfunk als Kommunikationsapparat,” 129. 
482 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 7. 
483 McLuhan and Fiore, The Medium Is the Massage, 8. 
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the archive, i.e. they massage communication so that it takes a certain form. In the 
case of larm.fm, it is the hope that the formal characteristics of the medium would 
massage more traditional research practices in the direction of a creative innovation 
with regard to the untapped potential of cultural heritage.  
 
4.2	Encryption	of	reality	
 
To a wide extent, Kittler accepted McLuhan’s premise. He acknowledged that the 
content of any medium is another medium and that the medium is the message.484 
He does, however, give his own definition of the medium: Storage, communication 
and computation are the three necessary and sufficient functions of a medium485 or, 
rather, “daß alle technischen Medien Signale entweder speichern oder übertragen 
oder verarbeiten” and that “der Computer, seit 1936 im Prinzip, seit dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg in der Praxis, das einzige Medium ist, daß diese drei Funktionen 
Speicherung, Übertragung und Berechnung vollautomatisch koppelt […]”486 
 Similar to McLuhan, Kittler is thus the example of a formalist approach to 
media: They are technical operations of one or more of the three functions, the trinity 
of which was first united in von Neumann’s architecture. As mentioned in section 3.5, 
Kittler was so focused on the formal qualities of the material side of media that he 
declared: “There is no software.”487 Software is fundamentally electric signals in 
computer hardware projecting the once separate music playback media or image 
displays onto the surface of the interface. Software thus has a tendency to hide the 
electrical hum of the machine room behind a shiny outer shell of images. The graphic 
user interface makes us forget that, fundamentally, the computer is an electrical 
typewriter writing electrical messages to itself: “[…] perfect graphic user interfaces, 
since they dispense with writing itself, hide a whole machine from its users.”488 
                                                            
484 Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 8, and Kittler, Optische Medien : Berlinger Vorlesung 1999, 
24. 
485 Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 353. 
486 Kittler, Optische Medien : Berlinger Vorlesung 1999, 17. 
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 A machine the operations of which are hidden is often called a black box.489 
Kittler’s hidden machine is such an obscured or obfuscated box.490 A simple example 
would be the aforementioned German cryptographic device ENIGMA the complexity 
of which made it impossible to predict a stable relation between input and output. By 
May 1941, however, Alain Turing and his team at Bletchley Park had obtained a 
sufficient understanding of the black box operations of ENIGMA that they were able 
to decrypt a message with only 24 hours of delay.491 The black box tended toward a 
white box. Kittler seemingly wants to repeat Turing’s accomplishment and decrypt 
the machine. He wants to go behind the glittery surface of the interface and 
understand how the different media relate to one another, influence and subsume 
one another, how reality is written or writes itself through them.  
 In addition to the radio’s relation to the very first sound recordings described in 
his Grammophon, Film, Typewriter (1986), Kittler can help us understand the digital 
radio sound of larm.fm as a transformation of the fundamental technical 
characteristics used to record radio. Audio recordings have gone from a continuous 
registration of sound, which in a certain sense wrote itself,492 to a symbolic encoding 
of the very same sound. When Edison bellowed his “Hullo!” down the tract of his new 
phonograph, the needle began etching traces and, thus, the voice itself was leading 
the pen. A similar transformation has happened within recordings on reel-to-reel tape 
where electromagnetic patterns succeeded the needle’s engraving in the 
phonograph’s wax cylinder. The sound writing of radio recordings has changed, 
however, and in 1987 the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) started recording 
its broadcasts on DAT tapes, i.e. in a digital format. The sound ceased to write itself 
and was, instead, written in zeros and ones by the recording device’s encryption of 
the world.  
 This transition from analogue storage and potential distribution via archived 
reel-to-reel tape to digitally stored and accessed sound files is, as we have already 
                                                            
489 “Black boxes, as Wiener used the term, meant a unit designed to perform a function before one 
knew how it functioned; white boxes designated that one also specified the inner mechanism.” 
Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy,” 246. 
490 Although not a Kittlerian, Galloway argues for the obfuscating effects of code: “These new black 
boxes are therefore labeled functions because they are nothing but a means of relating input to 
output, they articulate only their exterior grammar, and black box their innards. Computer scientists 
quite proudly, and correctly, call this technique ‘obfuscation.’” Galloway, “Black Box, Black Bloc,” 243. 
491 Kittler, Grammophon, Film, Typewriter, 368. 
492 Cf. “phonograph” as the contraction of the Greek words “φωνή” and “γράφειν.” 
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seen in the UNESCO documents, a crucial characteristic of larm.fm as digital cultural 
heritage archive. Not only does the immediate access to the quite substantial amount 
of sound, its plethora, depend on the digital format because the browsing behaviour 
related to such immediacy, and to which we have been habituated by the computer 
and the Internet, would be somewhat impractical to replicate using reel-to-reel tape 
and archive shelves. The digital form also gives the sound a new visibility, a new 
form of evidence. The phonograph left a trace, which could be examined under a 
microscope, and the tape could show the sound waves during playback but the 
digital file can show the entire broadcast as image, i.e. as waveform or spectrogram. 
Auditive diachrony is synchronically available as an image, which can then be 
diachronically perceived or evidenced. This changed media temporality does not only 
provide new possibilities of navigation because of the visual indication of certain 
changes in sound characteristics, but it also allows for new possibilities of analysis, 
because sound characteristics that are only difficultly grasped or described 
acoustically can be read and demonstrated visually. 
 
 
4.3	Principles	of	new	media	
 
Lev Manovich describes the medium’s material transition to the digital as the first of 5 
principles characteristic of “New Media.” He calls this first principle “Numerical 
representation” which means that the new media object consists of quantification and 
sampling.493 A digital image, for example, consists of a number of samples with each 
a numeric colour value. Within the colour scheme RGB (Red, Green, Blue) each 
pixel has three values (one for each basic colour) between 0 and 255. If R, G, and B 
all hold the value 255 the output colour is white. A triple “0” value will yield the colour 
black, a pure red has the values 255, 0, 0 etc. The frequency of samples per surface 
measure determines resolution. When a digital camera boasts its 18 megapixels, it is 
an expression of the sensors ability to capture 18 million pixels at once. Sound is 
sampled in a similar fashion with the added complexity of samples per time unit. An 
                                                            
493 Manovich, The language of new media, 27–30. 
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ordinary audio CD will usually be sampled with a frequency of 44100Hz at 16 bit 
resolution, i.e. 44100 times per second where each sample holds a numeric value of 
amplitude with 65.536 possible values (-32,768 through 32,767).  
 Kittler claimed that the digital has led us back to the symbolic regime of the 
printing press, which was otherwise broken by the early photo-, phono- and 
cinematographic media. They were characterised by a specific situation where reality 
itself left a trace in the medium. Digital media have now broken this form of 
“authenticity” and the world is, instead, only expressed via code encryptions. 
Manovich shares the same formal interest as McLuhan and Kittler and hopes, so to 
speak, to penetrate the ENIGMA machine’s settings to understand the construction 
of its message.  
 Manovich focuses specifically on “New Media,” the formal characteristics of 
which – apart from “Numerical representation” – are “modularity,” “automation,” 
“variability” and “transcoding.” Let us briefly illustrate each of them with regard to 
larm.fm. The sound of larm.fm is, of course, digital and, thus, a numerical 
representation of sound. The interface is also digital and consists of digitally coded 
instructions that generate, for example, the numerical representation of colours 
finally manifested on the display. 
 Larm.fm is, next, a profoundly modular structure. On a very basic level, it 
consists of what Kittler called address arithmetic, i.e. binary instructions to addresses 
in computer memory. The platform can, however, be considered the combination of 
many other modular units than the bits of computation, transmission and storage and 
the pixels of the interface. Larm.fm is the interface manifestation of hidden 
operational modules gathered in a system called CHAOS (Cultural Heritage Archive 
Open System).  
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Illustration of the modular structure of CHAOS, replicated after illustration by Andreas Røll Larsen, 
DR.  
 
These modules handle both automation and variability. When the user opens larm.fm 
in a browser, it presents a calendar overview showing the number of available 
broadcasts per decade. Adding new broadcasts to the database will make the 
interface update automatically because the indexation module recognises the time of 
broadcast from the files’ metadata and then updates the interface’s indication of 
number of broadcasts per decade.  
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Welcome screen of larm.fm 
 
 The welcome screen of the interface is an example of variability since the 
screen image differs according to the user. As was the case with our Netflix example, 
the user interface does not just display available content (in this case, broadcasts 
per decade); it presents content specifically aimed at the logged-in user profile. If the 
user has created his or her own folders with his or her own files, they are only 
available for this one user unless the system has been instructed otherwise. It is thus 
possible to create collaborative folders only accessible to the designated 
participants. Similarly, certain annotations can only be seen by their authors. This 
selective visibility of data and metadata are examples of the variability of the 
medium. Again, the horizontal accessibility of the system is in no way inherent to the 
system. The archival law N persists! 
 Finally, larm.fm is a product of transcoding. For one thing, because the 
analogue radio sound is digitised. Other analogue forms are imported into the digital 
world of the interface, however. The aforementioned folders are an analogue 
metaphor imported into the digital interface: Personal folders appear adorned with a 
small human silhouette in which the user should supposedly recognise a digital 
counterpart. This is a collection metaphor, which has long ruled in the computer 
world as part of the more general “desktop metaphor.”494 The larm.fm interface also 
contains another collection metaphor, however, namely the aptly named “collection” 
which is illustrated by a small box. Larm.fm’s collection box is thus yet another 
analogue entity, which has been transcoded into a digital afterlife within the desktop 
interface paradigm. 
 Perhaps transcoding is a good common denominator for our three 
representatives of what Galloway presented as the media perspective on the word 
techne. If the medium is a black box to be decoded, the task must be to understand 
how a given input is transcoded into an encrypted output. In McLuhan, money could 
thus be considered a transcoding of work, the transcoding of something concrete into 
something abstract which then establishes new human relations or massages 
society in new ways. With regard to our object of analysis we should thus examine 
                                                            
494 The desktop as the surface upon which work is performed, documents are opened and folders are 
splayed goes back to Xerox park in the 1970s but was popularised by the original 1984 MAC desktop. 
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how digital archive access establishes new forms of research and collaboration. In 
Kittler, the continuous world, which previously left continuous traces in analogue 
media, is now transcoded into discontinuous or, rather, discrete encryption which, 
nonetheless, produces so coherent a vision of the world that it makes us completely 
forget the machine operations inside the black box. From such a perspective we 
should examine what goes on behind the software or interface of larm.fm just as we 
should investigate the acoustic and visual characteristics of the digital encryption. 
Manovich continues in the same tradition and describes the fundamental principles 
for this digital encryption as transcoding of automatized modular and variable 
numerical representations. This perspective would require an investigation of how 
cultural entities from radio broadcasts to interface metaphors appear in new ways in 
our daily digital lives.   
 
4.4	Cultural	heritage	as	resource	
 
The influence of the digital on our practical interaction with the world and our fellow 
humans is the crux of the alternative approach to the word, techne: the technical as a 
dispositif, which determines practice. There is a fundamental difference, however, in 
that it is not a direct determination by encryption. In the case of the dispositif, the 
social massage is not provided by the determination of |NH| over |Sa’|. Analysing the 
dispositif would, rather, be an attempt to analyse the power distributions between all 
the involved positions at once.  
 A pivotal description of techne as practice is found in Heidegger’s Die Frage 
nach der Technik, where he criticises the contemporary technical worldview. This 
approach, what he calls “Gestell,” is characterised by the ordering of something as 
“Bestand,” i.e. as accessible resource for a specific purpose. Heidegger’s play of 
words on “Stand,” “stehen” and “Stelle” is completely compatible with the general 
function of “position” in the “dispositif”:495 
 
                                                            
495 Agamben argues for the Heideggerian concept of “Gestell” as a predecessor to the Foucauldean 
“dispositif”: “[…] il Gestell dell’ultimo Heidegger, la cui etimologia è affine a quella di dis-positio, dis-
ponere (il tedesco stellen corrisponde al latino ponere).” Agamben, Che Cos’è Un Dispositivo?, 19. 
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“Welche Art von Unverborgenheit eignet nun dem, was durch das 
herausfordernde Stellen zustande kommt? Überall ist es bestellt, auf der 
Stelle zur Stelle zu stehen, und zwar zu stehen, um selbst bestellbar zu 
sein für ein weiteres Bestellen. Das so Bestellte hat seinen eigenen 
Stand. Wir nennen ihn den Bestand.”496  
 
According to Heidegger, the Rhine is now only considered a resource for the 
hydroelectric plant or the tourist industry while we have completely forgotten how it 
could be considered according to its own being. Gestell thus operates a reduction of 
the proper being (“was eigentlich währt”497) to a being as resource, Bestand. Gestell 
and poiesis as two radically different modalities of Heideggerian uncovering 
(“Entbergen”) represent the dynamic difference between “hervorstellen” and 
“hervorbringen,” one positioning that which is as specific resource and the other 
assisting in the bringing forth of the potential of being. Contrary to the old wooden 
bridge that was built across the river to connect its banks, the river is now built into 
the hydroelectric plant and thereby reduced to its function as stored energy 
reserve.498 
 Should one transfer Heidegger’s critique of technology to the motives of 
cultural politics for building digital cultural heritage archives, one would criticise that 
cultural heritage in its digitally archived form is ordered as standing reserve. For 
example, the Lund Principles499 mentioned “Europe’s cultural and scientific 
knowledge resources” as “a solid basis for the development of our digital content 
industries in a sustainable knowledge society.”500 Just as the Rhine is built into the 
hydroelectric power plant so the river can be transformed into energy storage, 
cultural heritage is, from a Heideggerian perspective, built into the digital cultural 
                                                            
496 Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” 20. 
497 Ibid. 55. 
498 As a parallel to the difference between “hervorstellen” and “hervorbringen,” notice the difference 
between “gebaut” and “verbaut”: “Das Wasserkraftwerk ist nicht in den Rheinstrom gebaut wie die alte 
Holzbrücke, die seit Jahrhunderten Ufer mit Ufer verbindet. Vielmehr ist der Strom in das Kraftwerk 
verbaut.” Ibid. 19. 
499 “European Content In Global Networks – Coordination Mechanisms For Digitisation Programmes” 
(2001). 
500 European Council, “European Content in Global Networks: Coordination Mechanisms for 
Digitisation Programmes (Lund Principles),” 1. 
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heritage archive in order to render an untapped resource productive in a specific 
economy.  
 Similar to the Lund Principles, Europeana describes cultural heritage as a 
resource to be exploited via the access to the new archival portals: “These 
stakeholders, representing libraries, archives, museums, broadcasters, knowledge 
institutions and creative industries, share the vision that improved access to our 
cultural heritage will create “unity in diversity” and will underpin a thriving knowledge 
economy.”501 As we have already seen in Section 2.2, cultural heritage operates as a 
resource along the three strategic axes towards what we can now call the double 
goal of subjectivation and production – subjectivation as peaceful productive entity. 
Cultural heritage as a resource for production is the idea that cultural heritage can 
form the basis for the creativity and innovation of the contemporary knowledge 
economy, which, apparently, is so crucial these days, i.e. our third strategic axis. 
This idea of production is, for example, manifested in hackathons and 
encouragements to remix cultural heritage, where programmers, designers or just 
creative users should invent new applications of the preserved material – the dusty 
archival objects should be transformed to marketable creativity.  
 Cultural heritage as the basis for subjectivation, on the other hand, is the idea 
that users’ interaction with a given heritage will establish “the good subject,” i.e. the 
peaceful and responsible citizen who acknowledges the establishment of his or her 
own inheritance as well as that of the other and, hence, does not get all too 
destructive ideas. We saw this goal of subjectivation in our two first strategic axes: 
unity in diversity and national or supranational identity. First, access to the world’s 
collected cultural heritage will create “unity in diversity” via knowledge of those who 
are different from one self, i.e. the unity of S and a’. This is the assumption that 
knowledge via the traces H of those we do not understand will assure peaceful 
global coexistence.  
 In spite of this global respect for the other’s distinctive cultural character, the 
notion of subjectivation also entails another aspect, the claim of the second strategic 
axis that some cultural heritage is more important than the rest. Thus, the open letter 
of April 28 2005 written by the heads of state of France, Poland, Germany, Italy, 
                                                            
501 Europeana, “Business Plan - 2013,” 5, cf. section 2.2.4. 
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Spain and Hungary to the president of the European Union, Jose Manuel Barroso, 
indicates that European cultural heritage is particularly valuable.502 Cultural heritage 
as subjectivation thus contains the notion of cultural heritage as nourishment for 
national or regional identity as different from others. Subjectivation thus operates on 
a universal plane of “unity in diversity” as well as on a supranational plane where, for 
example, the EU seeks acknowledgement of and identification with Europe’s 
distinctive cultural wealth and, finally, on a national plane, where the feeling of 
national identity should be secured against a globalised world. The national scope of 
the content of larm.fm is clearly linked to this last aspect of subjectivation, the second 
strategic axis of national identity.503 
 
4.5	Institutional	survival	
 
This notion of “subjectivation” is, of course, not part of the Heideggerian vocabulary 
but should, rather, be read within the Foucauldean tradition, which is usually 
considered the origin of the present notion of the dispositif.504 Foucault defines the 
dispositif, somewhat loosely, as the answer to a strategic necessity to position 
certain heterogeneous elements in a specific relation to one another.505 Heidegger’s 
hydroelectric power plant would be the strategic unification of a specific need for 
energy, the engineering knowledge necessary for its exploitation, the technical 
construction of the power plant, the redistribution of the local livelihoods etc.  
                                                            
502 Chirac et al., “Lettre Des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement Au Président de La Commission 
Européenne, Monsieur José Manuel Durão Barroso.” 
503 Cf. the quote presented in section 2.2.4: “Cultural heritage is of significant importance for the 
Danish sense of identity in a globalised world, and in these years, the importance of art and culture 
will increase. The government will therefore continue the work with communicating Danish cultural 
heritage, nationally and internationally.” Digitaliseringsudvalget, “Digitalisering af Kulturarven - Endelig 
Rapport Fra Digitaliseringsudvalget,” 3. This report is an expression of the cultural politics that funded 
the LARM project the same year as the report’s publication. 
504 Foucault’s notion of the dispositif has its own origins, of course. Agamben indicates the link to 
Heidegger’s Gestell but especially emphasises the possible origin in Jean Hyppolite’s reading of 
Hegel and Hegel’s links to the theological notion of oikonimia, cf. Agamben, Che Cos’è Un 
Dispositivo? Matteo Pasquinelli, on the other hand, traces the origin of the dispositif to another one of 
Foucault’s teachers: Georges Canguilhem, cf. Pasquinelli, “What an Apparatus Is Not: On the 
Archeology of the Norm in Foucault, Canguilhem, and Goldstein.” 
505 Foucault, “Le jeu de Michel Foucault,” 299. 
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 The digital cultural heritage archive could then be described as a dispositif 
which, apart from its potential application for transforming cultural heritage into an 
untapped potential for productivity and subjectivation – or, simply, “productive 
subjectivation” – provides the strategic foundation for institutional survival. The digital 
format seems to provide a threat for the relevance of libraries, archives and 
museums. Why go to the library if books can just be found for free on the Internet? 
What is the purpose of even the DPLA if users themselves scan and upload books 
more efficiently than the institutions? What is the purpose of Resnais’s fortress if the 
barrier between storage and reading room can be easily transgressed via the smart 
phone in your pocket?  
 The international research partnership OCLC Research, whose participants 
count the Danish Royal Library as well as the British Library, is an example of an 
organisation that takes as its explicit goal to handle the very challenges posed by the 
new information technologies:   
 
“Our users — the scholars, students, and citizens at-large for whom we 
maintain our collections — seem increasingly unaware of what we have 
and how they might use it because they are becoming accustomed to 
going elsewhere to discover what exists, even if these means provide 
only a surrogate for the “real” thing.”506 
 
 Hence, the promotion of digital cultural heritage serves the opening of new 
possibilities for the threatened institutions. A publication from the American group of 
museums and research centres, the Smithsonian Institution, formulates the digital as 
a strategic opportunity: “In fact, the digital revolution offers museums, archives, and 
libraries a golden age of opportunity, because they are ideally suited for a world in 
which learning is informal and centered on inspiration and self-motivation.”507 And in 
addition to the possibilities of the new technical massage of society, the already 
burgeoning archives have been charged with a new aspect of legal deposit. The 
different institutions charged with the preservation of cultural heritage are now 
                                                            
506 Michalko, “Libraries, Archives, and Museums,” 77–78. 
507 Clough, Best of Both Worlds, 9–10. 
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confronted with new horizons where their stores should not only contain the hasty 
accumulation of heritage but also the new accumulation of what is born digital. The 
new archival responsibility and the new forms of user interaction open this “golden 
age of opportunity.”  
 With what we could call the ingenuity of the dispositif, and what Foucault 
called a “[p]rocessus de perpétuel remplissement stratégique,”508 the threat of the 
digital age can be turned into a golden age. This is the field of possibility opened by 
Henry P. Crowell’s efficient production of oatmeal to invent breakfast cereal and 
Hayles’ attempt to navigate the potential of the digital to establish a trademarkable 
disciplinary entity in order to obtain a favourable position within the new academic 
landscape.509 Within this perspective, larm.fm could, on the one hand, be seen as 
the defensive response to the threat against Danish academia of being left behind 
the wave of digital humanities discussed in chapter 3 but also, on the other, as the 
offensive navigation of current funding policies where, as beautifully put by Siegfried 
Zielinski, the “magic word digital” seemed like the “alchemists’ formula for gold.”510 
Since cultural politics have indicated digital cultural heritage as untapped potential for 
the future, it is in the obvious interest of institutions to tap such potential in their own 
way in their funding applications. 
 
 
4.6	Societal	control	
 
                                                            
508 “[...] une réutilisation immédiate de cet effet involontaire et négatif dans une nouvelle stratégie, qui 
a en quelque sorte rempli l’espace vide, ou transformé le négatif en positif […]” Foucault, “Le jeu de 
Michel Foucault,” 299-300. 
509 Cf. section 3.7. 
510 The full quote seems spot on: “[…] with the magic word digital, media systems were established 
that the decision makers did not understand. This was another reason they called the process a 
revolution. The digital became analogous to the alchemists’ formula for gold, and its was endowed 
with infinite powers of transformation. All things digital promised to those who already possessed 
wealth and power more of the same and, to those who possessed nothing, that they could share in 
this un-bloody revolution without getting their hands dirty. Governments and administrations opened 
their coffers when the magic word – even better if coupled with the menetekel Internet – appeared in 
grant applications.” Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media, toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing 
by Technical Means, 32. 
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Along with the above-mentioned national, supranational and international strategies 
for subjectivation and production, such institutional survival strategies would 
constitute vectors within Deleuze’s reading of the Foucauldean dispositif. Deleuze 
emphasises that the dispositif is the enmeshing or assemblage of what can be seen, 
said, done and been (possible subjective positions) in a given society at a given 
time.511 Moreover, he underlines that our dispositifs have changed. We no longer live 
in what Foucault called disciplinary societies where the subject during a lifetime 
passes from one mould to the next: family, school, barracks, hospital, prison, factory 
etc. No, we now live in a control society.512  
 Such a society differs from the separate moulds of the disciplinary society by 
promoting free modulations between institutions and spheres. The subject never 
finishes anything and slithers like a snake between different instances. The subject 
even ceases to be an individual and, instead, becomes a “dividual” – a constantly 
changing construction of discrete data. As we have already seen in our analysis of 
both the technological development necessary for digital cultural heritage archives 
and the related documents of cultural politics, such control societies are founded on 
modulations of access:  
 
“Félix Guattari imaginait une ville où chacun pouvait quitter son 
appartement, sa rue, son quartier, grâce à sa carte électronique 
(dividuelle) qui faisait lever telle ou telle barrière; mais aussi bien la carte 
pouvait être recrachée tel jour, ou entre telles heures; ce qui compte 
n’est pas la barrière, mais l’ordinateur qui repère la position de chacun, 
licite ou illicite, et opère une modulation universelle.”513 
 
Resnais’s barrier between storage and reading room is no longer the clear distinction 
between moulds where the subjective positions of library operator and reading room 
insect are formed. The transformation from dissemination between moulds to access 
as universal modulation is clear in the digital archive – both in terms of access but 
                                                            
511 Deleuze, “Qu’est-ce qu’un Dispositif,” 316–317. 
512 Cf. Deleuze, “Qu’est-ce qu’un Dispositif” and Deleuze, “Post-Scriptum sur les Sociétés de 
Contrôle.” 
513 Ibid. 246. 
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also in the abstraction of the heritage object from the substrate of the book or the 
local monument to basically anything of “outstanding universal value.”514  
 In December 2013, the British Library made more than one million images 
accessible to the public. In spring 2015, the Danish National Gallery (DNG) made 
25.000 images of artworks available in the “Public Domain” on their website for 
sharing, remixing or any other context, including commercial purposes. Similarly, the 
Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam “intends to digitize all one million objects in its collection 
[…].”515 Today, 25 per cent of the museum’s collection, including all of its paintings, 
are freely available for download in high-resolution on reijksmuseum.nl, with new 
images being added every day. These initiatives fall within what the Danish National 
Gallery tends to call “Sharing is Caring”516 and what, similarly, head of the 
Rijksmuseum’s image department, Cecile van der Harten, calls “sharing is the new 
having.”517 
 Whereas the Danish National Gallery and the Rijksmuseum both make their 
content accessible on their respective websites, the British Library decided to publish 
their images via Flicker Commons instead of, for example, the open archive platform 
Archive.org. This poses certain questions regarding the dispositival exploitation of 
cultural heritage as resource within control societies. Flickr is a Yahoo-owned 
platform and it is not clear how the users’ “creative” interaction with the content will 
be tracked and used for commercial and advertisement purposes. By publishing the 
image collection on Flickr, cultural heritage explicitly positions itself within the domain 
where companies like Google and Facebook operate by collecting data about user 
behaviour for the optimisation of targeted advertisement. Here we see that in spite of 
cultural politics’ discourse of subjectivation, the individual users cease to be national, 
regional or international citizens with respect for own and others’ identity and, 
instead, become the dividual of the database, the desubjectivised subject as 
aggregated data constellation. This is the subsumption of subjectivation under 
productivity that we saw in the EU’s Horizon 2020.518 
                                                            
514 Cf. section 2.2.2. 
515 Heyman, “A Museum at the Forefront of Digitization.” 
516 Sanderhoff, Sharing Is Caring, Openness and Sharing in the Cultural Heritage Sector. 
517 Quoted in Heyman, “A Museum at the Forefront of Digitization.” 
518 Cf. section 2.2.4. 
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 Even in the cases of the self-published image collections of the DNG and the 
Rijksmuseum, however, such a transformation is clear. In addition to the educational 
value of public domain collections, curator of digital museum practice at the DNG, 
Merete Sanderhoff, underscores the financial benefits of “supporting and harnessing 
people’s cognitive surplus”519: “Using digital methods of distribution caused the 
exposure and visibility of collections to skyrocket.”520 Here, the digital is clearly not 
the bringer of what we have called heritage but the shop window allowing increased 
commercial activity. The mention of harnessing cognitive surplus is a reference to 
Clay Shirky’s notion of the inherent generosity of the digital:  
 
“The harnessing of our cognitive surplus allows people to behave in 
increasingly generous, public, and social ways, relative to their old status 
as consumers and couch potatoes. The raw material of this change is the 
free time available to us, time we can commit to projects that range from 
the amusing to the culturally transformative. If free time was all that was 
necessary, however, the current changes would have occurred half a 
century ago. Now we have the tools at our disposal, and the new 
opportunities they provide.”521  
 
The disciplinary moulds no longer exist and it is possible for tiny reserves of 
unproductive time to be harnessed for productive purposes determined as productive 
by the dispositif. From Otlet, Wells, Bush and onwards, the time was close at hand, 
the tools were laughably close to reality. Shirky, and with him Robert Darnton, are 
now right. The tools are currently at our disposal. Minute reserves of free time can 
now be rendered productive. 
 The formalist media approach to the concept of techne explores the 
development and operations of those tools, whereas the dispositival approach to 
techne, the question of practice, explores the consequences for our subjective 
positions and possible practices. As is clear from this brief scholion, the dispositival 
                                                            
519 Sanderhoff, Sharing Is Caring, Openness and Sharing in the Cultural Heritage Sector, 33. 
520 Ibid. 56. 
521 Shirky, Cognitive Surplus, Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age, 63. 
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approach invariably poses the question of politics. The question, of course, is the 
political consequences of the availability of these new tools.  
 In the tradition from Guattari as referenced by Deleuze above, Maurizio 
Lazzarato recently argued that the knowledge or information economy, depicted and 
celebrated by Shirky and the mentioned documents of cultural politics, was rendered 
obsolete with the financial crisis of 2007 and that capital has turned to a protection of 
“creditors and owners of “securities””522 and the production of indebted man as the 
only possible subject position:  
 
“As the crisis wrought by repeated “financial” debacles has worsened, 
capitalism has abandoned its rhetoric of the knowledge or information 
society along with its dazzling subjectivations (cognitive workers, 
“manipulators of symbols,” creative self-starters and luminaries).”523 
 
As we saw in our rendition of the documents of cultural politics and especially the 
EU’s Horizon 2020, however, the cultural knowledge industry as a mean against the 
crisis persists – if nothing else as the illusionary attempt to dress indebted man in 
robes of creative action. The discourse of creativity persists to maintain the illusion 
that individual agency is still possible in the age of the neoliberal “[p]rocessus de 
perpétuel remplissement stratégique” of crisis.  
 Of course, larm.fm as digital cultural heritage archive is seemingly far from 
such insidiousness. What can be wrong with giving research access to historical 
radio material and facilitating such access by collaborative tools? On the one hand, 
not much. But on the other, larm.fm as a useful and admirable initiative should not 
make us forget that its funding comes out of the exact same discourse of cultural 
politics that has been described in this dissertation. And although there is no tracking 
of users to a commercial end, even larm.fm tracks user behaviour to understand 
interface interaction and thus let it feed back into the system design. Google 
Analytics, the web analytics tools provided by Google to optimise user interaction as 
                                                            
522 Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity, 10. 
523 Ibid. 9–10. 
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determined by site provider’s goals, was thus implemented on the site – not for 
commercial but for research purposes.  
 One of the tracking parameters of Google Analytics is “conversions”: “A 
conversion is a customer action that has value to your business, such as purchase, 
downloading an app, visiting a website, filling out a form or signing a contract. Online 
and offline actions are called conversions because a customer’s click translated – or 
converted – to business.”524 The evidence provided by access should feed back into 
the control of the user interaction afforded by access. Any digital platform walks an 
awkward tightrope between the pitfalls of access, evidence and control and even so 
laudable an initiative as larm.fm cannot be considered exempt from the strategic 
lines of the dispositif. Especially when the success of the afforded research 
practices, their institutional hosts and their possible societal value are constantly 
active in the operational elaboration of the dispositif. 
                                                            
524 Google Support, “Understanding Conversion Tracking.” 
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5.	A	community	of	Memory525	
 
We have now looked at the digital cultural heritage archive as 1. A kingdom of 
topological relations between the subject (S), the other (a’/A), the hypomnemata (H) 
and the archival nomos (N); 2. An object of historical formations where technological 
development and cultural politics converge in different ways, culminating in the “new 
legacy” of digital cultural heritage around the beginning of the new millennium; 3. A 
three-fold thing in a mirror dance en abyme between access, evidence and control, 
which produces promises and imaginaries when considered as a way to grasp the 
thing firmly in place but only allows a proper diagnosis when left in the open; 4. 
Larm.fm was presented as a concrete instance of a digital cultural heritage archive 
where the two meanings of the word techne intermingle and allow us to see different 
aspects of the platform.  
 It is now time to focus on the already mentioned relation between the archival 
organisation of knowledge and political organisation, the aspect which, although 
treated along the way, was left hanging so long ago when section 1.1.1 promised to 
return to Azoulay’s concept of civil media. We have seen that this relation between 
media and civility – between archival and political organisation or between the media 
and the dispositival versions of the word techne – tends to inspire different 
imaginaries regarding the fullness of the archive and the societal and subjective 
constitution of citizens.  
 Azoulay describes the civil archive in terms that should now seem familiar and 
immediately diagnosable on the basis of our historical analysis: “a civil archive of 
photographs that suspends the rule of the existing archives […] reconstructing the 
photographs as shared documents of a potential history.”526 In the civil archive, 
sharing is caring. “Radical changes brought about by the new social (civil) media”527 
makes the archival possibility of sharing a potential history, in and of itself, a 
potential for political emancipation. The opposite of this emancipatory civil archive is 
                                                            
525 Parts of sections 5.3-5.10 of this chapter have previously been published in Andreasen: 
“Constructing the contemporary via digital cultural heritage.” 
526 Azoulay, “Archive.” 
527 Ibid. cf. section 1.1.1. 
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then “a non-civil archive, in which the photographs have turned from shared 
documents into icons that serve the archive’s sovereign.”528 These icons are 
products of a “constituent violence” determining “the law of what may be seen and 
what may not.”529 They constitute the photograph as the identification of “This is X”530 
which then strips it of the plurality that otherwise serves as the foundation for a 
communal renegotiation of “the rule of existing archives,” i.e. the archival N.  
 Azoulay thus presents us with the dichotomy between photographs as shared 
documents and photographs as icons. And curiously, the difference seems to 
depend on “[…] a new archival contract, “signed” by users without the sentries’ 
consent. […] turning the archive into a platform for the rehabilitation of a 
community.”531 She posits a civil contract as a direct correlation between a 
community’s engagement with the hypomnesic material H and the possibility for a 
reconfiguration of this material’s archival distribution N, a new grid:  
 
“Traces of the constituent violence preserved in the archive can either be 
preserved untouched, preserving the law of the archive, or be 
reconfigured and re-conceptualized through a new grid, whose 
                                                            
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid. Section 1.1.1 criticised Azoulay’s reading of Derrida. She also seems to err slightly in her 
reading of Barthes’ “Ça a été”: “When we say “This is X” we are actually applying a name, category or 
concept to the photograph. In order to do so we first strip the photograph of the plurality inscribed in it, 
and reduce it to the “this” that is there in the photograph or, in Roland Barthes’ famous words, to “This 
was there.” Thus, when we say “This is X,” we are actually saying “X was there.”” Ibid. The problem 
with this reading is her emphasis on the adaequatio “this = X.” For Barthes, on the contrary, “Ça a été” 
is not the establishment of identity but the fact that something was there which escapes that very 
identity: “Le nom du noème de la Photographie sera donc : « Ça-a-été », ou encore : l’Intraitable. En 
latin (pédantisme nécessaire parce qu’il éclaire des nuances), cela se dirait sans doute : « interfuit » : 
cela que je vois s’est trouvé là, dans ce lieu qui s’étend entre l’infini et le sujet (operator ou spectator); 
il a été là, et cependant tout de suite séparé ; il a été absolument, irrécusablement présent, et 
cependant déjà différé. C’est tout cela que veut dire le verbe intersum.” Barthes, La Chambre Claire, 
120–121. Also, the temporality of the photography is not, according to Barthes, the archival 
constituent violence of “this is what happened” but, rather, the archival horror of a captured future 
which is now past, it is the grammatical aorist: “Je lis en même temps : cela sera et cela a été; 
j’observe avec horreur un futur antérieur dont la mort est l’enjeu. En me donnant le passé absolu de la 
pose (aoriste), la photographie me dit la mort au futur.” Barthes, La Chambre Claire, 150. The 
problem for Barthes, in both cases, is the presence of an absence, the only partial presence of a past 
and its future that both are no more. 
531 Azoulay, “Archive.” 
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consequences affect the way one is governed, as well as the ways one 
shares the world with others.”532 
 
Reconfiguring the grid via interaction with its content supposedly restores the 
plurality of meaning of the archival object that was ripped from it by the consignation 
of the sentries of the non-civil archive. And such plurality re-enables the injunction, 
the call for action, of the archival objects: “Photographs bear traces of a plurality of 
political relations that might be actualized by the act of watching, transforming and 
disseminating what is seen into claims that demand action.”533 
 In the terminology proposed throughout this dissertation, the relation of 
community |Sa’|, i.e. “the ways one [S] shares the world [H] with others [a’],” is 
determined by the possibility for that relation to reconfigure |NH|. A non-
reconfigurable |NH| is characteristic of the sovereign determination of the non-civil 
archive. The non-civil archive is the sovereign violent consignation of H as an icon 
constituted in accordance with the determinations of N, whereas the civil archive is 
the possibility for H to take part in grids determined by a communally negotiated N, 
or for the restored plurality of H to enable a reconfigured N. This restoration of 
hypomnesic plurality seems to depend on both the possibilities of civil consignation 
and interpretation provided by new media access to archives and the specific 
hypomnesic characteristics of photography.534 Communal sharing thus seems to 
depend on the correct dispositival use of the archive’s as well as the hypomnemata’s 
formal characteristics, the ones that allow archival pleroma via access/dissemination: 
It is a matter of “our public right to access everything in the archive.”535   
                                                            
532 Ibid. 
533 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 25–26. 
534 There is a Benjaminian strain to this argument: “[...] Benjamin proposed a new perspective on 
photography’s beginnings. The origin, he suggested, was the appearance of a professional 
community.” Ibid. 90. “In the early 1930s, Walter Benjamin wrote that “photographic records begin to 
be evidence in the historical trial. This constitutes their hidden political significance.” The images 
under discussion are evidence, incontrovertible evidence, of destruction, humiliation, injury, 
manslaughter, abuse, suffocation, suffering, misery and injustice. They are the basis for seeing 
everything, despite the case that not everything could be seen.” Ibid. 195. The specific potential of 
photography springs from the technical community of photography as well as photography’s 
supposedly inherently emancipatory form of evidence via its exhibition-value: “In der Photographie 
beginnt der Austellungswert den Kultwert auf der ganzen Linie zurückzudrängen.” Benjamin, “Das 
Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit - Dritte Fassung,” 485. The exhibition-
value of H rebels against the traditional cult-value of N. 
535 Azoulay, “Archive.” 
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 Just as Resnais’s description of happiness was based on the fulfilment of 
archival operations in the ideal pleromatic opus of the archive via actualisation in the 
reading room, Azoulay’s call for action to rehabilitate community goes via such total 
actualisation. She thus seems to consider Resnais’s barrier, i.e. the division of |Sa’| 
by |NH|, the obstacle to fulfilment in the rehabilitation of community: “The spatial 
administration of the movements of archive users is a means for preventing the 
complete fulfillment of the right to (the) archive.”536 Only when N ceases to hinder 
access as the right to both consign and interpret, and thus “enables us to overcome 
the limit set on the concept of citizenship by the nation-state,” can a new N be 
created as the community of all governed, who “are equally not governed within this 
space of photography, where no sovereign power exists.”537 Paradoxically, it is the 
inherent law N of the photographic H that it is without sovereign N. This right to the 
archive is manifested in a form of universal citizenship made possible by universal 
access and universal representation that seem to allow for an N without N – a 
communal reconfiguration of N without the sovereign aspect of N: 
 
“Against the political order of the nation-state, photography – together 
with other media that created the conditions for globalization – paved the 
way for a universal citizenship: not a state, but a citizenry, a virtual 
citizenry, in potential, with the civil contract of photography as its 
organizing framework. Citizenship in the citizenry of photography asks 
not to be stopped at borders and plays a vital political role in making sure 
other cultures are accessible, in all of their prestige or misery, deeming 
local cultures to be worthy of documentation and public display. 
Photography, being in principle accessible to all, bestows universal 
citizenship on a new citizenry whose citizens produce, distribute, and 
look at images.”538 
 
The access to all cultures, their documentation and display, or, rather, their evidence, 
is thought to neutralise the control of the nation-state, its sovereign constitutive 
                                                            
536 Ibid. 
537 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 25. 
538 Ibid. 134. 
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violence, in favour of a new form of control based on sensus communis as 
disagreement within agreed-upon boundaries.539 Although communally negotiated, 
as opposed to sovereignly dictated, the “organizing framework” of the “civil contract 
of photography” is an N that requires the fullness of both photographic representation 
H, i.e. consignation, and the fullness of “our” access to H, i.e. interpretation, in order 
to enable the heritage that is the new universal citizenship between all governed and 
not just those who are included in society as citizens as opposed to those who are 
excluded as “other.” Like Resnais’s happiness, then, actualisation of the library 
stores via consignation and interpretation in the reading room seem to produce, 
more or less automatically, full heritage in the form of the unity in diversity of a 
“universal citizenship,” or what we have so far called doxa. 
 
 
5.1	Archival	pleroma	
 
As should be clear, Azoulay’s critical take on photography shares certain 
fundamental characteristics with the imaginaries that we have located within the 
cultural heritage discourse of cultural politics. By relating the right to access 
everything in the archive, what she calls “the fulfillment of the right to (the) archive,” 
with a universal citizenship of hypomnemata, of which she happens to prefer 
photography because of its supposed globalising nature and inherent lack of 
sovereign N, Azoulay establishes the same relation between archival fullness and 
unity in diversity that we saw in the first strategic axis of the cultural heritage 
discourse of cultural politics.  
 Azoulay’s criticism thus participates in the dispositif, or oikonomia, which links 
the archival promise with societal organisation, i.e. the digital cultural heritage 
                                                            
539 “The photographs are part of the tools that enable us to rehabilitate the sensus communis and 
construct around it a common community of negotiation, in the framework of which we are able to 
agree on the boundaries of disagreement.” Ibid. 261. We should remember from Section 2.2.1 that 
Deleuze considered the sensus communis one of the two aspects of doxa. The sensus communis 
would then be the framework through which the new good sense can be destributed, cf. Deleuze, 
Logique du sens, 93–96. 
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archive as dispositif within the realm of cultural politics.540 So far, we have talked 
about heritage as either choice and affirmation with regards to the spectrality of 
hypomnemata or as the ethopoietic constitution of the self via the practice of 
hupomnemata. This ethopoietic aspect has been coupled with the relation to the 
other (a’) in a doxopoietic negotiation of truth, or what in the dispositif of the digital 
cultural heritage archive would be the coupling of possible ethopoiesis via archival 
pleroma with doxa as the fulfilled result of doxopoiesis. We shall now call this the link 
between archival and political pleroma541 and we shall approach this as the question 
of the possibility for a community of technologically mediated memory. 
 In order to clearly formulate this coupling, however, it would be useful to first 
recapitulate and then elaborate the notion of pleroma which, in Section 1.2.2, we 
described as “the fullness of the archive, the point where the spectral incorporation 
ceases to be paradoxical and the archive fever rages no more. Or to stay with the 
theological aspects of the term: Pleroma is the moment where the oikonomia of the 
archive is fulfilled and ceases to operate.”  
 As we saw in section 1.2, Resnais’s Toute la mémoire du monde performs a 
vertical movement from indiscernible form and prevalent darkness upon the face of 
the deep in the library cellars to the summits of institutional power in its domed view 
of the well-ordered rows of tables and chairs in the Labrouste reading room. This 
vertical axis is established and maintained by the horizontal library operations that 
                                                            
540 It is thus no surprise that, in 2014, Azoulay contributed to a symposion organised by The Human 
Rights Exhibition Project related to UNESCO’s Human Rights Exhibition, the description of which 
should require no further comment: “The Human Rights Exhibition Project is a research and curatorial 
initiative based on the archive of UNESCO’s travelling Human Rights Exhibition from 1949. This 
exhibition was the first international event designed to visualise and disseminate the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The Project is designed to open up the archive to public access and 
further research, displaying its richness and variety, and to encourage critical debate about the role of 
human rights today.” The Human Rights Exhibition Project: http://www.exhibithumanrights.org/. 
541 The link between doxa and pleroma is well established within theology. Deleuze emphasised the 
link between the double aspect of doxa – “bon sens” and “sens commun” – and God: “C’est dans 
cette complémentarité du bons sens et du sens commun que se noue l’alliance du moi, du monde et 
de Dieu […]” Ibid. 96. Within the present terminology, this would, of course be the alliance between S, 
H and N. Apart from the meaning taken from Deleuze, i.e. doxa as the affective response to the world 
of the generic subject, doxa has a different and older meaning: the glory of God as distinct from the 
administration of his reign. Agamben sees in the Deleuzian meaning a modern (a-)political 
extrapolation of the theological sense: “La democrazia contemporanea è una democrazia 
integralmente fondata sulla gloria, cioè sull’efficacia dell’acclamazione, moltiplicata e disseminata dai 
media al di là di ogni immaginazione (che il termine greco per gloria – doxa – sia lo stesso che 
designa oggi l’opinione publicca è, da questo punto di vista, qualquosa di più che une coincidenza).” 
Agamben, Il regno e la gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell’economia e del governo. Homo 
sacer, 280. 
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promise to transform the library objects from chaotic heap to collective happiness, or 
what we have called the archival promise of a movement from plethora to pleroma. 
 Plethora, of course, basically just means an excessive amount of something, 
but pleroma, directly translated, means “fullness.” Although they have the same root  
(plethein in Greek also means to “be full”) they are two different forms of fullness. It is 
the difference between plenty and plenitude. As a religious term, pleroma has been 
used in many ways, the gnostic and its Pauline editions being the more famous 
ones, but for the purpose of the present argument we shall skip the otherwise 
tremendously interesting history of the concept from early Christianity to Hegel and 
onwards and, for now, simply say that the pleroma which we have traced so far is 
the eschatological version, i.e. the fullness of time when God will be “all in all” 
(“πάντα  ἐν  πᾶσιν,” 1 cor. 15:28), when the oikonomia of the world, i.e. the 
administration of the godly reign, is brought to an end in the presence of God in 
everything: “For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness [πᾶν τὸ 
πλήρωμα] dwell.” (Col. 1:19). Everything shall dwell within the confines of the law of 
consignation and, hence, the confines cease to exist. As mentioned by Galloway and 
Thacker: “Inside the dense web of distributed networks, it would appear that 
everything is everywhere.”542 
 We already saw the pleromatic tendencies of Well’s World Brain: “The time is 
close at hand when any student, in any part of the world, will be able to sit with his 
projector in his own study at his or her convenience to examine any book, any 
document, in an exact replica.”543 As mentioned, “The time is close at hand,” along 
with the repeated uses of “any” or “every,” are recurring elements of what we have 
called the archival promise, but which we could also call the eschatological archival 
euangelion, the happy declarations of imminent archival pleroma. The biblical 
reference would be Mark 1:15: “The time is fulfilled [πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρὸς], and the 
kingdom of God [βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ] is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel 
[εὐαγγελίῳ].” It is the evangelic announcement of the fulfilled kingdom of relations, 
i.e. relational unity, in the eschatological moment of pleroma. 
                                                            
542 Galloway and Thacker, The Exploit, a Theory of Networks, 4., cf. section 3.3. 
543 Wells, World Brain, 54, cf. sections 2.1.2 and 4.6. 
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 Otlet expressed an even more obviously eschatological promise of archival 
pleroma in the final words of his Traité de documentation (1934):  
 
“Être partout, tout voir, tout entendre et tout connaître, mais cela n’est-ce 
pas la perfection et la plénitude que l’homme, en souverain hommage et 
souverain bien, attribua à son Dieu lui-même. Par ces instruments 
d’ubiquité, d’universalité et d’éternité, l’homme se sera donc rapproché 
de l’état de divinité, de l’état présumé être celui des élus devant Dieu, 
c’est-à-dire la contemplation radieuse de la Réalité Totale.  
 Tout cela, rien moins, plus peut-être, se trouve en puissance dans le 
Livre !”544 
 
 Where Valéry saw the conquest of ubiquity in the transmission of sound, Otlet 
proclaims such an imminent conquest via the potential of the book. He repeats the 
pleromatic markers of “tout” and then goes all the way by referring to “plénitude,” 
“ubiquité,” “universalité,” “éternité,” “Réalité Totale” and, finally, the involvement of 
God in this plenitude. The archival pleroma of books is that which was once 
attributed to the pleroma of God in his creation. Nothing less than totality, possibly 
more, is the promise of the book if the law of consignation N becomes all-
encompassing.  
 Similarly, we saw that although the somewhat more level-headed J.C.R. 
Licklider used the modifiers “may” and “almost,” he still deployed the eschatological 
pleromatic markers of the time is close at hand and “everything” in “any way”: 
“Extrapolation, however uncertain, suggests that the basic “mechanical” constraints 
will disappear […] Thus in the present century, we may be technically capable of 
processing the entire body of knowledge in almost any way we can describe […]”545  
 But as we saw in the case of digitised libraries as presented by Robert 
Darnton, the time is no longer near, it is actually here now: “We have the 
technological and economic resources to make all the collections of all our libraries 
accessible to all our fellow citizens—and to everyone everywhere with access to the 
                                                            
544 Otlet, Traité de documentation, le livre sur le livre, théorie et pratique, 431. 
545 Licklider, Libraries of the Future, 19–20, my emphasis. 
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World Wide Web. That is the mission of the DPLA.” We have actually got the 
archives now. Licklider saw storage as the main obstacle for his vision and since 
2002 digital storage capacity has exploded. But although many of the technological 
obstacles to pleroma, which were already shrugged off by Wells and Otlet, are no 
longer a problem, one obstacle remains for Darnton: copyright. The technologies of 
consignation now allow for pleroma but copyright is the aspect of archival law (N), 
which installs the final prohibition. Yet another effort, and still always another — the 
invisible irony persists. 
 To sum up, from Wells, Otlet and Licklider to UNESCO, Darnton and Azoulay 
we see these three aspects: 1. archival pleroma obtained by 2. the dispositifs of 
technology and cultural politics and 3. the beneficial consequences for human 
existence in some form of political pleroma, be it unity in diversity, collective identity 
or individual creativity and innovation. In all cases we have focused on the barrier 
shown at the end of Resnais’s film, |NH|, which separates library stores from reading 
room, archive from canon, i.e. the “untapped potential” from actualisation via “the act 
of watching, transforming and disseminating”546 in the |Sa’|-relation of the reading 
room. All imaginaries of pleroma desire the abolishment of the barrier in the fulfilment 
of its operation.  
 
 
 
                                                            
546 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 26, cf. the previous section. 
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Shot of the Library of Congress from Alan Pakula: All the president’s men (1976). 
 
 Fredric Jameson evoked Resnais’s final shot of the barrier as a possible 
inspiration to another domed shot of a library.547 That other shot shows the Library of 
Congress in Alan Pakula’s All the president’s men (1976). Jameson describes this 
view as a paradisiac recovery of an impossible vision of totality, “the momentary 
coincidence between knowledge as such and the architectural order of the 
astronomical totality itself, [which] yields a brief glimpse of the providential, as what 
organizes history but is unrepresentable within it.”548 For Jameson, that providential 
organising power is, of course, capital. And who could disagree? But for our purpose, 
it is interesting here, that Woodward and Bernstein, the two reporters trying to solve 
the puzzle of the Watergate break-in, are doing exactly what Resnais’s voice-over 
was describing: the paper-crunching insects are putting the pieces end to end, the 
fragmentary call slips that prove White House consultant Howard Hunt’s investigation 
of how to discredit Senator Ted Kennedy.  
 Shortly after this library scene, Woodward explains his troubles to Deep 
Throat: “All we’ve got are pieces, we can’t seem to figure out what the puzzle is 
supposed to look like.” In the end, however, they prove Nixon’s involvement and 
Nixon is forced to resign. The final justice of the reassembled puzzle, what Jameson 
called “the sentimental defence of the constitution with which Pakula’s film overtly 
ends,”549 is somehow already present in this view of the concentric circles of the 
library. The presumed link between the actualisation of organised knowledge and the 
just equilibrium of the organising power of history is clear. And so is the related 
extrapolation of such equilibrium in the DPLA as a digitally enhanced Library of 
Congress, here described by Darnton:  
 
“It would be the digital equivalent of the Library of Congress, but instead 
of being confined to Capitol Hill, it would exist everywhere, bringing 
millions of books and other digitized material within clicking distance of 
                                                            
547 Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, Cinema and Space in the World System, 80. 
548 Ibid. 79. 
549 Ibid. 82. 
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public libraries, high schools, junior colleges, universities, retirement 
communities, and any person with access to the Internet.”550 
 
 Although Jameson sees in Pakula’s library shot a possible reference to 
Resnais, such a view of the library is neither new nor unusual. In Well’s 
aforementioned book The work, wealth and happiness of mankind, he displayed the 
reading room of the British Museum Library in a similar fashion, calling it “a cell of the 
world’s brain.”551 I claim that Pakula’s library is closer to that of Wells than to that of 
Resnais. 
 
 
 
For Resnais’s view is radically different. Although the voice-over formulates the 
promise of pleroma, the overtly technical nature of the film, as constituted by the 
opening mise-en-scène of the camera, the microphone and the spotlights, 
nonetheless culminates by an unrelenting focus on the barrier. The barrier is what 
remains. And this barrier is more than just the distinction between the potential of 
universal memory and its actualisation in the reading insects. As we saw in the quote 
                                                            
550 Darnton, “A Library Without Walls,” cf. section 2.2.5. 
551 Wells, The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, 149. 
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from Sebald’s Austerlitz, it is the zone of indistinction between the Islands of the 
Blest and a penal colony.  
 What Austerlitz felt in the BNF is what the present dissertation has sought to 
demonstrate in each and every promise of the happiness of pleroma. The question is 
whether the persistent happy belief in the fall of the very last practical obstacles for 
pleroma does not overlook the view from Resnais’s domed shot: The view indicating 
that sinister imaginaries of the pleroma of knowledge tend to engage in insidious 
imaginaries of political organisation and that the guardians of the archive will always 
patrol the aisles of the reading room. Resnais’s imaginary boundary tends to become 
a zone of indistinction between, on the one hand, the institutional operations of 
consignation and its aspirations of fulfilling archival oikonomia, and, on the other, the 
individual interpretation of archival objects as the foundation of heritage, i.e. the 
construction of the subjective ethos but in a state where the reading room is ruled by 
the exclusion of antagonistic opinions, doxa, by the determination of universal 
happiness as the fulfilment of political pleroma.552 The pieces must be put end to 
end, the puzzle must be solved, and disagreement must only take place within the 
already agreed-upon limits. 
 
5.2	Political	pleroma	
 
Resnais’s insisting focus on the barrier that remains underneath the discourse of 
pleromatic happiness was, of course, already present in our initial Derridean notion 
of the archive. As mentioned, consignation is the production and incorporation of a 
lack, the presence of absent origins, keeping the archive from ever attaining 
pleroma. As Derrida stated, this is the impossibility of Freud’s ecstatic dream where 
“l’origine alors parle d’elle-même. L’arkhé paraît à nu, sans archive. Elle se présente 
et se commente elle-même. « Les pierres parlent ! » Au présent. Anamnèse sans 
hypomnèse !”553  
                                                            
552 Cf. again Wells: “there can be no two respectable and antagonistic opinions […]” Wells, The 
Shape of Things to Come, 256, quoted in Rayward, “H. G. Wells’s Idea of a World Brain,” 569. 
553 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 144. This ecstatic dream is, of course, what 
manifested itself in Chris Anderson’s fantasy that with “enough data, the numbers speak for 
themselves.” Cf. section 3.6. 
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 Such an archival pleroma without lack, without its feverish différance, finds its 
political equivalent in the political pleroma, one version of which is what Saint Paul 
called “pleroma of nations [πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν].”554 This would be the first 
strategic axis of the discourse of cultural heritage within cultural politics, that of “unity 
in diversity.” Jean-Luc Nancy explicitly referenced this pleroma of nations in his 
exploration of the possibility for such fullness in the unity, the “trait d’union,” of 
Judaism and Christianity as expressed by the term “judéo-chrétien.” His finds in such 
a conjunction “toute la question de l’Occident comme totalité et/ou comme 
dissémination.”555 In Derridean vain,556 Nancy sees in this “trait d’union” a 
composition that always already entails its own deconstruction. It is the link that 
separates. Our becoming global, or universal, is always already haunted by a 
remnant other. There is always a tension between the katholiké ekklésia and the 
diaspora.557 
 While Nancy formulated the problem of a universal union of cultures, 
exemplified by the union of Judaism and Christianity, and stressed the necessary 
operation within such unity of a deconstructing “trait d’union,” Derrida formulated a 
similar point with regards to the identity of any particular culture, i.e. the object of our 
second strategic axis of cultural heritage: “[...] le propre d’une culture, c’est de n’être 
pas identique avec elle-même.”558 This remark was given during at a conference on 
“L’identité culturelle européenne” and was thus an explicit analysis of what we have 
seen dubbed by EU cultural politics “a true European identity.”559  
 
“Quelque chose d’unique est en cours en Europe, dans ce qui s’appelle 
encore l’Europe même si on ne sait plus très bien ce qui s’appelle ainsi. 
A quel concept, en effet, à quel individu réel, à quelle entité singulière 
assigner ce nom aujourd’hui ? Qui en dessinera les frontières ?”560 
 
                                                            
554 (Rm. 11:25). 
555 Nancy, “Le Judéo-Chrétien,” 70. 
556 The text is a lecture given at a seminar on Derrida, “Judéités. Questions à Jacques Derrida” where 
Nancy focuses on Derrida’s Foi et savoir (2001). 
557 Ibid. 
558 Derrida, L’autre cap suivi de La démocratie ajournée, 16. 
559 Cf. section 2.2.4. 
560 Ibid. 12. 
 183 
 Derrida argued that Europe is divided between arkhè and telos, origin and 
perfection.561 In the present context of cultural heritage, we would say that Europe is 
divided between the plethora of the archive and the political pleroma of identity. We 
saw in the European Horizon 2020 that the three strategic axes of cultural heritage 
were mobilised with regard to the current financial crisis. Derrida’s analysis pertains 
to a different crisis – of identity, culture and spirit562 – and presents the heritage of 
that which is in crisis as an injunction: “La condition de possibilité de cette chose, la 
responsabilité, c’est une certaine expérience de la possibilité de l’impossible : 
l’épreuve de l’aporie à partir de laquelle inventer la seule invention possible, 
l’invention impossible.”563 The impossible invention is the affirmation of the radically 
other which can never be brought to the identity of the same. European heritage is 
explicitly formulated as “la mémoire de ce qui porte l’avenir ici maintenant,”564 i.e. the 
memory of an archive that can never find its pleromatic state, an archive that is 
always in a state of becoming via the consignation of its own other.  
 With regards to that other aspect of our second axis, that of national identity, 
Agamben similarly stresses the inherent division of the people.565 In his short text 
“Che cos’è un popolo?” he describes the division inherent to the concept of “the 
people”:  
 
“Tutto avviene, cioè, come se ciò che chiamiamo popolo fosse, in realtà, 
non un soggetto unitario, ma un’oscillazione dialettica fra due poli 
opposti: da una parte, l’insieme Popolo come corpo politico integrale, 
dall’altra il sottoinsieme popolo come molteplicità frammentaria di corpi 
bisognosi ed esclusi; là un’esclusione che si pretende senza residui, qua 
                                                            
561 Ibid. 29. 
562 Ibid. 34–37. This, of course, was just after the fall of the Berlin wall. 
563 Ibid. 43. This corresponds to the general definition of heritage in Derrida: “[...] l’héritier devait 
toujours répondre à une sorte de double injonction, à une assignation contradictoire : il faut d’abord 
savoir et savoir réaffirmer ce qui vient « avant nous », et donc nous recevons avant même de le 
choisir, et de nous comporter à cet égard en sujet libre. […] Réaffirmer, qu’est-ce que ça veut dire ? 
Non seulement l’accepter, cet héritage, mais le relancer autrement et le maintenir en vie.” Derrida, 
Papier machine, le ruban de machine à écrire et autres réponses, 15. 
564 Derrida, L’autre cap suivi de La démocratie ajournée, 76. 
565 Agamben, of course, engages in a debate with both on multiple levels. For my renditition of 
Agamben’s discussion with Nancy and Blanchot, cf. Andreasen, “Det Stedløse Fællesskab – Utopiske 
Konstruktioner Hos Nancy, Blanchot og Agamben.” (in Danish). Much has been written about 
Agamben’s relation to Derrida, e.g. Thurschwell, “Specters of Nietzsche.” and la Durantaye, Giorgio 
Agamben, a Critical Introduction, 184–191. 
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un’esclusione che si sa senza speranze; a un estremo, lo Stato totale dei 
cittadini integrati e sovrani, all’altro la bandita – corte dei miracoli o 
campo – dei miserabili, degli oppressi, dei vinti.”566 
  
The division between katholiké ekklésia and the diaspora located by Nancy, is here 
presented as not just inherent to the universality of the Greek καθολικός, but also to 
any attempt at creating a national people or collective identity. What is called a 
people is really a dialectical oscillation between the people of identity and those who 
are not part of such an identity. This fundamental fracture in the identity of the people 
designates “l’impossibilità di ogni identità di coincidere con se stessa.”567  
 This fundamental division between the People and the people, which 
necessitates the attempts of the People to exclude the people from its midst in order 
to achieve political pleroma, and which we witnessed in Nazi persecution of the Jews 
and which we continue to witness on a daily basis, is the division between naked life 
and political life, between what Agamben calls zoe and bios. From Agamben’s 
perspective, such a division is also at play within the third strategic axis of cultural 
politics, that of the dispositival subjectivation towards productivity in the form of 
creativity and innovation: 
 
“Vi propongo nulla di meno che una generale e massiccia partizione 
dell’esistente in due grandi gruppi o classi: da una parte gli esseri viventi 
(o le sostanze) e dall’altra i dispositivi in cui essi vengono 
incessantemente catturati. Da una parte, cioè, per riprendere la 
terminologia dei teologi, l’ontologia delle creature e dall’altra l’oikonomia 
dei dispositivi che cercano di governarle e guidarle verso il bene.”568  
                                                            
566 Agamben, “Che Cos’è un Popolo?” 31. 
567 Agamben, L’uso dei corpi. Homo sacer, IV, 2, 346. Although Agamben chooses a slightly different 
path than Derrida, he nonetheless aligns with certain technical terms also found in Derrida, e.g. what 
Derrida called “de n’être pas identitique avec elle-même” or his use of “non-coïncidence” as in “la non-
coïncidence entre l’expression, la Bedeutung (toutes deux en tant qu’unités idéales) et l’objet.” 
Derrida, La Voix et Le Phénomène, 101. For Nancy’s view on national identity, cf. Nancy, Identité. 
This small book was written in response to the 2009 French debate on “Identité national” launched by 
Éric Besson who then held the ignominious title “Ministre de l’Immigration, de l’Intégration, de 
l’Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire.” That very debate used a mode of digital 
consignation as a means of establishing the equation “French = X” by consulting the “people.” 
568 Agamben, Che cos’è un dispositivo?, 21. 
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The dispositif, according to Agamben, is what transforms the pure potential of living 
substance, i.e. naked life, into governable identity in the form of the subject.569 In our 
case, it is the dispositival transformation of the untapped potential of the library 
stores or archives of cultural heritage into what is designated as useful in the 
individual incorporation of common doxa by the N of the oikonomia.  
 While Nancy thus stresses the necessary failure of the first strategic axis of 
universal identity, both Derrida and Agamben emphasise the necessary failure of our 
second strategic axis of a particular collective identity – supranational or national. 
Nancy claims the a priori impossibility of a the universal (καθολικός) unity of 
peoples, i.e. the pleroma tôn ethnôn, while Derrida and Agamben maintain the a 
priori impossibility of a pleroma within a specific collective identity, or what we could 
call, with a somewhat inelegant invention in Greek, pleroma tou dimou (πλήρωμα 
του δήμου), or, more plainly, plenitude of the People.570 The a priori impossibility of 
the third axis is, finally, proclaimed by Agamben in his definition of the subject as the 
dispositival division of subject from substance, i.e. the division of zoe and bios.  
 As indicated by the zoe/bios distinction in relation to both the people and the 
individual, this division between the subject and substance is the individual 
manifestation of the division between People and people. And these two divisions 
meet in the construction of the citizen, i.e. the individual as belonging to the 
People.571 This is why Azoulay’s insistence on the emancipatory potential of 
universal citizenry should make us pause. She hopes to drive the force of 
globalisation (καθολικός) inherent to photography to the pleromatic constitution of a 
universal citizenry of the people without confronting the division inherent to that 
                                                            
569 “Ricapitolando, abbiamo cosí due grandi classi, gli esseri viventi (o le sostanze) e i dispositivi. e, 
fra i due, come terzo, i soggetti. Chiamo soggetto ciò che risulta dalla relazione e, per cosí dire, dal 
corpo a corpo fra i viventi e i dispositivi.” Ibid. 22. 
570 Agamben’s analysis of the term populus finds its Greek equivalent in the term demos, cf. “When 
an Athenia democrat sais ‘demos’ he meant the whole body of citizens, irrespective of the fact that 
only a minority were able to turn up to meetings; critics of the democracy, on the other hand, 
especially philosophers, tends to regard the demos as the ‘ordinary people’ in contrast to the 
propertied class, and in their eyes the Assembly [ekklesia] was a political organ in which the city poor, 
the artisans, traders, day labourers and idlers could by their majority outvote the minority of 
countrymen and major property-owners.” Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of 
Demosthenes, Structure, Principles and Ideology, 125. 
571 “[…] il complesso dei cittadini come corpo politico unitario (come in «popolo italiano» […]).” 
Agamben, Homo Sacer : Il Potere Sovrano e La Nuda Vita, 30. 
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pleromatic drive. Or, she hopes for universal consignation of the photographic 
representation of peoples without acknowledging that consignation always already 
entails the inclusion of its own lack, it always produces its own other. We shall return 
to the possibility of a different pleroma, one that has been called a messianic 
pleroma, according to which the dispositif of citizenry can be brought to a standstill.  
 
5.3	The	construction	of	contemporaneity	as	kenoma	
 
Just as Derrida stressed the impossibility of archival pleroma because consignation 
always includes its own lack, Derrida, Nancy and Agamben each stress the 
impossibility of political pleroma promised along the three strategic axes of cultural 
heritage. In spite of the eschatological proclamations that the time is at hand, the 
technical and the political pleromata covered in chapter 2 can have no actual 
existence. As we have seen, however, the imaginaries of pleroma are operational 
nonetheless – a contradiction in terms since eschatological pleroma constitutes the 
end of the operations of oikonomia. If the archival promise is not fulfilled in pleroma 
but the imaginaries of pleroma remain operational, nonetheless, what characterises 
this operation?  
 The paradox is clear in Chun’s formulation of the archival promise: “This 
always-thereness of new media is also what links it to the future as future simple, as 
what will be, as predictable progress.”572 The always there and everywhere of 
pleroma reduces the future to what will be, i.e. to that which is already as known 
future, as calculable extrapolation of the status quo. The future is operational only as 
a prolongation of the present. We shall call this the kenomatic (κένωμα, “emptiness”) 
operation of pleroma within the contemporary as the end of time – the operation of 
pleroma in kenoma. If pleroma is the abode of eschatological eternity, kenoma is the 
abode of the contemporary as the calculable “future simple” without an actual future, 
and the contemporary is a kenoma which, in spite of its imaginaries, will never know 
pleroma. The eschatological presence of pleroma must be considered an archival 
                                                            
572 Chun, “The Enduring Ephemeral, or the Future Is a Memory,” 154, cf. section 3.4. 
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mythologeme, and it is this mythologeme of pleroma that is operational in the 
kenomatic persistance of oikonomia, not pleroma itself.  
 When the cultural heritage discourse of cultural politics insists on cultural 
heritage as the untapped potential of the past for the future, how is it then possible to 
argue that it operates the kenomatic operation of the mythologeme of a pleromatic 
constitution of the end of time? As described in the presentation of Riegl in Section 
2.2, Antiquity and the Middle Ages perceived only certain intentional monuments of 
the past as immortally and eternally persistent in the present. From the Italian 
Renaissance and on, various elements of the past gained a present-day value in so 
far as the achievements of past generations allowed the given present to recognise 
itself in that past, i.e. to inscribe itself in a specific generational lineage. From the 
nineteenth century and on, the global past in its entirety offers itself up for 
identificational recognition, irrespective of any specific generational lineage. Finally, 
we see a current tendency to conceive of not only cultural artefacts but also “culture” 
in general as the bountiful stores for both the recognition of others and self and, 
further, for the production of future innovation and consequent economic growth. It is 
the cult of the eternally persistent past that as such offers an untapped potential for 
present-day use-value within the contemporary.  
 To further investigate the specific construction of the strategic interactions 
between past, present and future in the kenomatic operations of eschatological 
pleroma in digital cultural heritage archives, it is useful to consider the 
problematization of the concept of the contemporary by Peter Osborne. Though his 
(2013) investigation of the concept aims at the distinction between contemporary and 
modern art, his fourfold problematization holds for our purpose as well. 
 The contemporary, Osborne argues, is an idea in the Kantian sense, that is, “its 
object (the total conjunction of present times) is beyond possible experience […] and 
is hence a problem that requires investigation.”573 The idea as the representational 
form of reason, is thus distinct from Kant’s two other representational forms: intuition 
as the immediate representation of an experiential object through sensibility and the 
concept as the representation of an experiential object mediated by other 
                                                            
573 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 22. 
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representations through understanding.574 Such ideas are “heuristic fictions” that 
may ““regulate” experience as long as they are not contradicted by it.”575  
 Apart from UNESCO’s 1952 evocation of “contemporary man,”576 the term “the 
contemporary” is not widely and certainly not emphatically used in the discourse of 
digital cultural heritage. The “total conjunction of present times” is, however, distinctly 
operational in the specific ordering of the cultural past as “untapped potential” in 
order to drive the present into the future – a future which is always already 
determined by the three strategic axes and thus not a future at all, but an empty 
future operating under the promise of an imminently fulfilled eternity. And not only do 
the discourses of archival and political pleroma claim a contemporaneity of global 
presents, they also claim a contemporaneity of global pasts: “The digital heritage is 
inherently unlimited by time, geography, culture or format.”577 All of time and space 
are supposedly consigned within the pleromatic archive. 
 The specific temporal conjunction into which the three strategic axes of cultural 
politics are deployed constitutes the operational field of the cultural heritage 
dispositif. The permanent present-day use-value of the past as the heuristic fiction of 
the unlimited contemporaneity of past and present with regard to an already 
determined future is what allows for the constitution of cultural heritage as untapped 
potential.  
 What Riegl described as the recognition of ourselves in “die geringsten Taten 
und Geschicke selbst der geringsten, von der eigenen Nation durch 
unüberbrückbare Charaktergegensätze geschiedenen Völker”578 has now 
presumably been technologically relieved of remoteness. This, again, is what we 
saw in Valery’s and Otlet’s respective uses of the word “ubiquité” and what Wells in 
World Brain mentions three times as the “abolition of distance.”579 The recognition of 
ourselves and others via the heritage of deeds and events is open for creative 
innovation – a development which, we will remember, entails the shaping of “our 
                                                            
574 Deleuze, La philosophie critique de Kant, 14. 
575 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 22. 
576 Cf. Section 2.2.3. 
577 UNESCO. “Records of the General Conference (32nd Session - 2003) – Resolutions,” 75. 
578 Riegl, “Der moderne Denkmalskultus, sein Wesen, seine Entstehung,” 147, cf. section 2.2.2. 
579 Wells, World Brain, 27, 28 & 116. 
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thinking, imagining and behaviour”580 as well as the management of “all our non-
renewable resources.”581 The operations of the contemporary as unlimited temporal 
conjunction are thus a necessary presupposition for the strategic goals of the 
guardians of cultural heritage. The specific construction of the contemporary as idea 
via the mythologeme of eschatological pleroma establishes the terrain for these 
strategic operations.  
 
5.4	Existential	time	or	standing	reserve	
 
The temporal conjunction of cultural heritage is, of course, an idea or fiction 
contradicted by experience in several ways, and is as such an epistemological 
“problem that requires investigation.” Heidegger delivered one such investigation via 
an existential problematization in which he argued that the present itself “in its 
presentness, cannot be considered some kind of self-contained temporal receptacle 
for objects of experience, since it only ex-ists as the differentiation or fractured 
togetherness of the other two temporal modes (past and future), under the priority of 
its futural dimension.”582  
 A common and false conception of time as receptacle containing a past, 
present and future is only derivative of a more profound temporality, which has “als 
ontologische Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit die Seinsverfassung der Sorge, das heißt 
die Zeitlichkeit.”583 Care (Sorge) is here characteristic of Dasein which, in its 
character of thrown projection (geworfener Entwurf), “wesenhaft in seinem Sein 
Zukünftig ist […]. [N]ur Seiendes, das als zukünftiges gleichursprünglich gewesend 
ist, kann, sich selbst die ererbte584 Möglichkeit und augenblicklich sein für »seine 
Zeit«. Nur eigentliche Zeitlichkeit, die zugleich endlich ist, macht so etwas wie 
Schicksal, das heißt eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit möglich.”585 From a Heideggerian 
perspective, sharing can never be caring within the temporal conjunction of the 
                                                            
580 UNESCO, “Our Creative Diversity (CLT-96/WS-6) - Report of the World Commission on Culture 
and Development - Summary Version,” 12, cf. Section 2.2.3. 
581 Ibid. 10, cf. section 2.2.3. 
582 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 23. 
583 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 385. 
584 My emphasis. 
585 Ibid. 
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contemporary since caring is, in its very being, Dasein’s singular and futural 
“Entwurf” as a chosen reaction to its “Geworfenheit.” Dasein is “für seine Zeit” 
because it is a determined (entschlossen) reaction to it. And the inherited conditions 
into which Dasein is thrown only become heritage via this auto-determination 
(Entschlossenheit) of Dasein’s Sorge: “Damit bezeichnen wir das in der eigentlichen 
Entschlossenheit liegende ursprüngliche Geschehen des Daseins, in dem es sich 
frei für den Tod ihm selbst in einer ererbten,586 aber gleichwohl gewählten 
Möglichkeit überliefert.”587 
 This Heideggerian heritage is not a past as resource with regard to the future 
of progress. For Heidegger, temporality is “Dies dergestalt als gewesend-
gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche Phänomen,”588 i.e. a fundamental temporal 
disjunction, and not as claimed by the ordinary and “vulgäre Seinsverständnis,” “das 
Sein des Welt-Geschichtlichen im Sinne des ankommenden, anwesenden und 
verschwindenden Vorhandenen […].”589 Time always already is as auto-determined 
becoming with relation to a past and not as the coming and going of presents. Nor is 
time in any way unlimited in this passing, it is directed towards its own end in death. 
Being “für »seine Zeit«” is an articulation and singular constitution of time itself, a 
specific singular temporality, and not the inscription of the self in the linear passing of 
time or in the eternal presence of past time.  
 From this perspective, the very specific strategic construction or 
implementation of the past in the present as a driving force with regard to future 
progress must, rather, be described as the ordering of culture as the later 
Heidegger’s “standing reserve” (Bestand), i.e. a resource reduced to its ready 
availability with regards to a specific purpose. As we saw in section 4.4, this would 
be creativity and innovation as modes of actualising the “untapped potential of 
culture” in the production of a specific future (economic growth). The past as Bestand 
allows for no future since it is reduced to its latent availability in storage. Bestand is 
                                                            
586 My emphasis. 
587 Ibid. 384. 
588 Ibid. 326. 
589 Ibid. 389. 
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that which “herausgefördert und gespeichert werden kann.”590 And as storage, its 
actualisation is already predetermined.591  
 The past as resource, i.e. Bestand, has no future for it is ordered as readily 
available storage for actualisation with regard to a specific purpose. Heidegger’s 
critique of the technical attitude of “Enframing” (Gestell) which orders a given entity 
as standing reserve (Bestand) gives a new perspective on Riegl’s rendition of 
recognition of the self in the tiniest detail of cultural history and thus on our criticism 
of the discourse of cultural heritage. The human ordering of the entirety of being as 
standing reserve seemingly lets humanity meet only itself in the world and never 
allows for the meeting of the self in its proper being as becoming: “Indessen 
begegnet der Mensch heute in Wahrheit gerade nirgends mehr sich selber, d.h. 
seinem Wesen.”592 The temporal conjunction operated via cultural heritage as 
Bestand is thus the basis for the establishment of a space where nothing happens. 
Blanchot elegantly expressed this in his criticism of another operator in such a 
temporal conjunction, the paperback, as 1. access of the people to culture and 2. the 
ready availability of the totality of culture for everyone:593 "Qu’il y ait des événements 
intéressants et même importants et que cependant rien ne puisse avoir lieu qui nous 
dérange, telle est la philosophie de tout pouvoir établi et, par derrière, de tout service 
de culture."594 
 
5.5	Empirical	time	or	imaginative	disavowal	
 
Next, the temporal conjunction of an unlimited past in an unlimited present is 
contradicted by experience on empirical grounds: “There is no socially actual shared 
subject-position of, or within, our present from the standpoint of which its relational 
totality could be lived as a whole, in however epistemologically problematic or 
                                                            
590 Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” 18. 
591 This predetermination is the nature of techne as “Gestell.” The opposite is poiesis as a bringing 
forth which does not foreclose a different purpose: “Sie entbirgt solches, was sich nicht selber her-vor-
bringt und noch nicht vorliegt, was deshalb so, bald anders aussehen und ausfallen kann.” Ibid. 17. 
592 Ibid. 31. 
593 Blanchot, “Les grand réducteurs,” 82. 
594 Ibid. 79. 
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temporal-existentially fragmented anticipatory form.”595 This is another way of stating 
the three impossibilities of the strategic axes proclaimed by Nancy, Derrida and 
Agamben in Section 5.2. The temporal conjunction of global cultural heritage 
operates as if this totality were an actual empirical entity liveable both as a resource 
for unity in diversity and collective identity and as an individually accessible potential 
affording personal edification and development towards creative productivity.  
 Such a pleromatic entity is an operative fiction, a speculative horizon that 
amounts to a disavowal of politics in its postulation of a unity of heterochronous 
objects as Bestand. It obliterates the possibility of any fundamental disagreement or 
dispute of history in favour of the tranquillity of undisputed identity and creative 
potential. Simultaneously, it is also a productive act of imagination positing this 
tranquil historical coexistence as a given. Or, in the specific case of global cultural 
heritage, the productive act of imagination of a heritage “inherently unlimited by time, 
geography, culture or format”596 disavows all political disputes within that unlimited 
sphere in favour of the community of peacefully coexisting individuals engaged in 
creative and innovative pursuits.  
 Osborne points out that the “fiction of the contemporary” is becoming 
“progressively contracted” in the rapid succession of “generations.”597 On the one 
hand, such a contraction or abolition of temporal distance in the fulfilment of time 
renders our notion of hypomnesic heritage from chapter 1 impossible. In the case of 
Derrida’s emphasis on Freud’s deferred obedience towards his father in the 
affirmation of historical truth instead of material truth598 and the case of Foucault’s 
selection of fragments of truth as the affirmation of a spiritual genealogy in the 
constitution of the self,599 such heritage requires temporal distance for affirmation to 
operate. Eternal presence renders the generational aspect of heritage impossible. 
Jan Assmann’s (2010) distinction between “communicative memory” as a non-
institutional, disembodied memory reaching “no farther back than eighty years, the 
                                                            
595 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 23. 
596 UNESCO, “Records of the General Conference (32nd Session - 2003) - Resolutions,” 75, cf. 
section 2.2.4. 
597 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 24. 
598 Cf. section 1.1.3. 
599 Cf. section 1.4.2. 
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time span of three interaction generations”600 and “cultural memory,” institutionalised 
and guarded by specialists, reaching “back into the past only so far as the past can 
be reclaimed as “ours”,”601 thus seems slightly out of date. When everything is 
technically available as untapped potential, such a distinction collapses in the 
universal hypomnesic accessibility of everything in the now of the contemporary. 
Neither the individual nor the collective can claim heritage when confronted with such 
temporal fulfilment.  
 Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that in the context of digital cultural 
heritage archives, the rapid succession of technological generations is itself the 
necessary mechanical foundation of the fiction of eternity. The current Executive 
Director of Darnton’s Digital Public Library of America, Daniel J. Cohen, states: 
“historians, archivists, librarians, and museum curators, even those strongly 
committed to the long-term preservation of recent history, enter uncharted waters 
when they try to save the past digitally.”602 Far from the fetish of unfettered access to 
the eternally preserved artefact, the digital object requires “a special set of eyes, 
often unique hardware, and an accompanying operating system and application 
software, to view or read them properly.”603 As Wendy Chun argued, far from fulfilling 
“the archival promise” of a calculable “future simple” the digital format is but an 
“enduring ephemeral.”604 
 
5.6	Geopolitical	time	and	the	task	of	the	archive	
 
In the very construction of temporality as the contemporary, the supposed limitless 
presence of digital heritage objects projects an imaginary global present which 
actively disavows any possible dispute, disagreement or strife. It projects the doxa 
that Wells and Otlet called, respectively, a “World Pax” and “La fin de la guerre” 
under the motto “Per Orbem Terrarum Humanitas Unita.”605 Yet there are many 
                                                            
600 Assmann, J. “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” 111. 
601 Ibid. 
602 Cohen, “The Future of Preserving the Past,” 15. 
603 Ibid. 
604 Chun, “The Enduring Ephemeral, or the Future Is a Memory,” 148-150. Cf. section 3.4. 
605 Cf. section 2.2.1. 
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potentially antagonistic relations within this projected unity. For example, different 
postcolonial temporalities involve “not just temporal, but equally, indeed, in certain 
respects primarily – spatial” antagonisms.606 This, of course, poses a geopolitical 
problem, and consequently, it poses a task. We shall define task as the task of the 
previously mentioned attitude of ethos defined by Foucault: “je veux dire, un mode de 
relation à l’égard de l’actualité; un choix volontaire qui est fait par certains; enfin, une 
manière de penser et de sentir, une manière aussi d’agir et de se conduire qui, tout à 
la fois, marque une appartenance et se présente comme une tâche.”607  
 The task is to choose a relation to “l’actualité” as distinct from the 
determinations of history. Foucault asks the question of “le présent” or “l’actualité” in 
two identically titled texts on Kant: “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières,” to which Osborne’s 
analysis is deeply although quite silently indebted.608 Foucault reads Kant against 
the traditional presentation of conditions of possibility of truth in general and, instead, 
engages with Kantian Enlightenment as “la question : « Qu’est-ce que c’est que 
notre actualité? Quel est le champ actuel des expériences possibles?”609 Such 
ontology of the contemporary (actualité) entails a relation to the present against 
history:  
 
“Je veux dire que ce travail fait aux limites de nous-mêmes doit d’un côté 
ouvrir un domaine d’enquêtes historiques et de l’autre se mettre à 
l’épreuve de la réalité et de l’actualité, à la fois pour saisir les point où le 
changement est possible et souhaitable et pour déterminer la forme 
précise à donner à ce changement.”610   
 
Such an ethical task of “une critique pratique dans la forme du franchissement 
possible”611 is thus a reaction against the imaginary act of the contemporary as the 
constitution of a coherent whole of history, whether national, supranational or 
                                                            
606 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 25. 
607 Foucault, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières 1, 1387. Cf. section 1.4.3. 
608 Osborne only once mentions the “problem of the definition of the historical present – which 
Foucault picked in the late 1970s, in a quasi-existential mode, with his idea of a ‘critical ontology of 
the present’.” Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, Philosophy of Contemporary Art, 249 n. 22. 
609 Foucault, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières 2, 1506. 
610 Foucault, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières 1, 1393. 
611 Ibid. 
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international. It is the reaction of ethos against doxa; ethos as the para-doxical 
reaction to the conditions of history. In this regard, instead of Foucault, Osborne 
explicitly references the young Nietzsche’s notion of the “Unzeitgemmäße” which 
undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in Foucault’s notion of “l’actuel”:612  
 
“So viel muss ich mir aber selbst von Berufs wegen als classischer 
Philologe zugestehen dürfen: denn ich wüsste nicht, was die classische 
Philologie in unserer Zeit für einen Sinn hätte, wenn nicht den, in ihr 
unzeitgemäss — das heisst gegen die Zeit und dadurch auf die Zeit und 
hoffentlich zu Gunsten einer kommenden Zeit — zu wirken.”613 
 
For Nietzsche, history serves not a consolidation of time, but a challenging of the 
present not as a predetermined future of progress but in the hope of a time to come.  
 This was also Deleuze’s point when, still referencing Nietzsche, he located the 
untimely (intempestif / actuel) as the other side of Foucault’s archaeology: the 
diagnostics that bring archaeological analysis of what we have ceased to be into an 
emancipatory relation to our own becoming.614 This, finally, is the crux of Agamben’s 
argument when he references Barthes for explicitly bringing the Nietzschean notion 
of the untimely in relation to “il contemporaneo.”615 For Agamben, to be 
contemporary is never to belong to or coincide with one’s time. This opening of time, 
this con-temporaneity as being “for one’s time” and not just engulfed in it, rather, 
                                                            
612 Foucault mentions Nietzsche as one of several philosophers working within the described critical 
tradition; see Foucault, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières 2, 1507. 
613 Nietzsche, “Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen – Zweites Stück: Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie 
für das Leben,” 247. 
614 Deleuze, “Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif,” 322–323. Nietzsche’s formulation of the untimely as quoted 
above played a central role in Deleuzian philosophy from the earliest works to the late readings of 
Foucault, c.f. in Différence et répétition: “A la suite de Nietzsche, nous découvrons l’intempestif 
comme plus profond que le temps et l’éternité : la philosophie n’est ni philosophie de l’histoire, ni 
philosophie de l’éternel, mais intempestive, toujours et seulement intempestive, c’est-à-dire « contre 
ce temps, en faveur, je l’espère, d’un temps à venir ».” Deleuze, Différence et répétition, 3. It should 
be noted, however, that “intempestif” only becomes synonymous with “actuel” in the later works. In his 
1962 book on Nietzsche, “intempestif” is on the contrary synonymous with “inactuel,” cf. Deleuze, 
Nietzsche et la philosophie, 122, due to the French translation of Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäße 
Betrachtungen as Considérations inactuelles. 
615 “Une prima, provvisoria indicazione per orientare la nostra ricerca di une risposta ci viene da 
Nietzsche. In un appunto dei suoi corsi al Collège de France, Roland Barthes la compendia in questo 
modo: “Il contemporaneo è l’intempestivo.”” Agamben, Che cos’è il contemporaneo?, 8. 
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necessarily entails a challenging of the projection of a community of peacefully 
coexisting individuals engaged in creative and innovative pursuits. 
 Osborne thus evokes the geopolitical task of countering the unifying operations 
of the idea of the contemporary. The present dissertation has argued that in spite of 
the a priori impossibility of pleroma (archival or political), it is nonetheless 
paradoxically operational as a foundational mythologeme in the operations of the 
kenomatic contemporary as the open territory into which the three strategic axes of 
the cultural politics of cultural heritage are deployed. Now, the tradition from 
Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and Agamben evoke the necessity of a time different 
from such kenomatic oikonomia of pleroma. 
 
5.7	Grid	vs.	Vortex	
 
The problematization of “the contemporary” has demonstrated the idea or 
mythologeme of pleroma in the contemporary as the presupposition that allows for 
the constitution of cultural heritage as the terrain of untapped potential for the three 
strategic axes of cultural heritage discourse. It has shown that this potential rests on 
a specific temporality of Bestand that ignores the possibility of a more fundamental 
existential temporality claimed by the earlier Heidegger. The empirical problem of a 
contemporary conjunction of temporalities beyond any liveable subject position then 
showed the projection of the fictional conjunction of time as the negation of any 
political disagreement and dispute with regards to the past. And finally, this 
disavowal of politics was claimed to be a geopolitical task, a task which – according 
to the tradition running from Nietzsche via Foucault and Deleuze to Agamben – must 
consider contemporaneity as being out of time and “for time” in order to bring about a 
time to come instead of the contemporary as the contraction of the past in the 
present with regards to a future without becoming in the persistent kenomatic 
operations of the imaginaries of pleroma. 
 The digital cultural heritage archive should thus be positioned as a battlefield of 
temporalities: A battle between a universal and a singular temporality within the 
archival contemporaneity of ever-present pasts and an all-too present future, the 
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temporal conjunction of heterochronous objects and the global conjunction of 
collectives. In order to understand the privileged role of the digital archive within this 
discursive formation, we must now consider the temporal constructions of more 
specific archival orders. Or rather, staying within discourse analysis, we should 
contextualise our reading of Azoulay’s civil archive and consider the attribution of 
potential to certain archival configurations not by the cultural heritage discourse of 
cultural politics but by critical discourse. If the digital cultural heritage archive holds a 
specific promise as articulated along the lines of Azoulay’s civil archive, how does 
the digital archival order honour that promise? 
 Aby Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne and André Malraux’s Musée imaginaire have 
both been referenced as paradigmatic archival forms of great promise ultimately 
fulfilled by their digital successors.616 Similar to Azoulay, who claimed the inherent 
potential of her preferred kind of hypomnemata for a reconfiguration of the grid and 
thus of the N of community, Warburg and Malraux supposedly propose archival 
reconfigurations N that allow for the emancipation of H and thus hold specific 
potentials for knowledge creation and a sense of human collectivity. W.J.T. Mitchell’s 
and Georges Didi-Huberman’s respective analyses of specific arrays, albums and 
atlases have both attempted to distil the fundamental characteristics of these two 
exemplars.  
 In a recent lecture entitled Madness and Montage - Symptom and Symbol from 
Aby Warburg to A Beautiful Mind,617 Mitchell deploys a spatial dialectics between 
grid and vortex as a way of describing image arrays: grid representing rational 
Cartesian space and vortex as an expression of transformation, vertigo and 
                                                            
616 “[…] almost every major museum claimed and still claims that its Web site is André Malraux’s 
museum without walls.” Chun, Control and Freedom, Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics, 
23, and “[…] digitization has been trumpeted as a way for libraries finally to fulfil their mission: to 
accumulate and provide access to human knowledge. Digital archives are allegedly H. G. Wells’s 
“World Brain” and André Malraux’ s museum without walls, among other dreams, come true.” Chun, 
Programmed Visions, Software and Memory, 137. “In other words, similarly as the photographic and 
new image cultures in the early part of the twentieth century forced not only a rethinking of perception 
but also of collection, memory, and organisation as was evident for example in Aby Warburg’s work 
[…], now software cultures demand a rethinking of similar extent.” Parikka, “Archives in Media Theory: 
Material Media Archaeology and Digital Humanities,” 90. See also Berry et al., Imaginary Museums, 
Computationality & the New Aesthetic. 
617 Mitchell, “Madness and Montage - Symptom and Symbol from Aby Warburg to A Beautiful Mind.” 
 198 
madness.618 Mitchell is less interested in the attempts to transform multiple images 
into “unified artistic compositions,” e.g. Gerhard Richter’s Atlas (1964-1995) and 
Robert Morris’ Scatter Piece (1968-1969), that could in themselves hint at, 
respectively, the grid and the vortex. Rather, Mitchell wants to examine the 
“provisional assemblage,” the operations behind the production of “image 
knowledge.”  
 Mitchell highlights two notable exceptions to the “normal practice in art history” 
of controlling the display of image arrays in relation to a predetermined discourse or 
interpretation, i.e. the determination of H in accordance with a predetermined N: 
Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne and Malraux’s Musée imaginaire instead acknowledge 
the provisional character of the assemblage. One common characteristic of these 
two arrays or assemblages, which renders them especially relevant to the present 
context, is that – similar to Riegl’s tentative technological solution to the tension 
between historical value and age value619 and UNESCO’s increased use of “the most 
modern methods” in their pursuit of “preservation and dissemination” and, later, 
“preservation and access”620 – they both consist of photographic reproductions.  
 
                                                            
618 Mitchell’s lecture is studied here in two versions, one given in Berlin on April 10 2014 and one in 
Copenhagen on April 23 2014. The Copenhagen edition was experienced in person while the Berlin 
edition was watched on the website of the conference Image Operations: https://www.ici-
berlin.org/event/571/. Quotes from the Copenhagen edition are taken from an unpublished handout of 
the lecture’s manuscript. 
619 Cf. section 2.2.2. 
620 Cf. section 2.2.3. 
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Maurice Jarnoux: André Malraux chez lui, (1953) 
 
 Although the distinction was never explicit, one got the impression that, 
according to Mitchell, Warburg tended towards the vortex while Malraux tended 
toward the grid. Maurice Jarnoux’s famous depictions of the latter in his home (André 
Malraux chez lui, 1953) shows the floor covered by a nice grid of reproductions for 
his Musée imaginaire, a grid brought to only the slightest degree of turbulence 
around the feet of the organising mastermind. On the other hand, although 
Warburg’s plates do have a certain grid-like distribution, Mitchell quoted Didi-
Huberman for saying that Warburg’s goal was to set art history in motion:  
 
“To create a knowledge-montage was [...] to reject the matrices of 
intelligibility, to break through the age-old guardrails. This movement, with 
its new “allure” of knowledge, created the possibility of vertigo. [...] The 
image is not a closed field of knowledge; it is a whirling, centrifugal field. It 
is not a field of knowledge like any other […]”621 
 
                                                            
621 Ibid. quoting Didi-Huberman, “Knowledge: Movement (The Man Who Spoke to Butterflies),” 13. 
The original French version of the passage can be found in Didi-Huberman, Phalènes, Essais sur 
l’apparition 2, 115. 
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 Mitchell ended his lecture by showing the art installation T_Visionarium, which 
“offers the means to capture and re-present televisual information, allowing viewers 
to explore and actively edit a multitude of stories in three dimensions.”622 The digital 
installation demonstrated how the current enormous capacity for capturing, storing, 
displaying and manipulating data can move from grid to vortex in an instant. As 
Mitchell concluded: “If we are to study the totality of the world’s images, we had 
better get used to vertigo.”623 
  
 
5.8	Album	vs.	Atlas	 	
 
Mitchell’s dialectics between grid and vertigo operate between synchronous order 
and productive madness, one based on simultaneity, the other on futurity. Any image 
array will interface between the two with Malraux a bit more on the side of the grid 
and Warburg more on the side of the vortex. Mitchell’s distinction establishes a 
spectrum in which the two articulate in varying ways. Similarly, Didi-Huberman 
spends the better part of a recent book, L’Album de l’art à l’époque du « Musée 
imaginaire » (2013), presenting a fundamental conflict between Malraux’s Album and 
Warburg’s Atlas as two opposing ways of approaching pictorial heritage.  
 Didi-Huberman perceives Warburg’s Atlas – with its arrays of heterogeneous 
reproductions indistinctly related to a given theme or Pathosformel – as a 
fundamental complexity which can never be resolved in a unifying concept, a 
complete archive or a strict classification624:  
 
“C’est le pari que les images, assemblées d’une certaine façon, nous 
offrirait la possibilité – ou, mieux, la ressource inépuisable – d’une 
relecture du monde. […] Le Bilderatlas […] offrait […] un appareil à 
remettre la pensée en mouvement là où l’histoire s’était arrêtée, là même 
                                                            
622 T_Visionarium, “Project Overview.” 
623 Mitchell, “Madness and Montage - The Picture Atlas as Symptom and Therapy from Aby Warburg 
to A Beautiful Mind.” 
624 Didi-Huberman, L’oeil de l’histoire : Tome 3, Atlas ou le gai savoir inquiet, 20. 
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où les mots faisaient encore défaut. Il fut la matrice d’un désir de 
reconfigurer la mémoire en renonçant à fixer les souvenirs – les images 
du passé – dans un récit ordonné, ou pire, définitif.”625  
 
This imaginative perpetuum mobile is thus “notre héritage, l’héritage de notre 
temps”626 – a heritage that is both aesthetic and epistemic in that the new aesthetic 
forms entail a new approach to knowledge. As has hopefully been demonstrated, 
such a heritage must also necessarily be political. 
 For Didi-Huberman as for Mitchell, Warburg represents an articulation between 
grid and vortex, between “raison et déraison.”627 Didi-Huberman is, however, 
explicitly critical of Malraux and his Album for snapping the images too firmly to the 
grid, for losing sight of the “mad” end of Mitchell’s spectrum.628 Although Malraux 
claimed that, contrary to the determination of the traditional museum, his Musée 
imaginaire was an interrogation,629 Didi-Huberman accuses Malraux of instantly 
answering his own questions.630 If Malraux claims his Album to be what Mitchell 
called a “provisional assemblage,” Didi-Huberman claims that this provisionality is 
directed solely towards a “unified cultural composition.” In spite of the intended 
                                                            
625 Ibid. 20-21. 
626 Ibid. 21. 
627 Ibid. 22. 
628 Didi-Huberman is mainly critical of the later Malraux of the Musée imaginaire and onwards. He 
sees in Malraux’s earlier writings from the 1930s an emancipatory challenging of the past, which he 
calls “bien pensé,” whereas the later Malraux turns into a “bien pensant” mainly interested in 
preserving his own position as organising mastermind. A critical rereading of the earlier Malraux as a 
challenge of its description as “bien pensé” would be valuable but surpasses the scope of the present 
dissertation. A brief indication, however: Didi-Huberman sees in Malraux’s recurring dictum “l’héritage 
ne se transmet pas, il se conquiert,” (e.g. Malraux, “L’Œuvre d’art,” 1190, and Malraux, “Sur l’héritage 
culturel,” 1198) a Benjaminian constellation able “das Kontinuum der Geschichte aufzusprengen” 
Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 702. But even in the 1930s, Malraux saw any heritage 
reproduction and thus decontextualisation as a means of conquering the reproduced fragment under 
the banner of humanist universalisation: “Humanistes parce que universalistes.” Malraux, “Sur 
l’héritage culturel,” 1196. Such a decontextualizing reproduction is clearly inspired by Benjamin, but 
where Benjamin wanted to politicise art as a fragmentary or, even, destructive, response to the fascist 
rendering aesthetic of politics, Malraux countered fascist nationalism with universalism: “Il est dans la 
nature du fascisme d’être la nation et dans la nôtre d’être le monde.” Malraux, “L’Œuvre d’art,” 1189. 
Already in the 1930s, this universalism depended on the transmission of reproductions, which 
immediately after the war found its expression in a speech to UNESCO: “Pour la première fois, le 
Musée imaginaire ouvert sur la terre entière nous met en face de l’héritage du monde. […] héritiers de 
tout le passé […]” Malraux, “L’homme et la culture artistique,” 1207. Or as formulated in the early 
version of Le Musée Imaginare in Les Voix du silence: “Ce domaine – qui s’intellectualise tandis que 
l’inventaire et sa diffusion se poursuivent, et que les moyens de reproduction s’approchent de la 
fidélité – c’est, pour la première fois, l’héritage de toute l’histoire.” Malraux, “Les Voix du silence,” 240. 
629 Malraux, Le musée imaginaire, 176. 
630 Didi-Huberman, L’album de l’art à l’époque du musée imaginaire, 31. 
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dialogue between reproductions of artefacts from the remotest as well as the most 
familiar cultures, this dialogue was never allowed to go astray, dissolve into 
nonsense or get stuck in irresolvable tension or conflict. It was always brought back 
to “une synthèse stylistique ou spirituelle que fonde sa notion d’« art » ou de « 
création » universels.”631 
 The Musée imaginaire is the authoritative accumulation and presentation of 
timeless genius. It is open in so far as new or unknown old works of genius can be 
added, but closed with regard to a historical challenge of universal human essence. 
It is thus a re-sacralisation; the reproduced work is included in the church of 
universality. And this re-sacralisation is quite literal, in so far as many of the works 
included in the Musée imaginaire are former religious sculptures wrenched from their 
erstwhile cultic context and re-inscribed into the cult of universal cultural heritage.632 
 Where Walter Benjamin would have argued for the technologically induced 
decontextualization of the reproduced work of art as potential emancipation from 
tradition in the passage from cult-value to exhibition-value,633 Malraux re-inscribes 
the object in the universal eternity of the eschatological pleroma manifest in the 
Album form of his Musée. For Malraux, the emancipation of mechanical reproduction 
is what allows the possible decontextualization and subsequent inclusion in 
universality: “[…] la reproduction délivre leur style des servitudes qui le faisaient 
mineur.”634 Mechanical reproduction salvages the artefact from its contextual 
limitations in order to include it in the universal family album: “[…] la photographie en 
noir « rapproche » les objets qu’elle représente, pour peu qu’ils soient 
apparentés.”635  
 Malraux’s praise of the present presence of the accumulated past in the 
universal eternity of cultural heritage can be gleaned in crystalline form from a 
speech to Gaullist intellectuals in Paris on March 5, 1948: “Et dans cette salle, ce 
soir, nous pouvons dire sans ridicule : « Vous qui êtes ici, vous êtes la première 
                                                            
631 Ibid. 41. 
632 Malraux was familiar with such wrenching from his youth when in December 1923, after an 
unfortunate investment in the Mexican mining industry, he sought to alleviate his financial ruin by 
stealing devata statues from the Cambodian ruins of Banteay Srei. 
633 Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit - Dritte Fassung.” 
634 Malraux, “Les Voix du silence,” 213. 
635 Ibid. 212. 
 203 
génération d’héritiers de la terre entière. »”636 All of earth can be included in the 
family album and the room is invited to be the first descendants of that arch-
generation. The obvious question would be: What about those who were not present 
in the Salle Pleyel that evening? 
 
5.9	Profanation		
 
Didi-Huberman accuses Malraux of re-sacralising the decontextualized artefact and 
praises Warburg for his archival vertigo, “C’est un mouvement qui requiert toutes les 
dimensions anthropologiques de l’être et du temps.”637 Blanchot captures re-
sacralisation quite well in one of his essays on the Musée imaginaire: “[Q]ui regarde 
les statues gothiques ? nous; les autres les invoquaient. La disparition de la prière a 
eu pour conséquence de faire apparaître les monuments et les œuvres, de faire de 
la peinture un art à la portée de nos yeux.”638 We no longer invoke, we look, study 
and appreciate, and, according to Malraux, this gaze brings the artefact into to that 
other temple: the museum as archive of the universal essence of man.  
 As is not unexpected from an accusation of re-sacralisation, Didi-Huberman 
finds salvation in a gesture of profanation. At more or less the same time as Malraux 
was photographed at home surrounded by photographic reproductions for his Musée 
imaginaire, Chris Marker and Alain Resnais presented a short film entitled Les 
Statues meurent aussi (1953).639 In a style reminiscent of Malraux’s photographic 
reproductions, Marker and Resnais show various African artefacts, scenes from 
African and western culture and various western appropriations of African culture. 
Similar to Toutes les mémoires du monde, the film consists of a series of shots 
accompanied by music and a voice-over: 
 
                                                            
636 Malraux, “Les Conquérants - Postface,” 273. 
637 Didi-Huberman, “Savoir-Mouvement (L’Homme Qui Parlait Aux Papillons),” 14. 
638 Blanchot, “Le Musée, l’Art et le Temps,” 25. 
639 Parts of the movie were censured until 1963, i.e. also during Malraux’s tenure as minister for 
cultural affairs from 1959. Incidentally, Resnais married Malraux’s daughter, Florence, the year of his 
resignation from the ministry in 1969. 
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“Quand les hommes sont morts, ils entrent dans l’histoire. Quand les 
statues sont mortes, elles entrent dans l’art. Cette botanique de la mort, 
c’est ce que nous appelons la culture. […] Un objet est mort quand le 
regard vivant qui se posait sur lui a disparu. Et quand nous aurons 
disparu, nos objets iront là où nous envoyons ceux des nègres : au 
musée.”640 
 
The museum is a sacralising mausoleum that wrenches the cult object from its 
origins and forces it into the history of art. Aleida Assmann described the dynamics 
between archive and canon, i.e. between “cultural reference memory” and “cultural 
working memory.” But the museum is an archival instance which, although it 
pretends to transfer objects from the obscure archival depths of un-consigned 
plethora into a world canon of glorious pleroma, actually destroys the discursive aura 
of the object and thereby relegates it to a universal reference archive without 
memory:641 
 
“[…] ce pays de la mort où l’on va en perdant la mémoire. […] Classés, 
étiquetés, conservés dans la glace des vitrines et des collections, ils 
entrent dans l’histoire de l’art. Paradis des formes où s’établissent les 
plus mystérieuses parentés : nous reconnaissons la Grèce dans une tête 
africaine vieille de plus de 2000 ans, le Japon dans un masque de 
l’Ogoué, et encore l’Inde, les idoles sumériennes, nos Christs romans, ou 
notre art moderne.”642  
 
                                                            
640 Marker, Commentaires, 11. 
641 Cf. Section 1.1.2. A recent criticism of UNESCO’s ‘World Heritage’ listing as the transformation of 
a city into a mausoleum uses the term UNESCOcide: “UNESCO’s ‘World Heritage’ listing is the kiss of 
death […] with the loftiest intentions: to preserve – unaltered – a ‘legacy’ of humanity.” D’Eramo, 
“UNESCOcide,” 47. Agamben performs a similar analysis of Venice as a made up corpse: “Solo in 
questo modo si può spiegare la mancanza di amore dei veneziani per la loro città. Non sanno né 
possono amarla, perché amare una morta è difficile. È più semplice fingere che sia viva, coprirne le 
membra delicate ed esangui con mascherature e belletti per poterle esibire a pagamento ai turisti.” 
Agamben, Dell’utilità e degli inconvenienti del vivere fra spettri, 18–19. For Agamben’s description of 
the sacralising function of the museum and the “World Heritage” listing as well as the need for 
profanation cf. Agamben, Profanazioni, 96-98. 
642 Marker, Commentaires, 19–20. 
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The kinships of the museum, unhindered by geographical or cultural distance, 
supposedly allow for the identification of any individual with universal man. In the 
temporal conjunction of past and present in the museum, man recognises only 
himself. This is the realm of universal consignation as the realm of death. And in this 
“Classés, étiquetés, conservés” we should recognise the similar expression from 
Toute la mémoire du monde: “Ils les trient, les analysent, les classent, les 
numérotent méthodiquement.”643 Such reverberations only add to the ambiguities of 
the relation between the library stores and the reading room, between the happiness 
of a completed puzzle and the realm of death that is even the imaginary museum.  
 
 
 
Les Statues meurent aussi. 
 
 Les statues meurent aussi stresses the problem that this universalising 
celebration of culture glosses over: the very real oppression, exploitation and 
                                                            
643 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 66. 
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estrangement behind the accumulation of artefacts. A black woman is shown in front 
of a shop window displaying African statues and shortly thereafter a white man is 
shown teaching a young black man how to make cheap reproductions of African art 
objects. In spite of the hopes of Benjamin, the age of mechanical reproduction – the 
challenging of cult-value or value of tradition by exhibition-value – has not challenged 
the ruling class or private property; it has only reinforced white hegemony and black 
estrangement.  
 
 
 
Les Statues meurent aussi. 
 
 The end of the film affirms the possibility of the black artist to say No! Whether 
in the boxing ring or on the concert stage, the black artist tries to literally strike back, 
to “rendre les coups que reçoit son frère dans la rue.”644 It shows a black man with a 
                                                            
644 Marker, Commentaires, 24. 
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camera aimed directly at the screen, which for Didi-Huberman indicates the conquest 
of reproducibility:  
 
“Il ose même saisir d’un appareil photographique pour constituer lui-
même l’historicité de ses luttes ou bien l’état de nos propres cultures, 
accédant ainsi à la maîtrise de la reproducibilité et à la possibilité de 
nous regarder, dans tous les sens possibles de cette expression.”645  
 
Didi-Huberman clearly sees in the recapture of mechanical reproduction a possibility 
for a challenging of the universal time of the Album, i.e. a temporal dispute otherwise 
disavowed by the projection of universal time by the contemporary discourse of 
cultural heritage.646 Such a challenge entails the possibility of technical consignation 
to look back at us, in every sense of the expression. It is the possibility of the relation 
to the other enabled by Foucault’s correspondence. This new conquest of technical 
consignation allows for the specular relation to be broken, for man to see something 
different from himself in the world. This was the parresiatic moment of truth evoked 
by Foucault as the ethical dissociation from what we have called doxa.647 The 
conquest of the means of re-sacralisation is presented a way to profane their end in 
doxa. 
 Didi-Huberman thus presents the challenging of universal time in Les Statues 
meurent aussi as a mode of profanation akin to Warburg’s Atlas – the only resolution 
to a conflict which he describes by referencing Benjamin: The conflict between 
universal and singular time is described by Benjamin’s distinction between 
Universalgeschichte, whose “Verfahren ist additiv: sie bietet die Masse der Fakten 
auf, um die homogene und leere Zeit auszufüllen,”648 and materialistische 
                                                            
645 Didi-Huberman, L’album de l’art à l’époque du musée imaginaire, 166-167. 
646 I here take Malraux as a protagonist of the discourse of cultural heritage. And not without reason. 
Both before, during and after his tenure as minister for cultural affairs from 1959 to 1969, Malraux had 
a profound influence on UNESCO, e.g. via numerous speeches from 1936 and even until twenty 
years after his death where UNESCO played a recording of a 1960 speech of his in his honour. 
UNESCO states: “Mr. Malraux, who praised the “act by which man snatches something from death,” 
formulated for the first time the concept of the universality of cultural heritage, which thereafter would 
stand at the heart of UNESCO’s actions in the field of culture.” 
http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/96–210e.htm. 
647 Cf. section 1.4.3. 
648 Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 702. 
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Geschichtsschreibung, which locates a “von Spannungen gesättigten 
Konstellation”649 enabling the relation of a specific now with a specific past in an 
emancipatory break with the steady flow of progress.650 
 This distinction between Universalgeschichte and materialistische 
Geschichtsschreibung also holds for Benjamin’s own notion of cultural heritage. Only 
on few occasions does he reference a notion of cultural heritage directly but he 
always does so in a consistent manner. As mentioned in section 3.3, Benjamin’s 
perception of cinema, as expressed in “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” is that of a technical break with our commonplace 
images. This emancipatory potential also entails a destruction of the value of 
tradition of cultural heritage: “Sein [der Film] gesellschaftliche Bedeutung ist auch in 
ihrer positivsten Gestalt, und gerade in ihr, nicht ohne diese seine destruktive, seine 
kathartische Seite denkbar: die Liquidierung des Traditionswertes am Kulturerbe.”651  
 While this destruction of the value of tradition is compatible with Malraux, 
Benjamin emphatically resists any universalising accumulation of heritage in a 
storage or index. Benjamin later uses the French “héritage culturel” to translate the 
word “Kulturgüter” in “Über den Begriff der Geschichte”: “Die Beute wird, wie das 
immer so üblich war, im Triumphzug mitgeführt. Man bezeichnet sie als die 
Kulturgüter. Sie werden im historischen Materialisten mit einem distanzierten 
Betrachter zu rechnen haben.”652 Finally, the term “Menschheitserbe”653 is used in 
direct relation to Benjamin’s diagnosis of a poverty of experience: “Erfahrungsarmut: 
das muß man nicht so verstehen, als ob die Menschen sich nach neuer Erfahrung 
sehnten. […] Sie sind auch nicht immer unwissend oder unerfahren. Oft kann man 
                                                            
649 Ibid. 702–703. 
650 Didi-Huberman, L’album de l’art à l’époque du musée imaginaire, 171. For Benjamin, of course, 
progress is founded in the catastrophe that is the status quo: “Der Begriff des Fortschritts ist in der 
Idee der Katastrophe zu fundieren. Daß es »so weiter« geht, ist die Katastrophe.” The passage 
appears in both “Zentralpark,” 673 and Das Passagen-Werk 1, 592. Progress is what, in “Über den 
Begriff der Geschichte,” keeps the Angelus Novus fixed in place, blocking any view towards the future 
and hinders the saving of the ever increasing ruin heap of the past: “Dieser Sturm treibt ihn 
unaufhaltsam in die Zukunft, der er den Rücken kehrt, während der Trümmerhaufen vor ihm zum 
Himmel wächst. Das, was wir den Fortschritt nennen, ist dieser Sturm.” Benjamin, “Über den Begriff 
der Geschichte,” 698. 
651 Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit - Dritte Fassung,” 
478. 
652 Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 696, for the French translation: Benjamin, 
“Paralipomena - Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 1263. 
653 E.g. in Benjamin, “Erfahrung und Armut,” 219. 
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das Umgekehrte sagen: Sie haben das alles »gefressen«, »die Kultur« und den 
»Menschen« und sie sind übersatt daran geworden und müde.”654  
 In all cases the required reaction to cultural heritage is that of dissociation or 
to step back: “Und nun wollen wir einmal Abstand halten, zurücktreten.”655 Universal 
re-sacralisation in the ever-growing archival fortresses renders experience itself 
impossible. What is missing from experience is not the object but the capacity to 
establish a true historical relation or, rather, constellation to the fragment of history. It 
is therefore the task of the scholar, what Derrida would call a new scholar, to oppose 
any inventory of heritage:  
 
“Und es ist Sache der Denker und Forscher, welche noch eine Freiheit 
der Forschung kennen, von der Vorstellung eines ein für alle Mal 
verfügbaren, ein für alle Mal inventarisierten Bestandes an Kulturgütern 
sich zu distanzieren. Ihnen besonders muß es am Herzen liegen, einen 
kritischen Begriff der Kultur dem »affirmativen Kulturbegriff» 
entgegenzusetzen.”656  
 
Such a critical reaction is also attributed to materialist historiography: “Der 
historische Materialist rückt daher nach Maßgabe des Möglichen von ihr ab. Er 
betrachtet es als seine Aufgabe, die Geschichte gegen den Strich zu bürsten.”657 
Brushing history against the grain should not be read as merely the rewriting of 
history. It should be read as the bringing about of a different history, a profanation of 
any re-sacralisation in the “Triumphzug.” We shall return, soon and in conclusion, to 
what such dissociation from cultural affirmation of culture, which once and for all has 
been indexed and rendered accessible, may mean.  
                                                            
654 Ibid. 218. This passaged inspire the title of Alain Brossat’s excellent book on culture as a means to 
eliminate politics: Le grand dégoût culturel: “[…] une définition provisoire de ce qu’est la culture 
aujourd’hui : elle est cet élément liant ou cette surface de remplissage qui, dans nos sociétés, va se 
former là où l’on ne se trouve ni dans la zone ou la sphère de l’action (la praxis, la politique), ni dans 
celle de la fabrication ou de la production (la poiesis, le travail), ni dans celle de la création (l’œuvre, 
l’art). Elle est cet élément plastique, ou liquide, cette pâte molle qui comble les interstices, remplit le 
vide.” Brossat, Le grand dégoût culturel, 119. This definition is absolutely acceptable for the present 
dissertation, provided the specification that it is only a filling of the void to the extent that the void is 
filled with void. 
655 Benjamin, “Erfahrung und Armut,” 219. 
656 Benjamin, “Ein Deutsches Institut Freier Forschung,” 525. 
657 Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 697. 
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5.10	A	coming	community	of	memory	
 
Both Warburg’s Atlas and Malraux’s Album have been seen as forerunners for 
contemporary digital archives and Mitchell correctly locates their unification in 
something like the T_Visionarium, the interface of which (large curved screens from 
floor to ceiling) can visually change display types from grid to vortex by the push of a 
button. The interface is designed for the mastery of reproduction, for the vortical 
reconfiguration of the grid. For what is the digital archive but the zone of indistinction 
where grid and vortex coincide? Even beyond the interface, at a very material level, 
digital memory and storage, from the Williams Tube over spinning hard drives to 
current solid state drives, have always been characterised by a grid either flickering, 
fading or in rapid motion.658 
 The digital archive is, in its modes of preservation as in its modes of access, a 
grid in movement and it seems that this digital whirling of the grid inspires new 
archival hopes in both the powers of re-sacralisation and those of profanation. But 
when the grid’s vortical movement is the condition of possibility for the universal 
history of cultural heritage, can it then still be said that “assemblées d’une certaine 
façon,” images or cultural artefacts truly offer us the possibility “ou, mieux, la 
ressource inépuisable – d’une relecture du monde”659? Does the archival distribution 
of hypomnemata in and of itself turn Warburg’s images into dynamic challenges of 
“toutes les dimensions anthropologiques de l’être et du temps”660? 
 Is it indeed possible to attribute inherent aesthetic, epistemic or political 
characteristics to a specific organisation of cultural artefacts? And is the digital 
interface’s ability to strike back by partaking “à la maîtrise de la reproducibilité,” to 
“constituer lui-même l’historicité de ses luttes ou bien l’état de nos propres cultures,” 
not rather an aid to adopt Malraux’s pose at home where the grid only whirls at the 
feet of the organising mastermind? Is the attempt to find emancipation in the 
                                                            
658 Chun, “The Enduring Ephemeral, or the Future Is a Memory,” cf. Section 3.4 and the argument 
regarding the swift passing of generations as condition of possibility for archival eternity in Section 
5.5. 
659 Didi-Huberman, L’oeil de l’histoire : Tome 3, Atlas ou le gai savoir inquiet, 20-21. 
660 Didi-Huberman, “Savoir-Mouvement (L’Homme Qui Parlait Aux Papillons),” 14. 
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characteristics of the “media that created the conditions for globalization,”661 the 
global contemporary of universal heritage, and the faith in the dispositif to finally 
deliver on the emancipatory promise of Benjamin’s reproduction, not just other ways 
of inscribing oneself in the dispositif? Is not the T_Visionarium as the “means to 
capture and re-present televisual information, allowing viewers to explore and 
actively edit a multitude of stories in three dimensions,” exactly the present day 
culmination of Malraux’s re-sacralisation where any vertiginous rearrangement of the 
provisional assemblage is re-inscribed in the Album of the database?  
 It is necessary, here, to insist on the distinction between the attribution of 
inherent epistemological, existential, empirical and geopolitical force to a given 
technological archival order (grid/vortex, album/atlas) and the specific constructions 
of the contemporary as, respectively, universal and singular time. In a digital age, 
Warburg’s Atlas as archival distribution cannot be considered an inherently good 
model of materialistic historiography. It can most certainly be considered a tool for 
such a historiography, a trace of its maker’s singular practice. Yet we should be wary 
of generalising its historiographical qualities beyond that specific instance of practice, 
especially as a mechanically reproducible mode of profanation. This will just snap 
the vortex back to the grid.  
 Claiming a specific archival distribution as the presupposition for a specific 
construction of an emancipated contemporary must be abandoned as pure mimicry 
of the discourse of cultural heritage. Hoping for emancipation via a different and 
better dispositival fulfilment of eschatological pleroma, both archival and political, will 
only contribute to the kenomatic persistence of the empty time of the contemporary. 
We should remember that the discourse of cultural heritage desires nothing but the 
archive as the undepletable resource for a rereading of the world which Didi-
Huberman saw in Warburg’s Atlas. Indeed, in spite of his tendency to attribute 
inherent emancipatory powers to the Warburgian image array, Didi-Huberman does 
seem to acknowledge the need for a radical rejection of a claimed causality between 
archival distribution and a new construction of the contemporary: “Depuis que les 
                                                            
661 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 134, cf. the beginning of this chapter. 
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frères Lumière ont filmé leur Sortie d’usine, il est devenu facile de filmer les petites 
gens. Toute la question est de savoir comment.”662 
 How to move from the empty time of universal history as construction of the 
contemporary, what we have called the kenomatic operations of eschatological 
pleroma, to a materialist historiography of the temporal tensions of constellation, 
what we have called the geopolitical task, is not a question of arrays or archival order 
nor of recapturing mechanical reproduction to master one’s own story. Recapture is 
always already the capture of the dispositif. The contemporary as being for one’s 
time, as described in the tradition from Nietzsche via Foucault and Deleuze to 
Agamben, neither springs from the correct (re-)configuration of the archive as 
medium nor from the correct usage of the archival dispositif. In the age of digital 
reproduction, reconfiguration has become easy. The question is “knowing how” – not 
how to use the dispositif but how to profane it, to render it inoperable: “La 
profanazione è il controdispositivo che restituisce all’uso comune ciò che il sacrifico 
aveva separato e diviso.”663  
 Profanation is neither the destruction of the sacralising apparatus of archival 
consignation, i.e. the destruction of digital cultural heritage archives, nor is it the 
“correct” access to and use of its content in the reading room.664 Determining such a 
“correct” use will still put the pieces together to complete the puzzle, although with a 
different image, and thus always seek fulfilment in pleroma. Profanation brings the 
past out of its role as Bestand or eternally present use-value. Profanation seeks to 
render the discourse of cultural heritage inoperable by freeing the past from its 
necessary re-inscription along the three strategic axes and to establish the possibility 
for new use that is not a presupposed use-value. This can only be done via a 
problematization of the pleromatic drives of the archive and its kenomatic operation 
in the unified temporal conjunction of the contemporary to which the discourse of 
cultural heritage contributes – a conjunction which, because of its eschatological 
nature, renders any future impossible.  
                                                            
662 Didi-Huberman, Peuples exposés, peuples figurants, 198. 
663 Agamben, Che cos’è un dispositivo?, 28. 
664 “Non si tratta semplicemente di distruggerli, né, come suggeriscono alcuni ingenui, di usarli nel 
modo giusto.” Ibid. 24. 
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 The indistinction between presupposed use-value and the potential for new 
use not amenable to re-sacralisation must be clarified by “the contemporary” as what 
Deleuze considered the critical diagnostics of Foucault’s archaeology. Deleuze 
repeatedly stated: “Il y a une archéologie du présent,”665 an archaeology leading “aux 
couches désertes de notre temps qui enfouissent nos propres fantômes, aux 
couches lacunaires qui se juxtaposent suivant des orientations et des connexions 
variables.”666 Such an archaeology is the basis for a diagnosis of the present and the 
condition of possibility for the contemporary to be not just a temporal conjunction of 
universal time in eschatological pleroma, but an opening of time in the contemporary 
as the non-identity of the present.  
 We need an archaeology of the digital archive as well as the discourse of 
cultural heritage to provoke an experimentum monumenti – an experience of the 
conflicting presents of the past, the heterochronicity of monuments and the possible 
temporality of community as irreconcilable with the eternal presence of the past and 
the universal essence of man. An experimentum monumenti that is irreconcilable 
with the re-sacralising museum of cultural heritage, “ce pays de la mort où l’on va en 
perdant la mémoire.” Only such an archaeological experience and its ensuing 
diagnosis of the contemporary will enable us to be “for our time,” act counter to our 
time, on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come. 
 Earlier in this chapter, the Benjaminian opposition between empty universal 
time and the “Jetztzeit” of the constellation667 was briefly mentioned as the opposition 
between eschatological and messianic pleroma. The imaginaries of the digital 
cultural heritage archive, i.e. of the digital link between archival and political pleroma, 
claim that the obstacle keeping archival oikonomia from eschatological pleroma is 
but an exception in the line of inevitable progress toward the presence of God – 
“C’est la règle du jeu,”668 Resnais said. Now, that we are once again faced with the 
technical nourishment of the archival promise as we have seen in the new legacy of 
digital cultural heritage, we should acknowledge the task of bringing about this 
                                                            
665 Deleuze, L’image-temps, Cinéma 2, 317, Deleuze, Foucault, 58, Deleuze, “La vie comme œuvre 
d’art,” 132. 
666 Deleuze, L’image-temps, Cinéma 2, 317. 
667 “Die Geschichte ist Gegenstand einer Konstruktion, deren Ort nicht die homogene und leere Zeit, 
sondern die von Jetztzeit erfüllte bildet.” Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 701. 
668 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 69, cf. section 1.2.2. 
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different pleroma. This would not be the “Réalité Totale” of Otlet669 and his various 
companions but the constellation of past and present where the restitution of the past 
can only be the past as non-identical with itself in a similarly non-identical present. 
And such a past, which opens a future and not an eternity, can never be brought 
about by the oikonomia of the archival dispositif but only outside such oikonomia, or, 
rather, against such oikonomia, by profaning it and rendering it inoperable and open 
for new use. 
 This is the messianism proposed by Benjamin towards the end of “Über den 
Begriff der Geschichte”: “Die Jetztzeit, die als Modell der messianischen in einer 
ungeheuren Abbreviatur die Geschichte der ganzen Menschheit zusammenfaßt 
[…]”670 And such an abbreviation is what Agamben, in his reading of Saint Paul, 
termed messianic pleroma: “Il pléroma messianico […] è […] un’assolutizzazione 
della katargesis.”671 In the Aristotelian distinction between dynamis and energeia, i.e. 
the distinction between the potential of the library stores and its actualisation in the 
ideal opus (Greek: ergon) of happiness in the reading room, katargesis is what 
renders the eschatological oikonomia inoperable.672 The messianic is thus in its own 
way the name of profanation. Against the impossible and thus forever failed 
eschatological pleroma and its persistence in the oikonomia of the kenomatic 
contemporary, the messianic indicates the caesura where the pleromatic drive 
dividing potential and actualisation along the ideal line of the barrier between storage 
and reading room, dividing zoe and bios, substance and subject, is brought to 
inoperability:  
 
“Il messianico […] non rappresenta una nuova e più universale identità, 
ma una cesura che passa attraverso ogni identità – tante quella 
dell’ebreo che quella del gentile. L’«ebreo secondo lo spirito» e il «gentile 
secondo la carne» non definiscono una identità ulteriore, ma soltanto 
l’impossibilità di ogni identità di coincidere con se stessa – cioè la loro 
                                                            
669 Cf. section 5.1. 
670 Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 703. 
671 Agamben, Il tempo che resta. Un commento alla Lettera ai romani, 102. 
672 “Inoperable” as without the operation that exhausts potential in the work (opus):  “Katargéo è un 
composto di argós, che deriva a sua volta dall’aggettivo argós, che significa «inoperante, non-in-
opera (a-ergos), inattivo». Il composto vale quindi «rendo inoperante, disattivo, sospendo 
dall’efficacia» […]” Ibid. 91. 
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destituzione in quanto identità: ebreo come non ebreo, gentile come non 
gentile. (È verisimilmente secondo un paradigma di questo genere che si 
potrebbe pensare una destituzione del dispositivo della cittadinanza.)”673 
 
The dispositif of global citizenship is but another form of a more universal identity 
within political pleroma. The profaning katargesis of messianic pleroma would be the 
impossibility of thinking cultural heritage as the accumulation of “Kulturgüter” in the 
archive and its actualisation in the service of a progress that is but the kenomatic 
oikonomia of an imagined eschatological pleroma in the empty time of the 
contemporary. It is the task of the new scholar of a critical concept of culture to blast 
free of such servitude. “Die Geschichte muß gegen den Strick gebürstet werden. Die 
Kulturgeschichte als solche fällt weg: sie muß in die Geschichte die Klassenkämpfe 
integriert werden.”674 
                                                            
673 Agamben, L’uso dei corpi. Homo sacer, IV, 2, 346. For the analysis of what Agamben calls “il 
taglio di Apelle” in relation to the Pauline unification of gentiles and Jews and thus Agamben’s reading 
of Nancy’s “trait d’union,” see Agamben, Il tempo che resta. Un commento alla Lettera ai romani, 52–
55. Agamben nicely sums up his reading of the “people” with regards to Paul as follows: “Il popolo non 
è né il tutto né la parte, né maggioranza né minoranza. Esso è, piuttosto, ciò che non può mai 
coincidere con se stesso, né come tutto né come parte, ciò che infinitamente resta o resiste in ogni 
divisione, e – con buona pace di coloro che ci governano – non si lascia mai ridurre a una 
maggioranza o a una minoranza. E questo resto è la figura o la consistenza che il popolo prende 
nell’istanza decisiva – e, come tale, esso è l’unico soggetto politico reale.” Ibid. 58-59. 
674 Benjamin, “Paralipomena - Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” 1240. 
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Coda	–	A	tale	of	two	biennials		
 
The preceding pages have questioned concerning the digital cultural heritage archive 
and traced certain imaginaries relating to the archive, its technical foundation and 
instantiation and its political and academic strategies. These imaginaries have been 
formulated as springing from an archival promise – a promise of what can be 
attained with regard to knowledge and social organisation if only the archive 
achieved its fullness. These imaginaries have been conceptualised as the promise of 
archival and political pleroma as operating within the three-fold structure of access, 
evidence and control and along the three strategic axes of unity in diversity, 
collective identity and subjective creativity.  
 The described historical development found its point of culmination around 
2002, when UNESCO could proclaim the “new legacy” of digital heritage. Even 
though the new legacy is now supposedly in place, safely preserved and accessible 
within admirable archives such as larm.fm, the imaginaries relating to the oikonomia 
of archival and political pleroma continue to haunt. Although we now have the tools 
and the archives, the promise of pleroma is still operational as something to be 
fulfilled. This dissertation was prepared and written from March 2012 to August 2015. 
During that period, two instalments of the International Art Exhibition of la Biennale di 
Venezia were presented. Both carried titles and themes distinctly related to the 
present examination. The first, curated by Massimiliani Gioni in 2013, was called The 
Encyclopedic Palace and was inspired by Italian-American artist Marino Auriti’s 
hopes to build a 136-story building across sixteen blocks in Washington D.C to 
contain all the world’s knowledge. The second, curated by Okwui Enwezor in 2015, 
is called All the World’s Futures and is “devoted to a fresh appraisal of the 
relationship of art and artists to the current state of things.”675 The title of the first 
should remind us of Wells’ World Brain and Otlet’s twin projects for a centralisation of 
all knowledge in a single edifice in a single world city.676 The title of the second 
                                                            
675 Enwezor, “All the World’s Futures.” 
676 Cf. section 2.2.1. Auriti’s palace even shows certain aesthetic similarities to the palace envisioned 
by Hendrik Christian Andersen and Ernest Hébrard in collaboration with Otlet. 
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should evoke a conscious dynamic inversion of Resnais’s title Toute la mémoire du 
monde.677 Instead of universal memory, it is now a question of all possible futures. 
 Although a model of Auriti’s never constructed Palazzo Enciclopedico stood 
proud at the very beginning of the Arsenale exhibition, the edifice itself did not 
provide the theme for the biennial. Of interest was, rather, the imaginaries expressed 
in it: “the dream of universal, all-embracing knowledge” and the hope “to fashion an 
image of the world that will capture its infinite variety and richness.”678 Gioni clearly 
considered the dreams of Auriti and his semblables as “delusions of omniscience” 
but nevertheless engaged with such delusions by acknowledging the biennial form in 
general and the 2013 Venice version in particular as based on “the impossible desire 
to concentrate the infinite worlds of contemporary art in a single place: a task that 
now seems as dizzyingly absurd as Auriti’s dream.”679 
 The archival oikonomia and its promise of pleroma are deemed absurd but 
persist, nonetheless. Clearly, acknowledging the absurdity of the dream of archival 
pleroma as an impossible desire does not prevent engagement with archival 
oikonomia. The catalogue formed “le cerveau de la Bibliothèque Nationale”680 in 
Toute la mémoire du monde, and at the 2013 biennial “Catalogs, collections, and 
taxonomies form the basis for many works on view […]”681 Furthermore, Gioni’s own 
presentation of the exhibition seems almost like an index or catalogue with endless 
lists of participating names and works. Gioni presents the encyclopaedia of his 
exhibition in an almost feverish attempt to include everything in his archive, which 
reminds the reader of Blanchot’s beautiful criticism of beautiful names:  
 
“Inlassablement, nous édifions le monde, afin que la secrète dissolution, 
l’universelle corruption qui régit ce qui « est », soit oubliée au profit de 
cette cohérence de notions et d’objets, de rapport et de formes, claire, 
définie, ouvrage de l’homme tranquille, où le néant ne saurait s’infiltrer et 
                                                            
677 Cf. section 1.2. 
678 Gioni, “The Encyclopedic Palace.” 
679 Ibid. 
680 “Toute la mémoire du monde (scénario),” 71, cf. Section 1.3.1. 
681 Ibid. 
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où de beaux noms – tous noms sont beaux – suffisent à nous rendre 
heureux.”682  
  
 Gioni’s happy participation in the beautiful absurdity of fashioning a safe 
image of the world sprang from the desire to explore the “power of the imagination” 
inherent to these obsessions: The powerful imaginaries trying to establish relations 
between representations of organised knowledge and the complexity of the world, 
and between their ethopoietic and doxopoietic roles in “the representation and 
perception of the self” and “the subjective within the collective.” We have traced 
these imaginaries within the notion and the concept of the archive, from the 
beginning of the twentieth century to the convergence of technological development 
and the discourse of cultural heritage in the “new legacy” of digital heritage around 
the beginning of the new millennium. Further, we have described the desires and 
imaginaries related to the digital “thing” as we have located the multifaceted and ever 
elusive dance en abyme of the digital and its various manifestations in the concrete 
archive of larm.fm. Finally, we have explored the imaginaries within critical discourse 
of certain inherent emancipatory characteristics of specific archival orders.  
 For Gioni, the role of imagination in “the constant challenge of reconciling the 
self with the universe, the subjective with the collective, the specific with the general, 
and the individual with the culture of her time” seems “even more necessary and 
even more desperate” when faced with the current “constant flood of information,” 
“the blend of information, spectacle, and knowledge that is characteristic of the digital 
era.”683 The digital and its capacity for producing, transmitting and storing information 
truly appear to not only inspire but also necessitate new imaginaries.  
 Imagination as the creation of new and singular images seems be the thing 
for Gioni. Images serve to organise knowledge and shape our experience but “What 
room is left for internal images – for dreams, hallucinations and vision – in an era 
besieged by external ones? And what is the point of creating an image of the world 
when the world itself has become increasingly like an image?” It seems as though 
                                                            
682 Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, 46. This happiness evoked by Blanchot would be an excellent 
description of the happiness that concludes Toute la mémoire du monde. 
683 Gioni, “The Encyclopedic Palace.” 
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The Encyclopedic Palace and its multiple personal imaginary museums684 are 
intended to create new images to counter the ones externally imposed and 
predetermined. They should illustrate and examine “a condition we all share: we 
ourselves are media, channelling images, or at times even finding ourselves 
possessed by images.” We are all media and the dispositif has grown legs and 
started to walk. This condition seems unproblematic for Gioni as long as new images 
are created and the show goes on. The kenomatic operations of pleroma are fine as 
long as the empty operations of the contemporary are nourished with new images.  
 While Gioni’s introduction to his exhibition took Auriti’s 1955 patent filing as its 
historical point of departure, Enwezor chose the first Venice biennial in 1895, the 
year where Otlet and Lafontaine founded the Institut International de Bibliographie in 
order to establish their Répertoire bibliographique universel. Otlet and Lafontaine’s 
desires sprang from a decidedly internationalist aspiration of peaceful world 
government and, similarly, the first biennial at the Giardini was without national 
pavilions.685 Enwezor sees the Venice biennial as existing at the “confluence of many 
socio-political changes and radical historical ruptures across the fields of art, culture, 
politics, technology, and economics.”686 Just as Beniger argued that developments 
within what became computing “served to contain the control crisis of industrial 
society,”687 Enwezor seems to perceive the arrival of the Venice biennial as the 
response to a specific historical configuration: “[...] the institution of la Biennale di 
Venezia arrived on the world stage at a significant historic period, at a point when 
forces of industrial modernity, capital, emergent technologies, urbanization, and 
colonial regimes were remaking the global map and rewriting the rules of 
sovereignty.”688 
 The biennial rose out of a certain confluence, it bears its traces and it is 
uniquely suited to take account of what has happened since, i.e. the historical 
accumulation of those traces. En exergue, before the beginning of his text proper, 
Enwezor quotes the Angelus Novus-passage from thesis IX of “Über den Begriff der 
                                                            
684 The term “imaginary museum” is used both with regard to Auriti’s Palazzo and Cindy Sherman’s 
curatorial contribution. 
685 They did, however, arrive in 1907. 
686 Enwezor, “All the World’s Futures.” 
687 Beniger, The Control Revolution, Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society, 
16, cf. Section 3.7. 
688 Enwezor, “All the World’s Futures.” 
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Geschichte.” “Surveying these epic events from the vantage point of the current 
disquiet that pervades our time, one feels as if summoned by Paul Klee’s painting 
Angelus Novus.”689 Enwezor finds in the spectral Angelus the injunction to take 
account of the “State of things”: “How can the current disquiet of our time be properly 
grasped, made comprehensible, examined, and articulated?” Although no explicit 
reference is made, Enwezor is here decidedly Latourean. The exhibition should be 
considered a “Parliament of Forms,” a somewhat obvious reference to Latour’s 
concept of a Parliament of Things.690 This parliament is intended to properly grasp 
the historical complexity as accumulated in the present of the contemporary. 
 Section 3.8 criticised Latour’s use of the word “manage” as a means of 
control: “How do [things as assemblages] manage to bring in the relevant parties? 
How do they manage to bring in the relevant issues? What change does it make in 
the way people make up their mind to be attached to things?”691 The Parliament of 
Things is such an assemblage of assemblies; it is a way of taking account of 
assemblages and assemblies and thus constitutes Latour’s way of rethinking the 
political as a more subtle control of relations far from such “simplifying” notions as 
power and revolution. For Enwezor, the Parliament of Forms is a way of delving into 
“the contemporary global reality as one of constant realignment, adjustment, 
recalibration, motility, shape-shifting.”692 It is a mapping of relations as a way of 
giving evidence in order to, finally, obtain a controlling handle on chaos.  
 The parliament is not open to everyone, however, it is inhabited solely by the 
invited: “[...] the 56th Exhibition will solicit and privilege new proposals and works 
conceived specifically by invited artists […]” but it will also “activate works that are 
already existing.” Both the new and the old are consigned alike within the realm of 
the contemporary but only according to the archontic power of the curator at whose 
feet the grid is brought in motion. In Enwezor’s words one can almost hear a spectral 
echo of Malraux at the Salle Pleyel: “Et dans cette salle, ce soir, nous pouvons dire 
sans ridicule : « Vous qui êtes ici, vous êtes la première génération d’héritiers de la 
                                                            
689 Ibid. 
690 See for example Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, essai d’anthropologie symétrique, 
section 5.5. 
691 Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public,” 24. 
692 Enwezor, “All the World’s Futures,” my emphasis. 
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terre entière. »”693 Those invited have the privilege of giving account of the global 
state of things. Those invited to the parliament of forms, “[t]hese projects, works, and 
voices, like an orchestra will occupy the spaces of the La Biennale and pre-occupy 
the time and thinking of the public.” The N of the biennial archive consigns the H of 
art to not only occupy space but pre-occupy the time and thinking of |Sa’|.  
 Such a Parliament of Forms and its legal operation of a State of Things is, 
again, an empty operation, it is a kenomatic oikonomia: “a spatial and temporal 
manifestation that is relentlessly incomplete, structured by a logic of unfolding […] It 
will be a dramatization of the space of the exhibition as a continuous, unfolding, 
unceasing live event.” Logically structured, unfolding but never complete, 
unceasingly live: kenomatic oikonomia. It aspires for pleroma in a grasp of 
“contemporary global reality” but, similar to Gioni, Enwezor seems to acknowledge 
that the eschatological end of time is not imminent but nonetheless operational in the 
empty, never-ending unfolding. A beautiful, or, rather, horrifying, example of this 
signature live-ness is the live reading of Marx’s Capital. The work is celebrated for its 
ability to captivate thinkers and artists and “In All the World’s Futures, the aura, 
effects, and specters of Capital will be felt in one of the most ambitious explorations 
of this concept and term.” The live readings will “gradually expand into recitals of 
works, songs, librettos, readings of scripts, discussions, plenaries […]” and in the 
room the artists come and go, talking of Michelangelo. “On n’hérite jamais sans 
s’expliquer avec du spectre et, dès lors, avec plus d’un spectre”694, Derrida wrote, 
but the injunction is to choose and affirm, not to let the multiple voices recede into 
cacophony.  
 An inspiration for this “epic display of orality” is the initial injunction for a full 
reading of Capital in Lire le Capital: “But some day it is essential to read Capital to 
the letter. To read the text itself, complete, all four volumes, line by line […]”695 
Finally, learning how to read Capital. To the letter! Freud’s ecstatic dream where 
“l’origine alors parle d’elle-même. L’arkhé paraît à nu, sans archive. Elle se présente 
et se commente elle-même. « Les pierres parlent ! » Au présent. Anamnèse sans 
                                                            
693 Malraux, “Les Conquérants - Postface,” 273, cf. Section 5.8. 
694 Derrida, Spectres de Marx, l’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale, 46. 
See section 1.1.4. 
695 Althusser, Balibar, and Rancière, Lire le capital 1, 10. quoted in translation in Enwezor, “All the 
World’s Futures.” 
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hypomnèse !”696 Enwezor only mentions Althusser and Balibar among the authors. 
This would be a reference to the second edition from 1968. In the first edition from 
1965, there were, of course, others, Rancière prominent among them. Along with 
Pierre Macharey and Robert Establet, Rancière’s contribution had been removed 
from the second edition. They were no longer invited to the parliament deciding on 
the state of Marx. After 1968, Rancière famously distanced himself from Althusser, 
but he also distanced himself from the book, stating “What arrogance! Who were we 
to tell people how to read Marx?”697 Who were they to provide the N, or act the A as 
incorporation of N, for the otherwise ethopoietic practice of hupomnemata?
 Just as Ernst criticised Foucault for writing “archive” but practicing “library,”698 
one could criticise Enwezor for writing Benjamin but practicing Latour. In the manner 
described by Blanchot with regard to Malraux: The disappearance of prayer made 
painting an art within the reach of our eyes, it made the works accessible for 
appraisal, for a taking into account.699 Public access to the pre-established evidence 
of The Parliament of Things should make it possible to control the relentlessly 
incomplete logic of the unfolding of the world. But the wrenching from their erstwhile 
cultic context of auratic objects liberates only to re-inscribe them as storable 
resource (Bestand) in the contemporary cult of universal cultural heritage or, in the 
case of la Biennale, contemporary art.  
 Benjamin himself seems now to have become such a resource, one 
accessible for contemporary creative and innovative exploitation in the biennial 
(short) circuit.700 As argued in section 5.9, Benjamin’s injunction was exactly not a 
taking account of the state of things, an index or accumulation, but a stepping back 
from “the contemporary global reality” as the catastrophe of the status quo. This is 
the sad irony of Enwezor’s title: taking account of the state of things without the 
                                                            
696 Derrida, Mal d’archive, une impression freudienne, 144, cf. Section 5.2. 
697 Rancière, conversation in person. 
698 Cf. section 1.1.2. 
699 Cf. section 5.9. 
700 One of the more fortunate instances of Lacanian wordplay was his rendition of the current 
prevalent discourse, or what would be “le discours courant” in French, as “le disque-ourcourant,” see 
Lacan, Le Séminaire. Livre XX – Encore, 1972-1973, 35–36. The analytical discourse with its 
construction of new master signifiers is exactly what breaks with the empty repetition of short-
circuiting discourse. Similarly, the presented notion of an archaeology of the present is exactly what 
allows the diagnosis to establish a break with the status quo, although the presented notion of 
profanation disallows the reestablishment of master signifiers. 
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desire to break free from them has little to do with any future worthy of the name. In 
contrast to Enwezor’s Latourean appropriation of Benjamin, the present dissertation 
has presented Benjamin’s stepping back as an archaeology of the present to form 
the basis for a diagnosis of the present with the explicit goal of profanation, of 
breaking with the contemporary in order to bring about a time to come. But when all 
the world’s futures are inscribed in the contemporary, little hope is left. In Enwezor’s 
consignation, the Angelus Novus sees itself among the ruins. Its desire to turn back 
and save the ruins – to profane them by bringing them out of the operations of the re-
sacralising winds of progress, which fix the ruins as readily available Bestand in the 
temporal conjunction of the contemporary – is itself re-inscribed in the kenomatic 
operation of a progress without future. 
 Two lessons should be learnt from these two biennial presentations. First, it is 
not necessary to believe the imaginaries of pleroma for them to be kenomatically 
operational. Like Gioni, UNESCO doesn’t believe in pleroma. The World Heritage 
listing is clearly and explicitly a selection that will never consign everything. And no 
one, apart from possibly Chris Anderson, would believe that the full evidence of 
digital access and the related possibilities for control would actually manifest 
themselves. As Gioni pointed out, such imaginaries are absurd, Baudrillard even 
called them obscene,701 but they remain operational nonetheless. Within the 
oikonomia of pleroma, plethora will know only kenoma. 
 Second, it is distinctly possible and all too prevalent to evoke profanation in 
the service of re-sacralisation. In Benjamin, the ruins are not those of Riegl’s 
“Alterswert” open for appraisal and aesthetic pleasure to the cult of the monument. 
Nor are they, as in Hegel, the necessary means for the eschatological pleroma of the 
Weltgeist as “die substantielle Bestimmung, der absolute Endzweck, oder was 
                                                            
701 “Si tout cela était vrai, nous serions vraiment dans l’obscénité, c’est-à-dire dans la vérité nue, dans 
la prétention folle des choses à exprimer leur vérité. Heureusement, leur destin nous protège car au 
comble des choses, lorsqu’elles vont se verifier, toujours elles se réversibilisent, et retombent dans le 
secret.” Baudrillard, L’autre Par Lui-Même, 32. “Le discours de vérité est tout simplement impossible. 
Il s’échappe à lui-même. Tout s’échappe à soi-même, tout se joue de sa propre vérité, tout s’échappe 
du côté de la séduction. La rage de déshabiller la vérité, d’arriver à la vérité nue, celle qui hante tous 
les discours d’interprétation, la rage obscène de lever le secret est exactement proportionelle à 
l’impossibilité d’y arriver jamais.” Ibid. 64. 
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dasselbe ist, […] das wahrhafte Resultat der Weltgeschichte  […]”702 And they are 
not the fragments to be assembled in an account of the contemporary state of things. 
The heart-wrenching sadness of the Angelus springs from its impotence to derail this 
short-circuiting train of history. The power for such derailment belongs to messianic 
restitution of the past, not in eschatological but in messianic pleroma. And such 
restitution is the relation of every instant to the messianic community which knows no 
conjunction or disjunction, no “trait d’union,” and in which all legal and social 
presuppositions are rendered inoperable,703 i.e. where the dispositival separation of 
potential and actualisation, of zoe and bios, is no longer possible and only the Form-
of-Life704 as pure means without end remains.705  
 It seems that it is exceedingly difficult to avoid participation in the oikonomia of 
pleromatic imaginaries and not to re-inscribe the newly profaned under a new 
determination governing potentiality by consignation in the archival State of things. 
Both biennials rightly ask concerning the archive and its relation to the future but they 
fail to actually sufficiently distance themselves from the operations in question and 
simply end up illustrating them. And not just by the images they contain. The 
biennials themselves become an image of the kenomatic operation of pleroma in the 
contemporary. Their investigations become symptoms instead of a diagnosis.  
 In the kenomatic operations of eschatological pleroma in the contemporary 
there seems, indeed, always to be time to wonder “Do I dare” and, “Do I dare?” Time 
to turn back and descend the stair, to count the steps that lead to the future although 
such counting and accounting re-inscribes all the world’s futures into the empty 
operations of the contemporary in which the word “future” only operates its own 
foreclosure. We should, rather, seek a different time, the time that remains, the time 
                                                            
702 Georg W F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Die Vernunft in der 
Geschichte, 80, see Löwy, Fire Alarm : Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” 64–
65. 
703 See Agamben, Il regno e la gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell’economia e del governo. 
Homo sacer, 271. 
704 “Noi abbiamo pensato finora la politica come ciò che sussiste grazie alla divisione e alla 
articolazione della vita, come una separazione della vita da se stessa che la qualifica di volta in volta 
come umana, animale o vegetale. Si tratta ora di pensare invece una politica della forma-di-vita, della 
vita indivisibile dalla sua forma.” Agamben, L’uso dei corpi. Homo sacer, IV, 2, 263. 
705 Cf. “la sfera dei mezzi puri […] (cioè dei mezzi che, pur restando tali, si emancipano dalla loro 
relazione a un fine) come sfera propria della politica.” Agamben, “Avvertenza,” 10. We could translate 
the emancipation from a relation to an end as the emancipation from any possible re-inscription as 
Bestand. 
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where the question “Do I dare disturb the universe?” can emphatically be answered: 
By all means, and as pure means, let us disturb the universe. 
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Abstract	
 
The beginning of the new millennium saw the rise of what UNESCO called a "new 
legacy" of "digital heritage" and we have since witnessed tremendous efforts to build 
the archives to contain and profit from that legacy. It is, however, not an easy task to 
describe such a legacy and its archives. What is an archive? What is cultural 
heritage? How does one inherit culture? And what difference does it make if the 
archive is digital or not? This dissertation aims to explore the above questions, not to 
answer them individually, but to ask concerning the digital cultural heritage archive 
by tracing certain imaginaries relating to the archive, its technical foundation and 
instantiation and its political and academic strategies. These imaginaries are 
described as springing form an archival promise – a promise of what can be attained 
with regard to knowledge and social organisation if only the archive were to achieve 
its fullness. The various imaginaries are conceptualised as the promise of archival 
and political pleroma: an archival plenitude where everything is archived and the 
archival object reveals itself immediately and a political fulfilment, where society 
becomes identical with itself and there can be no two respectable and antagonistic 
opinions. The archival promise is argued to open various strategic domains in ways 
that require critical scrutiny to break free of the empty operations of pleroma.  
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Resumé	(in	Danish)	
 
I begyndelsen af det ny årtusind kunne man bevidne ankomsten af det, UNESCO 
kaldte et ”nyt eftermæle” i form af ”digital arv,” og der er siden gjort store indsatser 
for at bygge passende arkiver til at rumme den og til at drage nytte af den. Det er 
dog langt fra simpelt at beskrive en sådan arv og dens arkiver. Hvad er et arkiv? 
Hvad er kulturarv? Hvordan arver man kultur? Og hvilken forskel gør det, om arkivet 
er analogt eller digitalt? Afhandlingen søger at udforske disse spørgsmål, ikke ved at 
besvare dem enkeltvis, men ved at spørge til det digitale kulturarvsarkiv. 
Afhandlingen sporer visse forestillinger, der knytter sig til arkivet, dets tekniske 
fundament og udformning, såvel som de relaterede politiske og akademiske 
strategier. Disse forestillinger beskrives som udspringende af et arkivisk løfte – et 
løfte om, hvad der kan opnås i forhold til viden og social organisering, hvis bare 
arkivet kunne nå sin fylde. De forskellige forestillinger begrebsliggøres dermed som 
løftet om henholdsvis arkivisk og politisk pleroma: en arkivisk fylde, hvor alt er 
arkiveret, og det arkiverede objekt umiddelbart viser sig selv, og en politisk fylde, 
hvor samfundet bliver identisk med sig selv, og der ikke kan eksistere to acceptable 
forskellige og modstridende holdninger. Der argumenteres for, at det arkiviske løfte 
åbner for forskellige strategiske domæner, der fordrer kritisk granskning for at bryde 
fri af pleromas tomme operationer. 
